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Abstract 
Greenhouse Gases: Inventories, Abatement Costs and Markets for Emission 
Permits in European Agriculture – A Modelling Approach 
Ignacio Pérez Domínguez 
Greenhouse gas emissions from the agricultural sector are not yet fully included in the current 
international obligations on combating the effects of climate change. This is due to the fact that 
policy efforts have been mainly focused on carbon dioxide emissions from the energy and 
industry sectors. Nevertheless, the international community is already putting some pressure on 
scientific researchers to come up with reliable indicators to estimate emissions from other 
greenhouse gases. This further development towards integrative multi-gas strategy approaches 
has allowed the inclusion of the agricultural sector in the political agenda, where gases like 
methane and nitrous oxide present considerably higher shares than in other economic sectors. 
Modelling alternatives for the estimation of emission factors, definition of policy instruments for 
greenhouse gas emission abatement as well as measurement of their economic effects are at this 
stage quite important for the coming multilateral negotiations. With this purpose a modelling 
framework covering greenhouse gas emissions from agricultural sources is developed in this 
research study. At the first stage, greenhouse gas emission inventories for European regions are 
constructed with the help of an agricultural programming model, which is modified by 
integrating estimation methodologies of emission factors for agricultural emission sources 
recently published by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (United Nations). These 
are then used as base information for simulating at the regional level physical and economic 
effects of implementing uniform emission standards and tradable emission permits in European 
agricultural markets. Marginal abatement cost curves are also calculated for a wide range of 
emission objectives. The analysis shows how important is the combined selection of adequate 
instruments of emission abatement and feasible emission targets for the design of efficient 
emission reduction policies. 
Keywords: greenhouse gas emissions, Kyoto Protocol, agricultural modelling, CAP, standards, 
tradable permits, abatement costs. 
 

Kurzfassung 
Klimarelevante Gase: Emissionsbestände, Vermeidungskosten und Märkte für 
Emissionszertifikate in der europäischen Landwirtschaft – Ein Modellierungsansatz 
Ignacio Pérez Domínguez 
Emissionen klimarelevanter Gase aus der Landwirtschaft werden zur Zeit nicht vollständig in 
den aktuellen internationalen Verpflichtungen bezüglich der Auswirkungen des Klimawechsels 
berücksichtigt. Der Grund hierfür ist die Tatsache, dass die politischen Bemühungen sich 
hauptsächlich auf Kohlendioxid beziehen. Diesbezüglich sind sowohl der Energie- als auch der 
Industriesektor die Hauptverursacher. Trotzdem wird der Druck der internationalen 
Gemeinschaft auf die Wissenschaft größer, zuverlässige Indikatoren zu entwickeln, die die 
Emissionsauswirkungen anderer klimarelevanter Gase und Sektoren darstellen können. In der 
politischen Ausrichtung zielt diese Weiterentwicklung in Richtung einer integrativen 
Multigas-Strategie auch auf den Agrarsektor ab, da hier Gase wie Methan und Distickstoffoxid 
in höheren Mengen als in anderen ökonomischen Sektoren ausgestoßen werden. Die 
Quantifizierung der Emissionsfaktoren mit Hilfe von Modellierungsansätzen, die Bestimmung 
von politischen Instrumenten zur Verminderung klimarelevanter Emissionen, sowie die 
Abschätzung der daraus resultierenden ökonomischen Effekte, sind sehr wichtige 
Voraussetzungen für die kommenden multilateralen Verhandlungen. Zielsetzung dieser Studie 
ist es, einen Modellierungsrahmen zur Darstellung der klimarelevanten Emissionen in der 
Landwirtschaft zu entwickeln. Zunächst sind die vom internationalen wissenschaftlichen 
Ausschuss für Klimawandel (IPCC, Vereinte Nationen) kürzlich veröffentlichten 
Schätzmethoden zur Berechnung landwirtschaftlicher Emissionsfaktoren in ein 
Agrarsektormodell integriert. Somit werden für verschiedene europäische Regionen die Bestände 
klimarelevanter Gase ermittelt. Diese dienen dann als Basisinformation für die Simulation auf 
regionaler Ebene, mit welcher physische und ökonomische Effekte der Implementierung 
einheitlicher Emissionsstandards und Emissionshandel im Agrarsektor aufgezeigt werden 
können. Zudem sind Grenzvermeidungskostenkurven für eine große Auswahl von 
Emissionsbereichen berechnet. Die Analyse zeigt, wie wichtig die kombinierte Auswahl von 
Instrumenten zur Emissionsminderung und realistische Emissionsziele für die Gestaltung einer 
effizienten emissionsreduzierenden Politik ist. 
Schlüsselworte: klimarelevante Emissionen, Kyoto Protokoll, Agrarmodellierung, CAP, 
Emissionsauflagen, handelbare Emissionszertifikate, Vermeidungskosten. 
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CHAPTER 1 Introduction 
"It is believed that as long as the quality of input is right, the output is 
likely to be relevant; if the former is of dubious standing, the latter will 
have little chance of being relevant” (Rao, 2000, Preface). 
1.1 Introductory issues 
The climate change externality is nowadays increasingly seen as a relevant issue which 
encompasses cause-and-effect relationships in almost all sectors of the economy (inter-sectoral 
dimension) and world regions (inter-regional dimension). With the ratification of the Kyoto 
Protocol (KP) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) by 
Russia on the 4th of November 2004, the implementation of the currently most ambitious time 
plan towards the reduction of anthropogenic greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by industrialised 
countries has been formally initiated. The future environmental and economic effects of this 
piece of international legislation are, however, uncertain, particularly regarding their distribution 
along the afore-mentioned dimensions. The current research work addresses this issue and aims 
to close part of this information gap. 
1.2 Objectives of research 
The central objectives of this thesis are: 
(1) To estimate European GHG emission inventories with the help of an agricultural 
programming model. The main idea behind this is to mimic the structure and construction 
process of official national GHG emission inventories (NGHGIs) reported by UNFCCC 
parties within a single economic model. This should involve an endogenous calculation of 
activity and region specific emission coefficients for agricultural emission sources, based 
on the common methodology used by countries in their reporting obligations. For this 
objective, the use of a consolidated agricultural programming model at a European level is 
foreseen. 
(2) To estimate regional marginal abatement cost curves for GHG emissions as additional 
information tool for environmental policy regulation. Observed differences in regional 
production systems, and indirectly in regional GHG emissions, might have ‘attached’ 
different marginal costs of emission abatement. From this information some questions 
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could be answered: how can a certain emission reduction objective be optimally achieved?, 
how costly is it for the agricultural sector to fulfil this abatement goal?, and is it 
cost-effective for society to adopt a European-wide abatement policy or maybe there are 
signals for regulation at a regional level?. With this objective the optimal response of 
regional agricultural production systems to different abatement targets is modelled and 
marginal abatement costs (MACs) per region are estimated. 
(3) To model the use of tradable emission permits in European agriculture as a feasible 
instrument of emission abatement. In the last decade, tradable permits have been 
increasingly applied by national governments to target environmental emissions. Its use 
has been justified by its potential economic gains with respect to other instruments 
(e.g. emission standards). The European emission trading scheme (EETS) is set to start on 
January 2005 for CO2 emissions from industry and energy sectors. Some questions that 
might arise by looking at this example are: is this scheme also transferable to the 
agricultural sector when taking explicitly into account feasibility issues?, and, if 
implemented, what are the potential efficiency gains of tradable emission permits with 
respect to other type of instruments such as, for example, emission standards?. In order to 
answer these questions, a specific design for a market of emission permits in European 
agriculture is proposed and its potential income effects simulated by means of modelling 
tools. 
(4) To run simulation scenarios for different GHG emission mitigation policies considering 
price effects. Several mechanisms for emission abatement foreseen in the KP are modelled: 
a regional uniform emission standard, a burden-sharing agreement for agriculture 
(specific clause in the KP for European Member States) and a trading scheme of emission 
permits. In their comparison, the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and price feedback 
from the rest of the world are explicitly covered for the year 2001. This allows the 
consistent estimation of direct welfare effects derived from the implementation of the 
afore-mentioned emission mitigation policies (effects on agricultural income, consumers, 
taxpayers and processing industry). Further indicators, such as land use change, 
agricultural supply, level of emissions and price development are covered in detail for the 
stated scenarios. 
The conceptual design and justification for this study together with some background 
information on the current research topic are found in sections 1.3 to 1.5. 
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1.3 The economics of climate change 
'Uncertainty' requires working with parameter estimates, which are subject to significant biases. 
Human life has been inevitably dependant on the vagaries of climate changes and availability of 
natural resources. Many bio-physical models have been developed in the last decades trying to 
explain the rise in the earth's temperature or the concentration of gases in the atmosphere1. They 
differentiate between ‘naturally-induced’ and ‘human-induced or enhanced’ GHG effect. 
Although many inaccuracies and inconsistencies still appear as a form of 'remaining uncertainty', 
the balance of evidence suggests that there is a discernible human influence on global climate 
(IPCC, 1996, p. 5).  
The economics of climate change tries to analyse the enhanced greenhouse effect from an 
economic perspective, i.e. the effects on global warming of human economic development 
(through the emission of particular gases). Since 'uncertainty' is not completely overcome from a 
scientific perspective, economic models must be developed from a ‘precautionary’ perspective. 
By reducing climate relevant emissions, a slowing-down or even a reduction in the concentration 
of global warming gases is more likely to be achieved. With this idea in mind, the KP to the 
UNFCCC was launched in 1997 (UN, 1997) and every signatory received a quantified restriction 
on GHG emissions (see section 2.2.3). 
In this study, the ‘climate change’ externality is addressed from a economic perspective: 
modelling of GHG emissions, implementation options of different emission abatement 
instruments and welfare effects derived from climate policies. Climate change has been included 
in the current international political agenda as an increasing source of concern to society. It is 
therefore important to examine the economic effects of future action in this field. 
1.4  New ‘greening’ perspectives of the Common Agricultural Policy 
Agriculture is a highly regulated sector in Europe. The CAP defined in 1957 the objectives and 
instruments of a free market of agricultural products within the European Community and 
established protectionist policies that guaranteed sufficient revenues to European farmers, 
avoiding competition from products of third countries by granting agricultural prices (Treaty of 
Rome). This policy caused, among other problems, an increasing environmental degradation in 
certain regions due to an excess of agricultural supply and intensification of production. The 
need for reform was first noticed in 1992. The McSharry reform introduced several 
                                                 
1 A list of the most used Coupled Atmospheric-Ocean General Circulation Models (AOGCMs) is published by the 
Intergovernmental Panel of Climate Change (IPCC) under http://www.grida.no/climate/ipcc_tar/wg1/316.htm. 
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environmental payments as rewarding instruments for environmental benefits 
(e.g. extensification and afforestation payments). This was the first reform effort to attempt to 
move away from the traditional product support towards producer support. In 1999, the 
agreement on the Agenda 2000 Reform was reached and the concept of ‘cross-compliance’ 
introduced. The second pillar of the CAP (rural development) was reinforced and Member States 
were allowed to make direct aid payments conditional on compliance with environmental 
provisions. This path of reform was further revised in the third and last reform to date of the 
CAP, the Luxembourg Agreements of June 2003. ‘Modulation’ of premiums was introduced to 
shift financial resources from the first to the second pillar and further ‘decoupling’ of payments 
from production (subject to cross-compliance measures) was adopted. 
This history of reform in European agricultural policy highlights the need for revision of the 
objectives agreed in Rome: increases in productivity, assurance of a fair standard of living for 
the agricultural community, stabilisation of markets and food security (European Economic 
Community, 2002, article 33). On the one side, the European agricultural sector has reached a 
high level of technological progress and food security is no longer a domestic problem. On the 
other side, health and environmental issues have gained weight in people’s preferences. This has 
been mainly caused by recent incidences such as the Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy or foot 
and mouth crises and new scientific findings on the long-term effects of environmental pollution. 
The future fields of action in the CAP are therefore, among others: product traceability (quality 
control), water management (control of water scarcity in southern regions and nitrate and 
pesticides leaching in sensitive areas), air pollution (control of GHG and ammonia emissions), 
soil erosion (control of land abandonment) and market orientation (inter-sectoral horizon 
through economic and physical linkages with forest and industrial sectors). 
The current research study concentrates on European agriculture. A partial analysis is justified 
by the singularities of this sector, which is highly isolated from the rest of the economy through 
the afore-mentioned ‘umbrella’ of policy measures. Moreover, some other reasons justify the 
selection of this sector. Firstly, according to the estimates of the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC), agricultural activities in Europe contribute to about 10 % of European 
total GHG emissions (see section 2.2), therefore playing an important role in the concentration of 
GHGs in the atmosphere. Additionally, the complex agricultural policy network and the relative 
high availability of data in Europe offer a chance for modelling approaches in this field. Lastly, 
unlike other environmental externalities, climate change can be regarded within the European 
boundaries as a global externality, i.e. damages can be assumed to be equally distributed across 
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regions, so that ‘regional abatement costs’ are the principal determinant for emission abatement 
policies. 
1.5 A suitable methodological approach 
One of the most important questions to answer when choosing a methodological approach for the 
analysis of a specific issue is ‘if it matches the current need of research’. Actually, one of the 
recommendations of the 'Working Group 7 - Agriculture' within the European Climate Change 
Programme (COM (2000)88) was to connect emission reduction measures with concrete 
statistical data (Commission of the European Communities, 2000a, p. 15). With this purpose the 
CAPRI (Common Agricultural Policy Regionalised Impact) Modelling System2 is chosen and 
adapted. An additional environmental module should cover the estimation of GHG emissions 
and simulate the use of different instruments of emission abatement. The advantages of 
estimating GHG emissions within a solid modelling framework are: (1) a centralised pool of data 
which can be subject to tight consistency restrictions, (2) a common set of functions and similar 
assumptions for agricultural activities and sources and (3) a consistent calculation of emission 
parameters able to take account of the physical linkages between agricultural activities across 
Member State borders. The model is designed to reproduce official emission statistics in a 
baseline period and deliver simulation results for different impact scenarios. Policy 
recommendations might be extracted and used within the ongoing international negotiations on 
climate change. 
1.6 Structure of the thesis 
As the title indicates, this research work is divided in 3 main parts: estimation of regional GHG 
emission inventories in European agriculture, simulation of marginal abatement cost curves and 
modelling of a market of tradable emission permits. Additionally, the economic and 
environmental effects of several instruments of GHG emission abatement are simulated. 
Chapter 2 gives an overview of the global warming issue from an economic perspective and 
highlights the main climate-relevant externalities in agriculture (sections 2.2 and 2.3). Among 
other issues, it includes a review of the international legislation on GHG emission control and 
some of the modelling efforts applied to date to the estimation of agricultural GHG emissions. In 
section 2.5, the main modelling tool used in this research work, the CAPRI model, is thoroughly 
described. 
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Chapter 3 introduces the necessary technicalities for the estimation of regional GHG emission 
inventories. On the one hand, section 3.2 describes the equations and data flows used for a 
consistent estimation of agricultural emissions. On the other hand, the technical implementation 
in the model of the common accounting guidelines for single emission sources is analysed in 
section 3.3 and endogenously estimated emission factors presented. In section 3.4, selected 
aggregated results are compared with the official NGHGIs reported by European Member States 
to the UNFCCC. 
Chapter 4 contains a theoretical review on the use of emission abatement instruments and 
focuses on tradable emission permits for GHG emission abatement as a feasible option in 
agriculture. It begins with a historical overview of the implementation of pollution abatement 
instruments (section 4.2). Command-and-control and market-based instruments are confronted in 
section 4.3, the use of the latter being justified based on efficiency grounds. The basic economic 
theory and characteristics of tradable emission permit markets are introduced in section 4.4. 
Chapter 5 concentrates on the measurement of the economic costs faced by agricultural 
producers with the implementation of emission restrictions. In section 5.2, the concept of shadow 
value in mathematical programming models is introduced. The chapter builds upon this concept 
as a proxy to estimate marginal costs linked to GHG emission abatement and, in sections 5.3 and 
5.4, presents different methodological approaches for the estimation of marginal abatement cost 
curves (MACCs). In section 5.5, model results are presented for European regions. 
Chapter 6 deals with the implementation of a market of emission permits in the European 
agricultural sector. The European regulation on climate policy, with special focus on the 
emission trading directive (2003/87/EC), is thoroughly analysed in section 6.2. Based on this 
legislation, a potential market for emission permits in the European agricultural sector is then 
designed (section 6.3). In sections 6.4 and 6.5, the analytical implementation of an EETS in the 
CAPRI model is technically described, and results are analysed. 
In chapter 7 three selected emission mitigation policy strategies are simulated for European 
agriculture including price endogeneity: a regional uniform emission standard, a burden-sharing 
agreement and a market of emission permits. In section 7.2, simulation scenarios are described, 
with special consideration of the current KP abatement mechanisms. In section 7.3, several 
physical, environmental and economic indicators are analysed for these scenarios: emissions, 
supply, prices, income and, finally, welfare effects for the different economic agents implicated. 
                                                                                                                                                             
2 Web Site of the CAPRI Modelling System: http://www.agp.uni-bonn.de/agpo/rsrch/capri/capri_e.htm. A detailed 
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For this analysis, the main policy variables affecting agricultural markets are explicitly taken into 
account, both internal CAP regulations and trade policy instruments. In section 7.4, some 
conclusions are given. 
Chapter 8 introduces a short discussion on the limitations of the present study, the possible 
environmental effects of emission mitigation policies and the use of technological abatement 
options in agriculture. In chapter 9, the main conclusions to the study are summarised. 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
description is given in section 2.5. 
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CHAPTER 2 Climate Change and 
Agriculture 
"With the possible exception of another world war, a giant asteroid, or 
an incurable plague, global warming may be the single largest threat to 
our planet […]. On the other hand, there are those, some of whom are 
scientists, who believe that global warming will result in little more than 
warmer winters and increased plant growth. They point to the flaws in 
scientists’ measurements, the complexity of the climate, and the 
uncertainty in the climate models used to predict climate change […].In 
truth, the future probably fits somewhere between these two scenarios." 
(John Weier, NASA's Earth Observatory). 
2.1 Introduction 
The climate change phenomenon is a highly complex environmental issue that has become a 
great matter of concern in recent human history. The irreversible and uncertain consequences 
linked to it have pushed the international community to come up with some solutions in terms of 
emission reduction commitments and policy instruments. In this chapter, this environmental 
problem is analysed from the legal and economic perspectives and its importance for the 
agricultural sector highlighted. In section 2.1, general issues related to the global warming 
externality are addressed, including the important recent developments in international 
legislation. Section 2.2 gives an overview of the main linkages between agriculture and climate 
change from a twofold perspective: agriculture might suffer in the future from the consequences 
of an acute climate change (floods, high temperature variability) but at the same time is an 
important contributor to it, mainly through intensive farming practices. Section 2.3 includes a 
thorough literature review on the currently implemented modelling approaches to the estimation 
of GHG emission indicators for the agricultural sector. 
The Common Agricultural Policy Regionalised Impact (CAPRI) Modelling System is the basic 
tool of analysis in this study. It is an economic partial comparative-static equilibrium model 
designed primarily to analyse different policy simulation scenarios for European agriculture. For 
this research work, an expansion of the model towards the endogenous estimation of GHG 
emissions has been attempted. The general modelling system is presented in section 2.4 which 
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covers in detail its modular structure, data base issues and exogenous assumptions. In 
section 2.5, some conclusions are drawn on the advantages and disadvantages of this 
methodology for the construction of environmental indicators. 
2.2 The Global Warming Effect 
2.2.1 A historical perspective of climate change 
The term climate change refers to changes in the earth’s temperature, although 'climate' 
encompasses many other variables such as precipitation, clouds, etc. Climate change includes 
therefore natural and anthropogenic emissions, and global warming usually applies to 
temperature changes with predominantly anthropogenic influence, i.e. caused by human activity. 
The first references acknowledging the global warming effect are dated in the last decade of the 
19th century, with Arrhenius’ contributions. He described the warming or greenhouse effect as 
the imbalance between in and out infrared radiation in the atmosphere and analysed the possible 
contribution of fossil fuel combustion and industrial emissions of carbon dioxide to a 
human-induced greenhouse effect (Rao, 2000, p. 7). Recent studies have tried to measure the 
contributions of human activity in the last century to global warming (IPCC, 2001a). The hard 
task is to differentiate temperature variation derived from human activity from that derived from 
natural catastrophes that have occurred in the past such as, for example, glacial periods.  
There is a general consensus that global temperature has risen in the last century by around 
0.6 °C (IPCC, 2001b) and it is forecasted to increase until 2100 within a range of 1.4 °C to 
5.8 °C, depending on the simulation scenario used3. This short-term effect is mainly due to 
human activity, natural-induced changes not playing an important role. Moreover, global 
warming is not likely to be equally distributed, the southern parts of the planet facing more 
severe temperature peaks and also increasing temperature variability within regions and seasons. 
Relevant emissions causing the afore-mentioned temperature variations are the so called 
‘greenhouse gas emissions’: carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O) and 
fluorinated gases (HFCs, PFCs, SF6). These gases are classified by the IPCC according to their 
                                                 
3 The IPCC was established by the World Meteorological Organisation (WMO) and the United Nations 
Environment Program (UNEP). Its main task is to assess technical and economic information found in published 
technical reviews relevant to understand the scientific linkages of climate change. The IPCC defines six emission 
scenarios by introducing different variables like economic growth, evolution of global population, technological 
change. While the worst-case scenario considers rapid economic growth and intensive use of fossil fuels, the 
most optimistic one concentrates on flexible technological change, economic, social and environmental 
sustainability. 
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atmospheric lifetime and radioactive forcing4, scaling the data to a certain conventional lifetime 
period (usually 100 years), i.e. the so-called ‘global warming potential’ (GWP). Emissions are 
then expressed in relative terms, with CO2 units as the reference gas (see table (1)). By using this 
approach, emissions can be compared and homogeneously aggregated. 
Table (1) Global Warming Potentials (100-year estimates) 
Greenhouse Gas Symbol 1996 IPCC 
GWP
2001 IPCC 
GWP
Carbon Dioxide CO2 1 1
Methane CH4 21 23
Nitrous Oxide N2O 310 296
Trifluoroethane (HFC-23) CHF3 11.7 12
Pentafluoroethane (HFC-125) C2HF5 2.8 3.4
Tetrafluoroethane (HFC-134a) C2H2F4 1.3 1.3
Trifluoroethane (HFC-143a) C2H3F3 3.8 4.3
Difluoroethane (HFC-152a) C2H4F2 140 120
Heptafluoropropane (HFC-227ea) C3HF7 2.9 3.5
Hexafluoropropane (HFC-236fa) C3H2F6 6.3 9.4
Perfluoromethane CF4 6.5 5.7
Perfluoroethane C2F6 9.2 11.9
Sulfur Hexafluoride SF6 23.9 22.2  
Source: IPCC’s 2nd and 3rd Assessment Reports (IPCC, 1996; IPCC, 2001b). 
 
Table (1) shows different estimated GWPs for single GHGs and also addresses the 
improvements of science in the estimation of the global warming effect. The IPCC periodically 
updates these coefficients according to a better understanding of the physical and chemical 
processes involved. 
In the current study, only methane and nitrous oxide gases will be analysed since they account 
for most of GHG emissions in the European agricultural sector, carbon dioxide and fluorinated 
gases (HFCs, CFCs and PFCs) being mainly linked to industrial processes. 
In figure (1) trends on GHG emissions from 1990 to 2001 for the EU-15 are reported by the 
European Environmental Agency (EEA). Whereas total emissions in the whole period slightly 
                                                 
4 These gases do not remain eternally in the atmosphere, being removed physically (through rain), chemically 
(through reaction with radicals OH in the case of methane or photosynthesis of plants for carbon dioxide) and as a 
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decrease (-2.2 %), emissions under the rubric ‘agriculture’ drop from 434 to 400 Mio CO2eq 
(-7.7 %).  
Figure (1) Trends on greenhouse gas emissions for the EU-15 (1990-2001) 
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Source: EEA data service; CH4, N2O and CO2 gases expressed in Mio tonnes of CO2eq. 
 
This downward trend for the agricultural sector is consistent with the last policy reforms 
implemented in the EU within this period (‘McSharry’ in 1992 and ‘Agenda 2000’ in 1999): 
introduction of obligatory set-aside, environmental payments and reduction in subsidisation. 
Compared to emissions from other economic sectors, agriculture shows a share of 10 % on total 
emissions for year 2001 (see figure (2)). 
                                                                                                                                                             
consequence of a radioactive phenomenon (destruction of molecules through solar radiation in the case of 
halocarbons).  
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Figure (2) Greenhouse gas sectoral emissions for the EU-15 
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Source: EEA data service; year 2001; CH4, N2O and CO2 gases expressed in CO2eq. 
 
2.2.2 Legislation: international agreements 
In environmental legislation it is possible to differentiate between multilateral, regional and 
bilateral agreements. Bilateral or regional environmental agreements have usually small and 
highly localised effects, are signed between two or few parties respectively and apply preferably 
to non-transboundary pollution problems5. From a political economic perspective they offer a 
higher degree of flexibility since agreements between a limited number of negotiators are easier 
to achieve than in the multilateral case. The peculiarities of global warming, as a typical case of 
global externality, require a different solution. Emission abatement does not have to be localised 
in a specific region but requires the cooperation of a relevant number of parties. This is because 
(1) a significant percentage of emissions and polluters should be covered in order to achieve 
positive results for the environment, and (2) in large agreements free-riding is considerably 
reduced6. It is for this reason that in the last two decades several legislative efforts at multilateral 
level have been developed in this field, as summarised in table (2): 
                                                 
5 There is a strong relationship between how much a country pollutes and how much pollution is deposited within its 
national borders, i.e. the negative externality is ‘geographically bounded’.  
6 Free-riders in this case are those countries not taking part in a certain agreement but which benefit from it (e.g. less 
periods of droughts in the future through reductions in emissions). 
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Table (2) Multilateral international agreements on climate change 
Date of 
Agreement
Date of entry 
force
Place of 
Agreement Title of Agreement Parties
22.03.1985 22.09.1988 Vienna Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer 188 
a
16.09.1987 01.01.1989 Montreal Montreal Protocol on Substances that deplete the Ozone Layer 187 
a
09.05.1992 01.08.1994 New York United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 189 
b
36 Annex I c
93 Non-Annex I c
11.12.1997 18.02.2005 d Kyoto Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change  
a Last modified on: 4th October 2004. Amendments to the Montreal Protocol: 1990 (London, 175 signatories), 1992 
(Copenhagen, 164 signatories), 1997 (Montreal, 120 signatories) and 1999 (Beijing, 83 signatories). 
b Last modified on: 24th May 2004. 
c Last modified on: 25th November 2004. 
d Last modified on: 18 November 2004. Russia deposited its instrument of ratification with the United Nations. This 
marked the start of a 90 days countdown to the entry in force of the KP (16th February 2005). 
 
The Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer was the first international attempt 
to address the consequences of climate change on human health and the environment on a global 
scale. In 1981, the UN Council set up a working group whose aim was to secure a general treaty 
to stop ozone depletion, by encouraging research, cooperation among countries and exchange of 
information (UN, 1985). One of the main scientific findings was that the modification of the 
vertical distribution of ozone through photochemical reactions caused by several anthropogenic 
gases could have potential consequences for weather and climate on the earth. The Convention 
was agreed in 1985 and entered into force in September 1988, ‘on the nineteenth day after the 
date of deposit of the twentieth instrument of ratification’. Its importance lies in being one of the 
first applications of the ‘precautionary principle’ to a global environmental externality, 
i.e. precautionary measures were agreed by the parties, although dose-response effects in ozone 
depletion were not yet fully understood: ‘prevention first, science second’. 
The Montreal Protocol on Substances that deplete the Ozone Layer to the Vienna Convention 
was agreed in 1987 and entered into force in 1989 after being ratified by eleven states or regional 
integration organisations representing at least two thirds of 1986 estimated global consumption 
of the controlled substances (UN, 1992a). The Montreal Protocol is considered one of the most 
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successful environmental protection agreements in the world7. The Protocol sets out a mandatory 
timetable for the phasing out of single ozone depleting substances (article 2A to 2I) and 
acknowledges that the provision of additional financial resources is required to meet the needs of 
developing countries (article 5). Trade of these substances with non-parties is also banned within 
a tight schedule (article 4). This timetable has been under constant revision, with phase-out dates 
accelerated in accordance with scientific understanding and technological advances (see 
appendix 1). Recent scientific findings indicate that the Protocol measures are starting to achieve 
the expected results, with a slowing of the rate of ozone depleting substances entering the 
atmosphere. Assuming that all countries continue to meet the Protocol’s timetable, ozone 
depletion is expected to stabilise in the short-term and start to recover by about 2050 (The 
Economist, 1997). 
In 1994 the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) entered into 
force, after being ratified by fifty states or regional economic integration organisations (UN, 
1992b). It is the only treaty related to the control of global warming gases after the Vienna 
Convention. In contrast to the latter which concentrates on ultraviolet radiation from ozone 
depletion, the UNFCCC refers only to the effects of anthropogenic emissions on temperature 
change. It comprises as well a complex set of articles which define commitments and reporting 
obligations for its parties. This information is summarised in figure (3): 
                                                 
7 With the signature of Afghanistan on the 17.06.2004.188 parties have ratified, accepted or approved the Vienna 
Convention and 187 the Montreal Protocol (Equatorial Guinea has not yet joined the latter). 
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Figure (3) Commitments and reporting obligations of the UNFCCC 
• Detailed description of policies/measures adopted 
• Estimation of effects of anthropogenic emissions
• Details on measures of
assistance to developing
country Parties
Annex II parties 
&
Developed country 
parties
REPORTING
OBLIGATIONS
(Art. 12)
Annex I parties 
&
Developed country 
parties
Developing country 
parties
COMMITMENTS
(Art. 4)
• Adoption of national policy / mitigation measures
• Additional financial resources for compliance of 
developing country Parties
• Assistance for adaptation in vulnerable zones *
• Flexibility for transition economies (Annex I) 
Discretional
• National Inventory of anthropogenic emissions (not in Montreal Protocol)
• Description of steps taken/envisaged to implement the Convention
• Other relevant information
 
Source: based on the UNFCCC legislative text (UN, 1992b). 
* Refers to countries particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change 
 
In article 4 of the UNFCCC, the general commitments on reporting of anthropogenic emissions 
and cooperation among developed countries in the formulation of measures to ‘control, reduce or 
prevent climate change’ are described. It also foresees the complementarity of this text with the 
previous legislation, by only affecting GHGs not controlled by the Montreal Protocol. A detailed 
description of policy measures and necessary steps related to the implementation of the 
convention is foreseen in article 12. A sharp distinction is made between developed countries 
(Annex II countries), countries in transition to a market economy (Annex I countries not in 
Annex II) and developing countries in terms of their commitments and reporting obligations (see 
appendix 2 and appendix 3).  
Article 7 defines the Conference of Parties (COP) as the supreme body of the Convention which 
shall keep under regular review the adoption of instruments and legal texts of the Convention, 
and promote its effective implementation. A list of all the COPs and the main issues achieved in 
each one of them within a historical perspective is given in table (3). 
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Table (3) Conference of parties of the UNFCCC 
COP Location Date Main issues
COP-1 Berlin, Germany March/April 1995
Agreement on the inadequacy of the UNFCCC to meet its goals: need to quantify 
emission reductions within set time periods. Agreement on pilot phase of 
activities implemented jointly (AIJ) between Annex I and non-Annex I countries
COP-2 Geneva, Switzerland July 1996
Lack of unanimous agreement on the IPCC Second Assessment Report, failure to 
agree on voting procedures 
COP-3 Kyoto,        Japan December 1997
Signature of the Kyoto Protocol: legally binding commitment on 58 
industrialized countries plus the European Community to limit or reduce the 
emissions of six greenhouse gases
COP-4 Buenos Aires, Argentina November 1998
Emergence of a 2-year Plan of Action to strengthen the implementation of the 
UNFCCC and prepare the entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol. Agreement on 
substantial progress towards joint activities.
COP-5 Bonn,     Germany November 1999
Preparation of UNFCCC guidelines on reporting and review. Preparation of the 
COP-6, which should focus on modalities of the Kyoto mechanisms
COP-6 The Hague, Netherlands November 2000
No agreement, conference postponed. Discussion mainly centered on the 
treatment of carbon sinks and Kyoto mechamisms, implementation of 
enforcement penalties and implication of developing countries.
COP-6/2 Bonn,     Germany July 2001
Historical political deal clarifying most of the uncertainties about whether the 
Kyoto Protocol would work. Parties were able to agree on the process of 
ratification and implementation of the Kyoto Protocol and initiate internal 
negotiations in the respective national Parlaments.
COP-7 Marrakesh, Morocco
October/ 
November 2001
Agreement on the rules governing the implementation of the Kyoto mechanisms, a 
comprehensive compliance procedure and detailed rules on the accounting, 
reporting and review of emissions.
COP-8 New Delhi,   India
October/ 
November 2002
Progress on national communications and financial obligations for developing 
countries. Agreement on the rules for clean development mechanism registries, 
and legal and institutional relationships between Protocol and Convention bodies.
COP-9 Milan, Italy December 2003
Agreement on the remaining rules of the Kyoto Protocol mechanisms. Protocol 
ready to entry into force.
COP-10 Buenos Aires, Argentina December 2004
10th anniversary of the entry into force of the Framework Convention on Climate 
Change. Adoption of the Buenos Aires Programme of Work on Adaptation and 
Response Measures  
Source: own analysis based on the legal texts. 
 
2.2.3 The Kyoto Protocol: recent developments 
The KP was signed on the 11th of December 1997 at the COP-3 in Kyoto, Japan. In its article 3, 
countries included in the Annex I of the UNFCCC (see appendix 2) agreed to a 5 % reduction 
objective of their aggregate anthropogenic GHG emissions with respect to the 1990 base 
emission levels in the first commitment period 2008-200128. Reduction commitments range 
from a -8 % cut for the EU-15, with a redistribution of this target across Member States 
                                                 
8 Gases affected are listed in the Annex A of the Protocol (see appendix 4) and individual targets for Annex I 
countries in the Annex B (see appendix 5). 
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according to the so-called ‘burden sharing agreement’ (BSA), to a 10 % increase for Iceland. For 
this purpose, Annex I countries have to adopt a national system for the estimation of emissions 
and reduction of all GHGs not controlled by the Montreal Protocol (article 5). Reporting of 
annual national GHG emission inventories is an important feature so that emissions by sources 
and removals by sinks associated with those activities are reported in a transparent and verifiable 
way. 
The KP introduced several innovative mechanisms to help Annex I countries meet their targets at 
a lower cost. These are known as Joint Implementation (JI), Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM), and International Emission Trading (IET). Through the JI mechanism investors and 
partners from Annex I countries are allowed to transfer to or acquire from any other such party 
emission credits, the so-called Emission Reduction Units (ERUs), resulting from projects aiming 
at reducing anthropogenic emissions (article 6 of the KP). These projects have to be 
supplemental to domestic action for the purposes of meeting commitments under Article 3. The 
CDM was created as a successor to the previously described instrument and consists of bilateral 
agreements between developed and developing countries to complete GHG mitigation projects in 
the latter. The purpose of the CDM is to help parties not included in the Annex I achieve a 
sustainable development and, at the same time, to assist Annex I countries with their reduction 
commitments through the acquisition of Certified Emission Reductions (CERs) coming from 
such project activities (article 12 of the KP). This instrument should enhance the cooperation 
between developed and developing countries in climate policy. Finally, IET is also foreseen by 
the Protocol as a flexible mechanism for countries included in the Annex B to fulfil their 
commitments (article 17 of the KP). According to this instrument, industrial countries receive 
emission permits equivalent to their emission reduction objectives in the first commitment period 
and are allowed to trade them. Markets for permits will be analysed in more detail in chapter 6. 
The KP negotiations left a considerable number of issues to be completed in the post-Kyoto 
negotiation process. While the compliance system and mechanisms of abatement were basically 
agreed, their operational details were not defined and further work was required on emissions 
and sinks from land use, land use change and forestry (LULUCF activities). Several of these 
issues have been successfully addressed in the following COPs and meetings of the subsidiary 
bodies (articles 9 and 10 of the UNFCCC). With respect to agriculture, in June 2004 the 
subsidiary body for scientific and technological advice (SBSTA) of the UNFCC achieved 
important advances in the elaboration of common reporting format (CRF) tables for LULUCF 
modalities (Bonn, Germany). An increasing recognition in the international community of the 
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importance of agricultural and forestry activities, and non-CO2 gases towards an effective 
climate policy was reflected in the conclusions. 
The KP entered officially into force on the 16th of February 2005. In March 2005, 144 countries 
responsible for around 61.6 % of global CO2 emissions have acceded to, ratified, approved or 
accepted the KP9. The conditions required by the protocol to entry into force were fulfilled with 
the signature of the Russian Federation on the 18th of November 2004: 55 countries emitting at 
least 55 % of world 1990 CO2 emissions. The prospects for an effective implementation of the 
KP are good but still lack the ratification of the USA, which emits 36 % of global CO2 
emissions. 
2.2.4 Economic aspects of climate change 
The launching of the Kyoto economic instruments is an implicit recognition of the importance of 
economics in environmental policy-making. According to Rao simultaneous operations of a 
multitude of economic agents and the dynamics of bio-economic systems are some of the factors 
that must be considered in any realistic appraisal of the economic parameters (…) in the 
presence of environmental unknowns (Rao, 2000). In other words, many of the traditional 
assumptions regarding private-sector economics in ascertaining costs and benefits do not hold 
under environmental constraints because the value of the environment is not taken into account. 
In the following lines, the main concepts relevant to climate change economics are briefly 
explained: scarcity, adaptation, uncertainty and time horizon. 
− In economics resource scarcity is defined as the positive difference between the desire and 
the demand for a good. This means that a good is scarce if people would consume more of it 
if it were free (in the presence of markets) or if it were available (in the absence of markets). 
In a closed system like the earth, under the current circumstances, ‘normal climate 
conditions’ are not a free resource any more. None of the environmental adjustments needed 
to combat the global warming effect are free of costs, although these may not be entirely 
monetary in the market sense. Climate protection policies, e.g. markets for GHG emission 
permits, try to define property rights and liability systems and put a price on this 
environmental scarcity. 
                                                 
9 Stand of the KP thermometer: http://unfccc.int/essential_background/kyoto_protocol/status_of_ratification/ 
items/3134.php (March 2005). 
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− Adaptation. Climate change in a global context also incorporates vulnerability issues, the 
demand side of the problem (IPCC, 2001a). Assuming that climate change is unavoidable to 
a certain extent, adaptation to it in the long term puts an economic burden on the 
international community. The net present value of damages that arise from the emission of a 
gas, such as productivity losses or human health problems (also partially uncertain), would 
also have to be covered by the revenues achieved in today’s climate policy. As in any other 
environmental issue there are gainers and losers and most likely an unequal distribution of 
damages will result. It is at this stage where adaptation meets mitigation. 
− Uncertainty is the failure to know something that might be relevant for an economic 
decision. The climate change externality has a risk component since its real consequences are 
not perfectly known. Whereas the KP sets a time path in the medium-term for the 
achievement of an environmental good in the long-term, it is uncertain that this effort will 
achieve the expected results in terms of a ‘sufficient’ reduction in the atmospheric GHG 
concentration. The level of uncertainty can only be reduced through a better understanding of 
the weather phenomena and its long-term effects. 
− Time horizon. The radiation time of well-mixed gases is incorporated in the global warming 
potential concept and must be considered in the environmental assessment of a mitigation 
project’s lifetime. Moreover, discounting issues have an important effect on a project’s 
valuation. 
2.3 Main climate-relevant externalities in agriculture 
‘Agriculture and climate are mutually dependent’. Agriculture is an important source of 
environmental benefits and can play an important role in climate change regulation (e.g. through 
carbon sequestration). Moreover, agricultural activities can be a contributor to and a recipient of 
the effects of a changing climate (Rosenzweig, Hillel, 1998). Both these beneficial and negative 
effects, the latter from a production or consumption perspective of an environmental good, are 
unfortunately not captured by the market and result in market failure (Schimmelpfennig et al., 
1996). 
On the one hand, agriculture is an important source of environmental benefits. The use of best 
management practices and integrated farming systems protect soil fertility and stability, increase 
carbon sequestration and reduce the incidence and severity of natural disasters such as floods and 
landslides. These positive benefits should be seen as a ‘potential’ for targeted climate change 
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mitigation policies and might justify public assistance to producers such as technical and 
financial aid. On the other hand, agricultural production is also a direct and indirect contributor 
of GHG emissions, mainly methane and nitrous oxide, through concentrated livestock 
production, pesticide and fertiliser use, deforestation, drainage of wetlands and soil erosion from 
cropland. Moreover, from the ‘vulnerability’ perspective (regarding agriculture as a sector 
dependent on the environmental good ‘climate’) long-term effects of climate change are likely to 
have a negative effect on agricultural production. Fluctuations in weather patterns could have 
extreme impacts on agricultural production, slashing crop yields and forcing farmers to adopt 
new agricultural practices in response to altered conditions. Whereas a temperature rising will 
expand the area of cereals cultivation in the colder regions of the globe and an increase of CO2 
concentration will have a positive effect on yields, drier conditions will reduce the growing 
season and enhance water requirements. Overall, climate change may lead to water stress, lower 
yields and the need for new varieties and cultivation methods (IPCC, 2001a). 
There is, however, a complex debate around the scientific evidence of climate change (Centre for 
the Study of Carbon Dioxide and Global Change, USA; School of International Service, 
American University, USA; Argentinian Foundation for a Scientific Ecology, Argentina). These 
institutions, among others, refute today’s scientific basis for climate change and the significant 
effect of human behaviour on it. In fact, they stress that scientific knowledge about climate 
change is limited and data are poor and not of sufficient quantity and quality to support a 
rigorous scientific debate. It is therefore important to pay attention to this controversy and ensure 
within the current climate change international negotiations more and better data for the future. 
Policy-makers will decide, upon this information, if evidence for such a change exists and what 
should be done about it. With this purpose, the development of models to estimate confidently 
the impacts of agriculture on climate change and vice-versa is critically important. They provide 
the information needed for the design of sector-specific mitigation policies and at the same time 
help agricultural producers to develop their own long-term responses to climate change within a 
certain policy context. 
2.4 Modelling climate change indicators for agriculture 
In the last two decades, the combination of economics and bio-physics has proven to be a 
feasible approach in the analysis of environmental policies. Several economic models have been 
recently developed in order to estimate climate change indicators in the agricultural sector. 
An interesting economic model applied to the measurement of GHG emissions through the 
integration of bio-physical parameters is the US Agricultural Sector Model (ASM). It was 
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designed as a regionalised model whose main objective was to simulate the effects of various 
changes in agricultural resource use or availability (Chang, McCarl, 1992). It is characterized by 
a welfare maximization objective function, where regional consumer and producer rents for the 
main crop and livestock activities, production costs, fixed resources (land, water and labour) and 
premiums are included. In the ASM, available technologies are represented through production 
budgets (fixed input-output combinations) and crop rotations are explicitly modelled. For 
simulation purposes, regional area allocation is constrained by ‘crop-mix equations’ which 
couple factor-production possibilities with historical cropping records. The ASMGHG (US 
Agricultural Sector and Greenhouse Gas Mitigation Model) expands this model and analyses 
GHG emission mitigation options by incorporating several agricultural management options 
(Schneider, 2000). Emissions and sinks by source are estimated for the US agricultural sector 
and simulation scenarios for different mitigation options and carbon prices constructed. 
A second economic model used to assess the impacts of agri-environmental policy on GHG 
emissions is the AROPAj model (Jayet et al., 2000). This model was developed by the Institut 
National de la Recherche Agronomique France (INRA) to evaluate the economic impacts of 
agricultural and environmental policies first in France and afterwards extended to the EU. It 
comprises a classical linear programming supply model where agricultural income is maximised 
at the regional level subject to agronomic requirements and policy restrictions. It covers crop, 
animal and feeding activities and is based on representative farm types from the Farm 
Accountancy Data Network (FADN). In recent years, GHG emissions and sinks by source have 
been calculated by following both the IPCC methodology and some technical references 
(econometric estimation based on published parameters). 
2.5 The CAPRI Modelling System 
For the purposes of this study the CAPRI model is chosen as the main instrument of analysis. It 
is a spatial economic model that makes use of non-linear mathematical programming tools to 
maximise regional agricultural income with explicit consideration of the CAP instruments of 
support in a wide context (price interactions with other regions of the world are taken into 
account). Moreover, it makes use of bio-physical data to construct environmental indicators. Its 
main characteristics are explained in detail in this section. 
2.5.1 History of the model 
The CAPRI model was first developed in the context of the 4th EU Framework Program 
(FAIR3-CT96-1849) within the period 1997-1999 and coordinated by the Institute for 
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Agricultural Policy of the Bonn University. It comprised a network of four main partners and 
further sub-partners in order to cover all EU-15 Member States. In 1999, the system was first 
tested on an ‘Agenda 2000 reform’ simulation run and the concept and main results presented. 
After a short phase of consolidation, the model was further developed within a new framework 
project titled CAP-STRAT, Common Agricultural Policy Strategy for Regions, Agriculture and 
Trade (QLTR-2000-00394), which was developed during the period 2000-2004. In this period, 
several objectives were achieved: a complete update of the data base, the implementation of 
important methodological improvements in the market component of the CAPRI model, a 
thorough validation of the complete system and the construction and analysis of several policy 
scenarios10. 
A third phase of model development has been initiated for the period 2004-2007 within the 6th 
EU Framework Program (STREP 501981). The Specific Targeted Research Project 
CAPRI-DynaSpat (Common Agricultural Policy Regional Impact Assessment – The Dynamic 
and Spatial Dimension) aims at ex-ante policy assessment of the CAP by maintenance and 
application of the existing model and its improvement in several directions11. 
2.5.2 General system layout 
This model was designed from the beginning as a complex projection and simulation tool for the 
agricultural sector based on: 
− An activity-based breakdown of regional agricultural production (about 50 activities) and 
farm and market balances (60 products and 35 inputs). 
− A physical consistency framework covering balances for agricultural area, young animals, 
feed requirements for animals and nutrient requirements for crops (requirement functions are 
modelled as constraints in the regional supply models). 
− Economic accounting principles according to the definition of the Economic Accounts for 
Agriculture (EAA). All outputs and inputs included in the national agricultural accounting 
systems for the Member States are included and revenues and costs are broken down 
consistently by regions and by production activities. 
                                                 
10 Note: the current study has been financed by the CAP-STRAT project. 
11 Relevant information on the description and different development phases of the model can be found on the main 
CAPRI web site: http://www.agp.uni-bonn.de/agpo/rsrch/capri/capri_e.htm. The final report of the CAPRI 
project can be found under http://www.agp.uni-bonn.de/agpo/rsrch/capri/finrep.pdf. 
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− A detailed policy description. The regional supply models capture all relevant payment 
schemes with their respective ceilings as well as set-aside obligations and sales quotas. The 
market component includes tariff rate quotas, intervention purchases and subsidised exports. 
The policy of non-EU regions is based on data from the OECD (Junker et al., 2003). 
− Behavioural functions and allocation mechanisms strictly in line with micro-economic 
theory. Functional forms are chosen to be globally well-behaved, allowing for a consistent 
welfare analysis. 
In CAPRI supply and market modules are distinguished. They are iteratively coupled to allow 
for a feasible computation of the model. 
2.5.3 The supply module 
In the supply module, regional agricultural supply of annual crops and animal outputs is 
modelled by an aggregated profit function approach under a limited number of constraints: land, 
policy restrictions such as sales quotas and set-aside obligations and feeding restrictions based on 
requirement functions. The underlying methodology assumes a two-stage decision process. In 
the first stage, producers determine optimal variable input coefficients per hectare or head 
(nutrient needs for crops and animals, seed, plant protection, energy, pharmaceutical inputs, etc.) 
for given yields, which are determined exogenously by trend analysis (data from EUROSTAT). 
Nutrient requirements enter the supply models as constraints and all other variable inputs, 
together with their prices, define the accounting cost matrix12. In the second stage, the 
profit-maximising mix of crop and animal activities is determined simultaneously with 
cost-minimising feed and fertiliser in the supply models. Availability of grass and arable land 
and the presence of quotas impose a restriction on acreage or production possibilities13. 
Moreover, crop production is influenced by set-aside obligations and animal requirements 
(e.g. gross energy and crude protein) are covered by a cost-minimised feeding combination. 
Fertiliser needs of crops have to be met by either organic nutrients found in manure (output from 
animals) or in purchased fertiliser (traded good). This part of the model is explained in more 
detail in chapter 3. 
                                                 
12 The process mimics the calculation of gross margins in farm management. 
13 Agricultural land is considered a fixed resource in the model and divided in arable land and grassland. It is 
distributed according to cropping shares, crop rotations not being explicitly considered a restriction in the model. 
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2.5.4 The market module 
The market module breaks down the world into 12 country aggregates or trading partners14, each 
one featuring systems of supply, human consumption, feed and processing functions. The 
parameters of these functions are derived from elasticities borrowed from other studies and 
modelling systems and calibrated to projected quantities and prices in the simulation year. 
Regularity is ensured through the choice of the functional form (a normalised quadratic function 
for feed and supply and a generalised Leontief expenditure function for human consumption) and 
some further restrictions (homogeneity of degree zero in prices, symmetry and correct 
curvature). Accordingly, the demand system allows for the calculation of welfare changes for 
consumers, processing industry and public sector (see analysis in chapter 7). Policy instruments 
in the market module include bilateral tariffs and producer or consumer subsidy equivalent price 
wedges (PSE/CSE). Tariff rate quotas (TRQs), intervention sales and subsidised exports under 
the World Trade Organisation (WTO) commitment restrictions are explicitly modelled for the 
EU-15 (Junker et al., 2003). 
In the market module, special attention is given to the processing of dairy products in the EU. 
First, balancing equations for fat and protein ensure that these make use of the exact amount of 
fat and protein contained in the raw milk. The production of processed dairy products is based on 
a normalised quadratic function driven by the regional differences between the market price and 
the value of its fat and protein content. Then, for consistency, prices of raw milk are decomposed 
into their fat and protein content valued with fat and protein prices. 
The market module comprises of a bilateral world trade model based on the Armington 
assumption (Armington, 1969). According to Armington’s theory, the composition of demand 
from domestic sales and different import origins depends on price relationships according to 
bilateral trade streams. This allows the model to reflect trade preferences for certain regions 
(e.g. Parma or Manchego cheese) that cannot be observed in a net-trade model. A two stage 
Armington system is adopted: on the top level, total demand is divided into imports and domestic 
sales and, on the lower level, different import shares from different origins are determined. The 
resulting layout of a market for a country/aggregate is shown in figure (4). 
                                                 
14 EU-15, East European Candidate Countries, Mediterranean countries, U.S., Canada, Australia & New Zealand, 
Free trade developing countries, High tariff traders (as Japan), India, China, ACP countries, Rest of the World. 
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Figure (4) Graphic presentation of a spatial market system for one region 
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Source: description of the CAPRI model in Britz et al., 2003. 
 
According to the Armington assumption, markets for different agricultural products in different 
regions are linked to the observed import streams and import prices in the base year15. 
Accordingly, no uniform world market price is found in the system. 
2.5.5 Link between the supply and market modules 
As previously mentioned, the equilibrium in CAPRI is obtained by letting the supply and market 
modules iterate with each other. In the first iteration, the regional aggregate programming 
models (one for each Nuts 2 region) are solved with exogenous prices. Regional agricultural 
income is therefore maximised subject to several restrictions (land, fertiliser need, set-aside, etc). 
After being solved, the regional results of these models (crop areas, herd sizes, input/output 
coefficients, etc.) are aggregated to Member State level models, which are then calibrated using 
Positive Mathematical Programming (PMP) estimation techniques. Young animal prices are 
determined by linking these calibrated Member State models into a non-spatial EU trade model 
with market balances for young animals, as shown in figure (5). In the second iteration, supply 
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and feed demand functions of the market module are first calibrated to the results from the 
supply module on feed use and production obtained in the previous iteration. The market module 
is then solved at this stage (constrained equation system) and the resulting producer prices at 
Member State level transmitted to the supply models for the following iteration. At the same 
time, in between iterations, premiums for activities are adjusted if ceilings defined in the 
Common Market Organisations (CMOs) are overshot. 
Figure (5) Link of modules in CAPRI 
Market Module
• Multi-commodity
spatial market model
• 11 regional world
aggregates and EU-15 
Member States
Supply Module
• 200 regional 
optimisation models
(Max. ag. income
s.t. restrictions)
• Perennial sub-module
(econometric estimation)
Premium Calculator
• Calculation of 
agricultural premiums
depending on CMOs
(ceilings, base areas, …) Young Animal
Markets
• Linked optimisation
models at Member
State levelAggregation to
MS level
Supply
Feed Demand
Levels
Prices
 
Source: Britz et al., 2003. 
 
A cost function covering the effect of all factors not explicitly handled by any restriction or 
included in the accounting costs (e.g. risk aversion) ensures calibration of activity levels in the 
base year and plausible reactions of the system. It is also important to notice that the supply 
approach just described is not well suited to model perennial crops (vineyards, fruit and olive 
trees). These activities have a longer planning horizon than one year and require long-term 
investment decisions which are not suitable to be solved within the presented programming 
framework. Equally, some other crops such as flowers or vegetables require a completely 
different marketing and production chain. For both types of activities, a simultaneous 
econometric estimation of yields, activity levels and market balance positions is embedded in the 
analysis, with additional constraints ensuring closed market balances (El Kamel et al., 1999). 
                                                                                                                                                             
15 This property can be of great advantage when having regional differentiated products, as already mentioned, but 
does not solve the problem of the ‘zero observation’, i.e. unobserved trade flows in the base year situation cannot 
be generated in the simulation. This problem is of course also present in net trade models. 
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2.5.6 Data base issues 
The CAPRI modelling system is, as far as possible, fed by statistical sources available at 
European level which are mostly centralised and regularly updated. Farm and market balances, 
economic indicators, acreages, herd sizes and national input-output coefficients are almost 
entirely taken from EUROSTAT. In order to use this information directly in the model, the 
CAPRI and CAPSIM16 teams developed out of EUROSTAT data a complete and consistent data 
base (COCO) at Member State level (Britz et al., 2002). COCO was primarily designed to fill 
gaps or to correct inconsistencies found in statistical data and, additionally, to easily integrate 
data from non-EUROSTAT sources in the model. However, given the task of having to construct 
consistent time series on yields, market balances, EAA positions and prices for all EU Member 
States, a heavy weight was put on a transparent and uniform econometric solution so that manual 
corrections were avoided. 
In the regionalisation of the model, aggregation errors are minimised by choosing homogenous 
regions for which data are available. The only uniform data sources at EU level are the REGIO 
and FADN data bases, from EUROSTAT and the European Commission respectively. Both 
sources are used to construct a regionalised data base. Given the regional composition of these 
sources, Nuts 2 and farm typologies are chosen as the minimum level of regionalisation (the 
latter only used for selected studies17). Whereas natural conditions such as slope, soil types and 
temperature are quite heterogeneous at this level, the main economic indicators and management 
variables are available. REGIO is used to define acreages, herd sizes and yields at Nuts 2 level. 
Data at national level (cropped hectares, slaughtered heads, herd sizes and production quantities) 
are taken directly from COCO. REGIO data are then systematically corrected to allow for a 
consistent disaggregation. FADN data provide parameters for input-demand functions, which 
estimate the input allocation and income indicators for activities at a regional level. These data 
flows are shown in the following figure: 
                                                 
16 The ‘Common Agricultural Policy Simulation Model’ (CAPSIM) has been developed by Dr. Heinz-Peter Witzke, 
EuroCare, Bonn (http://www.eurocare-bonn.de/profrec/capsim/capsim_e.htm). 
17 Nuts 2 regions in CAPRI are further regionalised in ‘farm-type regions’. The aggregation error due to 
heterogeneity inside of the regions is partially addressed by consistently aggregating for each Nuts 2 region 
individual farm data from FADN into six categories: the five most important farm types in the region plus a 
residual mixed type closing the data base. 
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Figure (6) Data flows in CAPRI 
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2.5.7 Exogenous assumptions and additional sources 
Within the supply module, the following assumptions are made: 
− Exogenous development of yields. Trends have been used to determine yield development in 
future scenarios, including information from years 1980 to 2002. These are harmonised with 
yield estimations included in the latest DG-AGRI market outlooks. 
− Rate of input saving technical progress. Variable inputs besides nutrient requirement needs 
for crops and animals as well as replacement rates of animals are shifted proportionally with 
yields. Nutrient needs of crops are yield dependent but driven by specific functions (as well 
as by nutrient requirements for animals). The rate of input-saving technical progress is 
assumed to be -0.2 % p.a. 
For the market module several assumptions mainly related to the selection of additional data 
sources are also needed: 
− Inflation is set to 1.9 % p.a. and nominal Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth for the EU 
to 2.7 % p.a. (Commission of the European Communities, 2002). 
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− Data on bilateral trade between selected world regional aggregates (main trading players) 
are borrowed from the World Agricultural Trade Simulation Model (WATSIM) (Kuhn, 
2003)18. Shift parameters like population growth, income growth and preferences are taken 
from EUROSTAT. A main data source for shifts in supply and demand in non-EU regions is 
the @2030 framework of the FAO global perspective unit (FAO, 2003). 
− Data on policy variables such as applied and scheduled tariffs, tariff rate quotas or bilateral 
trade agreements are obtained from the AGLINK Model (OECD) and the Agricultural 
Market Access Database (AMAD) (compilation by Junker et al., 2003). 
− Preferences. Changes in demand behaviour not linked to income or prices changes are 
trended using ex-post time series on per capita consumption, in most cases in line with data 
found in the EU Prospects for Agricultural Markets (Commission of the European 
Communities, 2002). 
− The price framework contained in the market module is based on representative long-term 
time series for world market prices of major raw and processed agricultural product, which 
are trend forecasted. 
2.6 Conclusions 
In this chapter the main physical linkages between climate change and the agricultural sector are 
addressed as an introduction to the issue of analysis in the following chapters. First, the global 
warming effect as a global negative externality is thoroughly reviewed from an economic and 
legislative perspective. Then, the use of economic models able to estimate GHG emissions from 
agricultural sources is proposed and the CAPRI Modelling system, as the selected tool of 
analysis, is explained in detail. This methodology has the following advantages for the design 
and estimation of environmental indicators: 
− A consistent and detailed break down of agricultural production at regional level in Europe. 
Regions do not only differ by soil type, which affects crop yields, but also by agricultural 
specialisation. Related to this, there are different environmental issues that are relevant for 
agriculture (e.g. over-production of organic fertiliser is a problem in regions with high animal 
densities). 
                                                 
18 The ‘World Agricultural Trade Simulation Model’ (WATSIM) has been developed at the Institute for Agricultural 
Policy, Bonn (http://www.agp.uni-bonn.de/agpo/rsrch/watsim/wats_ov_e.htm). 
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− A mathematical programming approach. This makes it easily possible to include regions, 
agricultural production activities and environmental indicators and, additionally, alternative 
technologies. Moreover, it allows explicit consideration of specific policy variables 
(e.g. CAP direct payments). 
− Endogenous prices. This is achieved either through an internal balancing of demand and 
supply or through the linkage between the supply and market modules. By doing this, 
agricultural producers’ behaviour is more realistically modelled; as the aggregated effect of 
changes in demand and supply on market prices is taken into account. 
− Data base coverage. The model consistently covers the whole agricultural sector so that the 
trade-off between different environmental indicators can be assessed. 
Nevertheless, some weaknesses have to be recognized: 
− Aggregation error stemming from the regional programming approach. The aggregation at 
Nuts 2 level does not allow the assessment of local environmental effects (e.g. different 
environmental problems between farms). A further disaggregation of Nuts 2 regions to lower 
aggregation levels could help reduce this bias. 
− Environmental indicators are modelled as rather robust pressure indicators (see section 3.3). 
In order to improve the explanatory power of these indicators, more refined selected 
parameters from bio-physical or highly regionalized approaches have to be linked to the 
model. 
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CHAPTER 3 Modelling of 
Greenhouse Gas Emission Inventories for 
the European Agricultural Sector 
The significant problems we have cannot be solved at the same level of 
thinking with which we have created them (Albert Einstein, Physicist). 
3.1 Introduction 
A sufficient knowledge on domestic GHG emissions is the initial and most important task to be 
faced by governments willing to undertake global warming abatement measures. Without a 
comprehensive set of national sources and sinks or a suitable emission estimation procedure no 
effective implementation of the Kyoto mitigation instruments is feasible. For this reason, the 
IPCC published in 1997 and 2000 a set of guidelines and common practices to be used by 
governments in the construction of regional emission inventories (IPCC, 1997; IPCC, 2000)19. 
After ratifying the KP in 2002 (Council of the European Union, 2002), European countries 
committed themselves to monitor anthropogenic GHG emissions from different sources and 
evaluate the progress towards compliance with the Kyoto objectives (Council of the European 
Union, 2004a), agriculture being included among other sectors. 
The IPCC proposed a mechanism to calculate national GHG emission inventories based on 
default emission factors for single polluting activities, regional differences being covered by 
additional bio-physical studies. This method is currently widely accepted by the scientific 
community for its simplicity. On the one side, it guarantees a complete data set under certain 
quality standards through the validation of the guidance rules and, on the other side, it allows for 
regular updates and the incorporation of expert data. Nevertheless, it has been somewhat 
controversial, mainly within the research community, since the complexity of the global 
warming issue cannot be fully covered by ‘passive’ emission factors. 
One of the relevant tasks of this research study is to feed an economic model with the necessary 
information to calculate global warming emissions from agricultural sources. This can be done: 
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(1) by explicitly considering endogenous interactions with bio-physical models applied to the 
measurement of GHG emissions (construction of a meta-model) or (2) by including emission 
factors linked ex-post to activities and technologies. Since an important objective of this study is 
not only to measure emissions but also to analyse the economic implications of instruments of 
emission abatement currently discussed in international negotiations, the second option has been 
chosen and an existing economic model used. This will allow a higher degree of transparency 
and direct comparison with other research studies. Moreover, in terms of its practicability, this 
system has some advantages since measurement is based on transparent rules and validated 
parameters. This should help governments to keep monitoring and enforcement costs low and 
increase social acceptability. 
The chapter is divided in five sections. After this short introduction, in section 3.2 the feeding 
and fertilising modules of the CAPRI modelling system are explained in detail. Section 3.3 
focuses on modelling issues and presents the key equations used in the model for the 
construction of GHG emission inventories, the main agricultural emission sources being 
individually analysed. Regional results for emission factors per activity and methodological 
issues are thoroughly discussed. In section 3.4, selected results for the year 2001 are provided 
and comparisons to NGHGIs for agricultural sources are given. Some concluding remarks are 
presented in section 3.5. 
3.2 Feeding and fertilising parameters in the model 
The overall structure of the CAPRI model has been thoroughly explained in section 2.5. As 
mentioned, the main elements of this modelling system are a set of regional supply models at 
Nuts 2 level and a market module taking care of price interactions between the EU and the rest 
of the world. Moreover, the CAPRI supply component incorporates feeding and fertilising 
modules which are quite relevant for the construction of environmental indicators. In the 
following paragraphs, the interactions between these two modules are given a closer look. 
3.2.1 Treatment of feeding requirements 
The model covers energy, protein, fiber and dry matter requirements for 16 animal activities: 
dairy cows, suckler cows, bulls for fattening, heifers for fattening and raising (2), male and 
female calves for fattening and raising (4), pigs for fattening, piglets for pig production, sheep 
                                                                                                                                                             
19 This methodological work is being revised again at the moment and will be published by the IPCC in 2006 based 
on the 1997 revised guidelines, the 2000 good practice guidance and the 2003 good practice guidance for 
LULUCF activities. 
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and goats for milk and fattening (2), laying hens, poultry for fattening and other animals. 
Additionally, dairy cows are broken down in low and high milk yield (2), and bulls and heifers 
for fattening in low and high final weight (4). Overall, 4 feeding requirement functions are 
derived for 19 animal activities. On the supply side, crop products used for feeding (according to 
the EAA product balances) are aggregated into 10 feeding compounds, entering the model as 
inputs for the animal activities: cereals for feeding, rich protein feeding, rich energy feeding, 
milk products for feeding, other products for feeding, grass, fodder maize, other fodder on 
arable land, fodder root crops and straw.  
The feeding module is basically divided in two parts. First of all, the need of nutrients by animals 
and the availability of them on feeding aggregates are defined. Requirement functions for each 
animal category are estimated depending on the ingestion capacity, live weight, days of 
production and yields (Nasuelli et al., 1997). Net energy lactation, crude protein, fiber and dry 
matter intake are calculated for each animal category, with the choice of ingredients included in 
the animal feeding being influenced by its physiological and biochemical characteristics. In 
practical terms, each animal has to cover its energy balance and cannot ingest above a certain 
volume. At the same time, feeding products are described in the model in terms of their 
nutritional characteristics. The feeding-mix always has to remain balanced so that the different 
nutritional requirements per animal in a region can be satisfied. 
In equation (3.1) feeding demand by animals is a variable ( ojrFD ,, ) that has to satisfy previously 
calculated individual bio-physical feeding requirements ( qjrREQ ,, ). Whereas energy and crude 
protein requirements have to be met exactly for each animal category (equality restrictions), fiber 
and dry matter requirements are included as minimum values in the optimisation (inequality 
restrictions). 
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o
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Where: 
REQ = requirements per animal (energy in MJ per day and rest in kg per day) 
r = regional unit 
j = animal activity 
q = requirement type 
d = days of production in a year 
o = product in the model (netput for feeding activities, i.e. a product can be an output for crops 
and an input for animals) 
FD = feeding demand (in kg per head and year) 
NC = nutrient content in feeding products (energy in MJ per kg and rest in dry matter share) 
 
As expressed in equation (3.2), total regional feeding demand has to be in line with fodder 
consumption in the EAA and the availability of non-tradable fodder ( ojrFD ,,  is a variable 
entering also regional market balance constraints). 
(3.2) ( ) )(,,)(,, * feedor
j
jrfeedojr FUXFD == =∑  
Where: 
FU = regional feed use or fodder availability (in kg) 
X = level of production (in 1000 heads or hectares per year) 
 
Additional corrections are introduced in the requirements to cover ‘luxury feeding’ practices, 
i.e. differences between current farming practices and estimations based on engineering data. 
This adjustment or correction mechanism is necessary to ensure the calibration of the model to 
observed data and will be also used in the fertiliser module. 
In the second part of the feeding module, fodder prices are estimated for non-tradable feeding 
compounds in the model. Prices for grass (extensive and intensive production), other fodder on 
arable land, fodder maize and fodder root crops are not available in the EAA, only an aggregate 
price index. They are therefore estimated with the help of a cross-entropy estimator which is 
designed to choose a product price so as to generate plausible gross margins for the 
corresponding activities while fixing the aggregate price index. Once all feeding products are 
consistently given a price, they can enter as input costs in the objective function. In the optimal 
solution (maximal regional agricultural income), an optimal feeding-mix per animal activity is 
endogenously estimated. 
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For the purpose of this analysis, energy requirements for cattle, sheep and goat activities are 
further divided into: maintenance, lactation, growth or pregnancy. This replicates the approach 
followed by the IPCC in its Good Practice Guidance for the calculation of NGHGIs. Information 
on sub-energy positions is relevant in order to calculate methane emissions by enteric 
fermentation processes following the IPCC - Tier 2 methodology20, as pointed out further on in 
this chapter (section 3.3). Moreover, this approach adapts quite well to the core structure of the 
model, which differentiates between growth and fattening activities. 
In table (4) modelled net energy requirements per animal activity, average live weight, 
production days and main output coefficient21 are reported for the EU-15 as an aggregate for 
year 2001. 
                                                 
20 The IPCC defines different methodologies for the calculation of emissions, depending generally on the 
availability of data. Whereas the Tier 1 method is a simplified way of calculating emissions based generally on 
default emission factors drawn from previous studies, the Tier 2 method requires country-specific information. 
21 ‘Milk’ is the main product for dairy cattle and sheep and goats for milk, as the name already indicates. ‘Meat’ is 
considered the principal output coefficient of suckler cows, fattening and raising cattle activities, pigs, sheep and 
goats for fattening, hens and chickens (beef, veal, pork, lamb or poultry meat). 
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Table (4) Net energy intake, average live weight, production period and main yield per 
head (average for the EU-15) 
Net 
energy
Average live 
weight
Production 
days Main yield
Bulls high weight 71.0 491.5 313.5 390.9
Bulls low weight 58.9 408.8 146.4 260.6
Calves female fattening 26.0 177.3 172.2 134.0
Calves female raising 35.5 243.0 270.8 1**
Calves male fattening 25.2 171.7 160.3 134.0
Calves male raising 34.3 243.0 274.3 1**
Dairy cows high yield 175.3 600.0 365.0 8604.5
Dairy cows low yield 112.0 600.0 365.0 3687.6
Heifers high weight 58.4 415.5 288.8 311.6
Heifers low weight 46.7 342.6 106.5 207.7
Heifers raising 66.1 441.6 365.0 1**
Hens* 886.5 1.6 365.0 1241.8
Pigs fattening 18.9 109.4 134.2 85.3
Poultry for fattening* 522.3 1.1 58.3 1809.8
Sheep and goats for milk 11.0 60.0 365.0 47.3
Sheeps and goats for fattening 3.5 12.4 99.5 14.9
Sows 33.03 153.5 365.0 68.7
Suckler cows 64.4 550.0 365.0 59.9  
Source: own calculations; 2001 three year average calibration year. 
Measurement units: net energy (MJ per day), average live weight (kg), production days (per year) and main yield 
coefficient (kg or litre per head). 
* Energy and yield measured for 1000 heads. 
** Young animal activities as output (young cows, young bulls and young heifers). 
 
In the previous table average energy requirements are presented for animal activities in the 
EU-15. High yield dairy cows deliver on average over 8600 litres of 4 % fat milk per year and 
need around 174 MJ per head and day of overall net energy (40 to 50 % of this energy required 
for the lactation process). Suckler cows need approximately 64 MJ per day when assuming one 
calf per year and 60 kg beef production. These values are in line with the IPCC feed intake 
values for Western Europe (IPCC, 1997, table B-1), measured in gross energy intake, and 
slightly above Kirchgeßner’s estimates (Kirchgeßner, 1997, pp. 268 and 312). As reflected in the 
table, higher yields, heavier animals and longer periods of production are directly correlated with 
higher energy needs. These are the main determinants introduced in the animal requirement 
functions. 
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Crude protein requirements are also calculated in the model based on econometric functions 
estimated in several experimental studies taken from the literature (Nasuelli et al., 1997). Milk 
yields, fat content in milk and daily fattening rates enter as variables in these functions. 
Moreover, crude protein requirements are used to calculate nitrogen (N) intake by animals. 
According to the literature (Udersander et al., 1993), there is a relation of 1 to 6 between crude 
protein and N in feeding22. By combining this information with N retention rates per animal 
activity (IPCC, 2000, table 4.15), manure production rates can be estimated (N-intake minus 
N-retention)23. The following equation is used to calculate N delivery in manure: 
(3.3) ( )jjrjr NRPINM −= 1*6/,,  
Where: 
NM = N in manure (in kg) 
PI = protein intake (in kg of digestible intestinal crude protein)  
NR = N retention rate (share)  
 
In table (5) crude protein requirements per animal activity, N in manure and N retention rates are 
reported for the EU-15 as an aggregate for year 2001. 
                                                 
22 The National Forage Testing Association calculated conversion factors of 6.25 for forages and feeds and 5.7 for 
wheat grains. In CAPRI, a value of 6 is assumed across all products entering the feeding process. 
23 Further research was carried out in CAPRI by applying N retention functions per animal type in the calculation of 
N excretion produced in manure (Nasuelli et al., 1998). However, this approach will not be applied in this study 
since it has not proved to give significant gains compared to the currently used IPCC approach. 
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Table (5) Crude protein intake, manure production and nitrogen retention per head 
(average for the EU-15) 
Crude 
protein
Nitrogen in 
manure
Nitrogen 
retention
Bulls high weight 1.7 83.8 0.07
Bulls low weight 1.4 31.7 0.07
Calves female fattening 0.8 21.5 0.07
Calves female raising 0.9 38.4 0.07
Calves male fattening 0.8 20.2 0.07
Calves male raising 0.9 38.6 0.07
Dairy cows high yield 4.3 210.1 0.20
Dairy cows low yield 2.7 129.4 0.20
Heifers high weight 1.5 64.4 0.07
Heifers low weight 1.2 20.6 0.07
Heifers raising 1.7 95.9 0.07
Hens* 21.2 900.9 0.30
Pigs fattening 0.4 7.0 0.30
Poultry for fattening* 7.6 52.9 0.30
Sheep and goats for milk 0.2 13.7 0.10
Sheeps and goats for fattening 0.1 2.0 0.10
Sows 0.9 36.4 0.30
Suckler cows 1.5 87.2 0.07  
Source: own calculations; 2001 three year average calibration year. 
Measurement units: crude protein (kg per day), N in manure (kg per head and year) and N retention rates (shares on 
total N intake). 
* Crude protein and N in manure measured for 1000 heads. 
 
In this table the correlation between crude protein intake and N content in manure is presented 
for each animal activity. Pigs for fattening weigh on average slightly over 100 kg and need 
around 0.4 kg of raw protein per day with 7 kg of N released in manure. Suckler cows weigh 
550 kg, require 1.5 kg per day and release 87 kg of N. Compared to Kirchgeßner’s estimates, 
these calculations are low for dairy activities and quite accurate for pigs for fattening and suckler 
cows (for these last two activities he reports 0.315 and 1.340 kg per day, for 100 kg and 650 kg 
animals respectively) (Kirchgeßner, 1997, pp. 268, 312-314 and 237-240)24. Reported IPCC N 
retention rates vary between 1 % for sheep and goat activities and 7 % for cattle activities. 
                                                 
24 As in the case of the net energy calculation, Kirchgeßner refers only to the lactation process for dairy cows. On 
the contrary, the IPCC approach takes into account energy and crude protein requirements for maintenance, 
pregnancy and activity. 
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An accurate estimation of energy and crude protein requirements is necessary for the 
measurement of GHG emissions in agriculture. Moreover, the estimation of N production rates 
in organic fertiliser is of importance for the calculation of manure management emissions and a 
consistent N flow in agricultural soils. This aspect is analysed in the following paragraph, as part 
of the fertiliser module. 
3.2.2 Treatment of fertilising requirements 
Whereas in the feeding module animals demand nutrients which are supplied by crop feeding 
activities, in the fertilising module crops enter the equation as ‘consumers’ and need to cover 
their nitrogen, phosphate and potassium (NPK) nutrient needs through the application of 
fertiliser. This can be done by applying mineral or organic fertiliser25 on the field. Both types of 
fertiliser are used to cover the nutrient need of crops, consistently linking manure production by 
animals and consumption of mineral fertiliser by crops at a regional level. Consequently, the 
approach gains in complexity since an additional link between animal and crop activities to the 
one mentioned in the previous section is included in the model. In the following paragraphs, the 
structure of the fertilising module is explained in detail. 
First of all, sources and sinks of nutrients in agriculture are translated into the model. This is 
done according to the following equation: 
                                                 
25 Mineral fertiliser is traded according to public statistics on fertiliser consumption from FAOSTAT 
(http://apps.fao.org). Organic fertiliser from animals is assumed to be a non-tradable good produced in the model 
(based on engineering functions) and has to be applied within the region where it was produced. 
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Where: 
k = crop activity 
fi = NPK nutrients (as inputs) 
ND = nutrient demand by crops (kg per crop and year) 
Nfix = N import by biological fixation (kg per crop and year) 
NutCorr = regional correction factor for over-fertilisation practices 
Natm = N import from atmospheric deposition (kg per crop and year) 
TRD = nutrient imports from purchased mineral fertiliser (kg) 
AmmMF = nutrient losses in the application of mineral fertiliser (share) 
fo = NPK nutrients in manure from animals (as outputs) 
NS = nutrient supply from manure (kg per animal and year) 
AmmOF = N losses through ammonia emissions from organic fertiliser (share) 
NavCorr = correction factor for nutrient availability in manure (share) 
 
Nutrients exported by cropped products ( fikrND ,, ) must be covered by purchases of mineral 
fertiliser ( firTRD , ) or ‘available’ organic fertiliser ( fojrNS ,, ). These sources are also subject to 
losses through application ( rAmmMF ) and volatilisation as ammonia ( jrAmmOF , ). Moreover, 
demand for nitrogenous fertiliser is reduced by N fixation ( kNfix ) and N from atmospheric 
deposition ( krNatm , ). As in the case of the feeding module, nutrient correction and nutrient 
availability factors are included and specified in the model in order to calibrate observed data on 
national mineral fertiliser consumption and regional manure production derived from 
bio-physical equations. They ensure consistency to given statistical data by covering regional 
over-fertilisation practices ( firNutCorr , ) and variability of nutrient contents in manure 
( forNavCorr , )
26. 
                                                 
26 By using a cross-entropy approach, nutrient correction factors are given a density distribution in line with 
over-fertilisation estimates from the Nutrient Flow model (NFM), designed by the Agricultural Economics 
Research Institute in Holland (LEI). On the other hand, nutrient availability in manure is trimmed across regions 
by allowing higher nutrient losses per hectare in regions where manure production is higher compared to the 
national average. 
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By following this approach and further disaggregating ammonia emissions by sources 
(Oudendag et al., 2003) a closed N balance can be calculated at a regional level. Its structure and 
average results for the EU are briefly presented in the following table. 
Table (6) Nitrogen balance (average for the EU-15) 
Import of nitrogen by 
anorganic fertiliser a 68.2
Export of nitrogen with harvested 
material f 80.95
Import of nitrogen by organic 
fertiliser (in manure) b 77.31
Nitrogen in ammonia losses from manure 
fallen on grazings g 2.08
Nitrogen from biological 
fixation* c 2.89
Nitrogen in ammonia losses from manure in 
stable h 7.13
Nitrogen from atmospheric 
deposition d 14.36
Nitrogen in ammonia losses from manure 
storage i 2.53
Nitrogen in ammonia losses from manure 
application on the field j 8.34
Nitrogen in ammonia losses from 
organic fertiliser k=g+h+i+j 20.08
Nitrogen in ammonia losses from 
mineral fertiliser l 2.89
TOTAL INPUT e=a+b+c+d 162.768 TOTAL OUTPUT n=f+k+l+m 103.92
Nutrient losses at soil level 
(SURPLUS) m=e-f-k-l 58.85
INPUT OUTPUT
 
Source: own calculations; 2001 three year average calibration year. 
Measurement units: kg N per hectare. 
* In the model pulses and some fodder activities are considered N-fixing crops. 
 
Table (6) reflects N sources and sinks for the EU-15 on a per hectare basis. On average, around 
81 kg of N are exported from the system to the harvested product (f) and additionally 23 kg are 
counted as losses through ammonia volatilisation processes (k+l). Different N loss factors are 
used according to each animal category and observed management: manure fallen on grazings, 
in stables, in different storage systems and applied on the field. These losses are covered by the 
application of organic and mineral fertiliser (149 kg) (a+b). As mentioned in the previous 
paragraph, organic fertiliser is estimated based on manure output functions from each animal 
category (total manure available for the herd size in the base year) and mineral fertiliser is 
collected from FAO statistics at a national level and broken down for each crop activity by using 
different engineering parameters. Additionally, N is imported through biological fixation 
processes (c) and atmospheric deposition (d), with 3 and 14 kg per hectare respectively. The 
difference between N output and N input is considered a surplus in the system (m), in our case of 
59 kg per hectare. This N balance is linked to the GHG module described in the next section 
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since ammonia and N in soils are subject to chemical reactions that release nitrous oxide 
emissions in the atmosphere. 
In the second part of the fertilising module, regional production of organic N in manure is 
allocated to crop activities according to their physical characteristics and expert knowledge. 
Manure is assumed to be non-tradable in the model, has to be consumed within a certain region 
and is applied differently on land (fodder activities get in practice, for example, a much bigger 
share of organic fertiliser than vegetables). This is an important step in the estimation of nitrous 
oxide emissions from soils since some Member States apply different emission factors for 
mineral fertiliser and manure. 
As a concluding remark, the approach adopted in the model considers NPK nutrients in manure 
and fodder production as netputs (output/input for animal activities and input/output for crops, 
respectively). They are therefore endogenously given a price in the model and compete to a 
certain extent with other agricultural inputs. These linkages make both crop and animal sectors 
interact with each other. 
3.3 Modelling of single greenhouse gas sources 
Measuring emissions in agriculture is a difficult task for several reasons. In the agricultural 
sector, there are many small sources and in most cases it is not easy to localise them 
geographically. Moreover, it is very costly, if not practically impossible, to measure emissions 
directly. There are only a few studies with top-down estimated nitrous oxide emissions (Manning 
et al., 2003). This is somehow easier for methane as the concentration gradients in the 
atmosphere are more pronounced (shorter lifetime due to its reaction with OH radicals). A more 
feasible approach would be therefore to estimate emissions indirectly by using certain emission 
coefficients which consistently incorporate the current scientific knowledge on GHG formation. 
This interdisciplinary approach would imply working in two opposite directions, using inputs 
from different sciences like biology, chemistry and meteorology.  
On the one side, within a bottom-up framework, controlled laboratory experiments with animals, 
crops and soils for different management technologies can provide the necessary information on 
emissions at the micro-level. Regional specificities of crop production or data on emissions from 
different animal activities should be included in the respective emission factors. In Europe, there 
are several institutions running bio-physical models that are relevant for the measurement of 
global warming emissions released in agriculture. Amongst others, the Agricultural Economics 
Research Institute in Holland (LEI, The Hague, Netherlands) has been carrying out important 
CHAPTER 3 
 45 
research on emissions from nutrients, the University of Bologna on emissions from animal 
production and the Institut Agronomique Méditerranéen (IAMM, Montpellier, France) on plant 
growth, water stress and fertiliser use. Information from these sources can be carefully selected 
to complete the IPCC emission coefficients and cover some emission sources in more detail 
(Helming, 1998; Nasuelli et al., 1998; Flichman, 1997). 
On the other side, a top-down approach can be considered to complement the previous one. The 
measurement of global GHG concentrations gives information on the changing atmospheric load 
and is combined with the analysis of sink processes in order to come up with reliable source 
estimates. With the help of laboratory experiments the radioactive properties of different gases 
and therefore their climate impact in the long term are estimated. This information is obtained 
from several bio-physical models following different methodologies: measurement of 
paleoclimatic carbon records in polar ice, analysis of temperature changes in the stratosphere and 
photo-chemistry analysis of solar radiation. This scientific basis and some estimates are reviewed 
by the IPCC in its Third Assessment Report27. 
In this study a bottom-up approach is followed and results compared with official reporting data 
at the national level. By getting some information on the regional structure of the European 
agricultural sector, information on emissions at Nuts 2 level is estimated. Agri-physical models 
are used to identify relevant agricultural emission sources and estimate emission factors. This 
information flows into a regionalised economic model, where (1) all important agricultural 
activities and most of the physical and economic linkages between agricultural products in 
Europe are covered and (2) GHG emission coefficients are included and adjusted when 
necessary (see figure (7)). 
                                                 
27 In Europe model estimations and data on emissions submitted by Member States to the UNFCCC are gathered 
and distributed by the EEA through the European environment information and observation network (EIONET). 
This information is already allocated to sources, partially combining top-down and bottom-up approaches. For air 
emissions, the CORINAIR data base is built up (CORE Inventory of AIR emissions) covering emissions from 
several sectors (agriculture included) for years 1990 to 2000. 
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Figure (7) Information flows used in the calculation of regional emissions 
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This analysis with CAPRI is a first attempt to focus on the agricultural sector and model 
emission sources and environmental policy restrictions in a regionalised European Union. A 
similar structure is followed by the POLES Model28 for the energy sector, a model aiming to 
provide an outlook on long-term energy systems. It performs a calculation of CO2 emissions 
from energy production for the major regions in the world, analyses technical progress and tries 
to estimate the effects of different environmental restrictions on the energy sector.  
For the purpose of modelling GHG emissions from agriculture, a multi-strategy approach is 
followed (Manne, Richels, 2000). It is important to take into account that agriculture is an 
important emitter of several climate relevant gases other than carbon dioxide. Therefore, in this 
analysis two types of pollutants are measured: methane (CH4) and nitrous oxide (N2O). The 
sources considered are: CH4 emissions from animal production, manure management and rice 
cultivation and N2O from agricultural soils and manure management. In this section, the main 
equations and data used to calculate these emission sources are described29. 
The structure of the CAPRI model is modified in this study to allow for a consistent construction 
of GHG emission inventories in the European agricultural sector. As already mentioned, land use 
                                                 
28 The POLES world energy model has been developed in the framework of the EC-DGXII JOULE Programs 
‘Climate Technology Strategy’ and ‘Energy Technology Modelling” (http://www.upmf-
grenoble.fr/iepe/textes/POLES8p_01.pdf). 
29 Carbon sinks are not included since the measurement of carbon dioxide absorption through agricultural biomass is 
highly complex (high uncertainty involved, especially in agricultural soils) and has strong linkages with other 
economic activities not considered in this analysis, such as bio-diesel production and forestry management. 
CHAPTER 3 
 47 
and nitrogen flows are estimated at a regional level. This is the main information needed to 
calculate the parameters included in the IPCC Good Practice Guidance (IPCC, 2000). The 
following table lists the emission sources modelled: 
Table (7) Agricultural greenhouse gas emission sources included in the model 
Greenhouse Gas Section Emission source Code 
 3.3.1 Enteric fermentation CH4Ent 
Methane 3.3.2 Manure management CH4Man 
 3.3.3 Rice production CH4Ric 
 3.3.4 Manure management N2OMan 
 3.3.4 Manure excretion on grazings N2OGra 
 3.3.5 Emissions from synthetic fertiliser N2OSyn 
 3.3.5 Emissions from organic animal waste N2OWas 
Nitrous Oxide 3.3.5 Emissions from fertiliser application N2OApp 
 3.3.6 Emissions from crop residues N2OCro 
 3.3.7 Emissions from nitrogen-fixing crops N2OFix 
 3.3.8 Indirect emissions from ammonia losses N2OAmm 
 3.3.8 Emissions from atmospheric deposition N2ODep 
 
3.3.1 Methane emissions from enteric fermentation 
Animal production is the main source of methane emissions in Europe, providing around 53 % 
of total CH4 and 98 % of agricultural CH4 emissions (year 2001, EEA data service). Of the latter, 
73 % are generated in the digestion process of ruminants (enteric fermentation process) and 25 % 
by decomposition of organic products in animal excrements. Furthermore, emissions from 
ruminants are estimated to contribute to 15 % of global atmospheric methane (Boadi, 
Wittenberg, 2003). 
The production of methane is a natural by-product of feed fermentation in the gastrointestinal 
tract of the ruminant animal. The utilisation of fiber, mainly cellulose, pectin and hemicellulose 
takes place in the intestinal tract of herbivores with the help of certain micro-organisms 
(Kirchgeßner, 1997). Methanobrevibacter spp. appears to be the major methanogen in the 
rumen: they ferment food carbohydrates, mainly cellulose and lignin, and release energy in the 
process of methane formation. This energy can be used for bacterial cell formation or can be lost 
as chemical compounds in faeces, urine and fermentation gases. The decomposition of these 
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carbohydrates or fermentation process occurs in the first stomach of the ruminants. It constitutes 
a loss of dietary energy away from animal production and contributes to atmospheric GHG 
emissions since carbon dioxide, methane and, in small quantities, hydrogen are emitted. These 
gases are considered metabolic losses and depend on the race, age, activity and fodder 
composition and intake of the animal. Nowadays, it seems clear that the feed ration formulation, 
together with the adopted intensive/extensive production technology, play an important role in 
methane emission control. 
The IPCC establishes a common procedure in the calculation of CH4 emissions from enteric 
fermentation which will be followed in this study. In the following two equations, digestible 
gross energy for growth and non-growth energy classes is calculated for cattle and sheep animal 
activities. As a result, the conversion ratio of energy to digestible energy is estimated based on 
animal specific digestibility parameters for Western Europe (IPCC, 2000, p. 4.19): 
(3.5) ( ) ( ) jjjgej DEDEDENEDE /4.37*00001.0*308.1*160.5*001.0164.1 2)(, −+−==  
(3.6) ( ) ( ) ( ) jjjgej DEDEDENEDE /4.25*00001.0*126.1*092.4*001.0123.1 2, −+−=≠  
Where: 
NEDE = ratio of net energy available in a diet to digestible energy consumed for each energy 
class 
j = animal activity 
e = energy class; maintenance (m), lactation (l), activity (a), pregnancy (p) and growth (g)  
DE = digestibility energy expressed as percentage of gross energy 
 
This conversion parameter is used to calculate gross energy intake. Animal production and 
regional differences are incorporated through the variable ‘net energy’ ( ejrNE ,, ), which is a 
feeding requirement function in the model ( qjrREQ ,,  in section 3.2): 
(3.7) ( )100//)/( ,,,, jej
e
ejrjr DENEDENEGE ∑=  
Where: 
GE = gross energy in MJ per day 
NE = net energy in MJ per day 
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In the following equation the fraction of gross energy transformed into methane is calculated 
( jYM ), energy is converted into methane emissions ( 65.55/ ) and these are aggregated at a 
regional level across animal activities for a year: 
(3.8) ( )[ ]∑=
j
jrjrjrjr XDAYSGEYMEntCH ,,, *65.55/**4  
Where: 
CH4Ent = methane emissions due to enteric fermentation processes (in tonnes) 
YM = conversion factor of energy into methane (in kg of methane per MJ) 
DAYS = days of production for an animal activity in a year 
 
From the previous equation IPCC Tier 2 enteric fermentation emission factors can be derived per 
animal activity and region (without the last aggregation term). These factors are no longer equal 
across regions, as in the case of the IPCC Tier 1 method (more simplified method based on fixed 
coefficients), since energy requirements are taken into account and depend on fodder availability 
and fertilising activities in each region. In the next section, table (8) gives a comparison of these 
two estimates. 
Agricultural producers have the following options to cut down methane output: (a) reduce the 
number of cattle and therefore enteric fermentation emissions and/or (b) improve cattle 
production efficiency by changing the feeding-mix. In the following chapters, abatement issues 
are specifically addressed. 
3.3.2 Methane emissions from manure management 
Livestock manure is the second most important source of methane emissions in agriculture, due 
to its high content of organic material (10 to 20 %). When this organic material decomposes in 
anaerobic conditions, methanogenic bacteria, as part of an interrelated population of 
micro-organisms, produce methane (IPCC, 1997, p. 4.4 of the Reference Manual). The portion of 
manure that decomposes anaerobically depends on how the manure is managed: storage type and 
duration, technology of application on the field and state of the residues (liquid or solid). Other 
regional variables such as temperature and humidity are also relevant in the methane production 
process. When manure is handled as solid or deposited on pastures, it tends to decompose 
aerobically and almost no methane is produced. 
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In the model degradable organic material in manure is estimated from gross energy intake by 
animals according to the following equation (already calculated in section 3.3.1 as a determinant 
of enteric fermentation emissions): 
(3.9) )100/1/(*)100/1(*)45.18/1(*,, jjjrjr ASHDEGEVSER −−=  
Where: 
VSER = volatile solid excretion per day on a dry-matter weight basis (in kg dry matter per day) 
ASH = ash content in manure (in percentage) 
 
Additionally, information on management systems and climate regions has to be considered. The 
IPCC reports some information on manure management systems per animal type for Western 
Europe ( jmMG , ): anaerobic lagoon, liquid slurry, solid storage, dry lot, pasture/range, pit under 
and over 1 month (only for pigs), daily spread, digester, burned for fuel and other (IPCC, 
1997, tables B-2, B-3, B-4 and B-6). Methane conversion factors ( mCa ) for ‘warm’, ‘temperate’ 
and ‘cold’ regions (above 25 °C, between 15 °C and 25 °C and below 15 °C respectively) are 
also reported and included in the model. The maximum methane conversion capacity from 
manure ( jB0 ) is taken into account and emissions calculated according to the following 
equation: 
(3.10) ( )∑ ∑ ⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
=
j
jrjr
m
mjmjjrr XDAYSCaMGBVSERManCH ,,,, ****67.0*0*4  
Where: 
CH4Man = methane emissions from manure management (in tonnes) 
B0 = maximum CH4 producing capacity in % of the manure (in kg of methane per kg of manure) 
m = management system 
MG = manure management system for manure per animal activity in Western Europe (in 
percentage) 
Ca = methane conversion factor for each manure management system in each climate region 
 
The calculation of manure management emissions is not an easy task since little data on 
management systems is available at a regional level and climate parameters are quite sensitive. 
For this reason, the IPCC Tier 2 approach is fully adopted in the model, avoiding more complex 
approaches which would just introduce some more uncertainty in the current analysis. In table 
(8), both IPCC Tier 1 and 2 methods for the calculation of methane enteric fermentation and 
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manure management emissions are compared for the EU-15. In table (9), maximum and 
minimum emission factors for animal activities are presented for Member States. 
Table (8) Methane emission factors for enteric fermentation and manure management; 
IPCC Tier 1 and 2 methods (average for the EU-15) 
IPCC Tier 1 IPCC Tier 2 IPCC Tier 1 IPCC Tier 2
Bulls high weight 41.2 66.5 9.6 15.3
Bulls low weight 19.2 26.6 4.2 5.8
Calves female fattening 22.7 15.3 6.1 4.1
Calves female raising 35.6 31.0 9.0 7.9
Calves male fattening 21.1 14.1 5.7 3.6
Calves male raising 36.1 28.9 8.8 7.1
Dairy cows high yield 100.0 146.9 25.3 40.2
Dairy cows low yield 100.0 96.2 25.3 26.4
Heifers high weight 38.2 54.1 9.3 13.4
Heifers low weight 14.1 17.6 3.5 4.4
Heifers raising 84.0 54.2 11.7 13.4
Pigs fattening* 0.6  - 1.8  - 
Sheep and goats for milk* 8.0  -  -  - 
Sheeps and goats for fattening* 2.2  -  -  - 
Sows* 1.5  - 5.1  - 
Suckler cows 100.0 63.0 14.6 19.5
CH4 Enteric 
Fermentation
CH4 Manure 
Management
 
Source: own calculations; 2001 three year average calibration year. 
Measurement units: kg per head and year. 
* For these activities no Tier 2 method is defined and therefore the estimates from the Tier 1, if available, are taken. 
 
For the EU-15 the model delivers Tier 2 coefficients that are on average close to Tier 1 fixed 
coefficients. As the table shows, Tier 1 emission factors tend to overestimate enteric 
fermentation emissions from suckler cows and in general underestimate methane emissions from 
cattle’s manure. Moreover, it can be observed how activities with a high energy need have higher 
emission factors (e.g. raising vs. fattening activities). Activities with a high protein intake and 
low N retention rates, i.e. less efficient digestive process, are linked to higher methane emissions 
from manure management (e.g. bulls vs. pigs). In general, Tier 2 coefficients give more accurate 
information for activities that are subject to different intensities, e.g. dairy cows and bulls for 
slaughtering. This allows for the calculation of regional differences, as presented in the following 
table: 
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Table (9) Regional differences in methane emission factors for manure management and 
enteric fermentation – IPCC Tier 2 method (minimum and maximum average values 
for Member States) 
Bulls high weight Netherlands 100.8 Denmark 28.5 France 29.0 Denmark 3.7
Bulls low weight Netherlands 45.2 Denmark 4.4 n France 12.2 Denmark 0.6 n
Calves female fattening Spain 44.0 UK 1.4 n Spain 12.2 Denmark 0.3 n
Calves female raising Sweden 32.5 Netherlands 29.2 Portugal 13.6 Netherlands 3.8
Calves male fattening Spain 40.9 UK 0.4 n Greece 14.3 UK 0.2 n
Calves male raising Finland 30.2 Netherlands 26.8 Portugal 12.6 Netherlands 3.5
Dairy cows high yield Sweden 170.6 Ireland 123.6 UK 72.7 Ireland 18.4
Dairy cows low yield Sweden 106.4 Ireland 86.2 UK 47.2 Belgium 13.3
Heifers high weight France 70.9 Finland 34.6 France 29.9 Finland 4.5
Heifers low weight France 35.2 Finland 4.5 n France 14.9 Finland 0.6 n
Heifers raising Netherlands 55.5 Spain 52.9 Greece 22.8 Austria 7.1
Suckler cows Italy 65.3 Portugal 62.3 France 26.6 Ireland 8.2
Maximum value Minimum value
CH4 Manure ManagementCH4 Enteric Fermentation
Maximum value Minimum value
 
Source: own calculations; 2001 three year average calibration year; Luxembourg is modelled together with Belgium. 
Measurement units: kg per head and year. 
n Poor statistical representation of these regional activities. 
 
These values reflect differences in the emission coefficients according to animal characteristics 
in each region (weight, yields, etc.). There are some extreme minimum values for some activities 
such as calves for fattening, bulls and heifers low weight. This is due to the fact that these 
production activities are not well represented in some regions (the activity is booked in another 
position or the EEA and therefore statistics on yields are underestimated). However, this does 
not have any relevant effect on average values and emission accounting since they are marginal 
values with a fairly low weight attached. 
3.3.3 Methane emissions from rice production 
Rice production in flooded paddy fields is the most important anthropogenic source of methane. 
The warm, waterlogged soil of rice fields provides ideal conditions for methanogenesis, i.e. CH4 
production through anaerobic decomposition of the organic matter carried out by methanogens. 
Global methane emission rates from rice paddies are estimated to range between 20 and 100 
million tonnes per year, which corresponds to about 6 to 29 % of total annual anthropogenic 
methane emissions. Though some of the methane produced is usually oxidized in the shallow 
overlying water, around 90 % is released into the atmosphere through rice plants (Cicerone, 
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Shetter, 1981). Before flooding and after drainage emissions are relatively low and during the 
flooding period they increase, reaching a maximum level during the panicle differentiation and 
maturing (Sass et al., 1990). 
Research on emission factors from rice paddies has been intensively carried out over the last two 
decades (see table (10)). Estimates show a high variation, methane emissions depending heavily 
on assumptions related to soil temperature, flooding period, rice type, soil texture and quantity of 
organic matter in soils. 
Table (10) Estimations of methane emission factors for rice cultivation found in the 
literature 
SOURCE Estimates
Cicerone e Shetter (1981) 0.15 – 0.18
Cicerone e Shetter (1983) 0.22 – 0.28
Seiler at al. (1984) 0.096 – 0.336
Hlzapfel-Pschorn and Seiler (1986) 0.384 – 0.504
Khalil et Al. (1991) 0.58
Sass e Fisher (1990) 1.43 – 5.03
Sass, Fisher and Harcombe (1991, a) 3.22 – 8.75
Sass, Fisher et Al. (1991, b) 6.77 – 10.52
Sass, Fisher and Wang (1992) 2.556
Zongliang et Al.  (1993) 0.26 – 0.86
Sigren et Al. (1997, b) 9.6  
Source: compilation by Nasuelli et al., 1998. 
Measurement units: g per m2 and day. 
 
Nevertheless, this activity is of little relevance in Europe, having only some significant share of 
crop production in the warmer regions of Spain and Italy. For this reason and for comparison 
purposes, a uniform non-regionalised IPCC default emission factor of 20g per m2 per season 
(200 kg per hectare) is adopted in the model30 according to the following equation: 
(3.11) ( )∑==
k
krricekr XCbRicCH ,)(, *4  
Where: 
CH4Ric = methane emissions from rice paddies (in tonnes) 
Cb = methane conversion factor for rice cultivation (per hectare) 
 
                                                 
30 There is high correlation between seasonal methane emissions and sand percent in different soils (Sass et al., 
1990). Information on temperature variations and soil types could be used to further improve this indicator and 
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3.3.4 Nitrous oxide emissions from manure management and from manure excretion 
on grazings 
During manure storage and application not only methane emissions are produced, but also 
nitrous oxide emissions. Formation of N2O in agricultural soils primarily results from 
nitrification and denitrification processes31. Most of the N2O emitted from agriculture is 
produced when excess of nitrate in soil undergoes denitrification, either on the field or after it is 
leached away. Measurements indicate that about 7 % of denitrification leads to the production of 
N2O. Some N2O is also emitted through the aerobic microbial oxidation of ammonium to nitrate, 
or nitrification32 (Firestone, Davidson, 1989). When nitrate for denitrification is derived from 
nitrification, the process is called coupled ‘nitrification-denitrification’. 
Farmers feed and manage their cattle in different ways during the different stages of the 
production cycle. The amount of N2O emitted depends on the system used and the stage in the 
cycle. As N in manure is present as organic or ammoniacal N, the aerobic process of nitrification 
is needed for the production of nitrous oxide (e.g. in solid storage systems or upon surface 
application). Under anaerobic conditions the production of methane is favoured (e.g. anaerobic 
lagoons or slurry tanks). Management systems can be compared in terms of net emissions.  
In the following equation a weighted nitrous oxide emission factor for a bundle of management 
systems in Europe is calculated, in the same way as methane emissions from manure 
management (see equation (3.10)): 
(3.12) ( )∑ ∑ ⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
=
≠j
jr
pasturem
mjmjrr XCcMGMNOManN ,
)(
,, *28/44***2  
Where: 
N2OMan = nitrous oxide emissions from manure management (in tonnes) 
MN = N content in manure (kg of N per animal and year) 
Cc = nitrous oxide conversion factor for each manure management system in each climate region 
44/28 = conversion factor for N2O-N into N2O 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
calculate an ‘adjusted seasonally integrated emission factor’ (IPCC, 2000). This information is not available in 
the current version of the model. 
31 Denitrification is an anaerobic process, the microbial reduction of nitrate (NO3-) to di-nitrogen gas (N2). 
Denitrification is sometimes referred to as 'dissimilatory' nitrate reduction because it occurs in association with 
the dissimilation (decomposition) of organic matter. It is, however, important to notice that when the process 
becomes too anaerobic no release of N2O takes place, because everything is reduced to N2. 
32 Nitrification or 'ammonium oxidation' is a two-step respiratory process in which bacteria oxidise ammonium 
(NH4+) to nitrite (NO2-) and nitrate (NO3-). 
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Results in table (11) show that emission factors vary between 0 and 1.7 kg per head and year, 
regional differences originating from different regional manure excretion rates (correlated with 
crude protein content in the feeding-mix). 
Table (11) Estimations of nitrous oxide emission factors for manure management (average 
for the EU-15 and minimum and maximum average values for Member States) 
EU-15 Average
Bulls high weight 0.14 Germany 0.18 Denmark 0.05
Bulls low weight 0.05 Austria 0.07 Denmark 0.01 n
Calves female fattening 0.04 Spain 0.08 UK 0.01 n
Calves female raising 0.06 UK 0.08 Belgium 0.04
Calves male fattening 0.03 Spain 0.08 UK 0.01 n
Calves male raising 0.06 UK 0.08 Belgium 0.05
Dairy cows high yield 0.84 France 1.68 Belgium 0.80
Dairy cows low yield 1.37 Italy 1.02 Greece 0.49
Heifers high weight 0.11 Germany 0.14 Finland 0.06
Heifers low weight 0.03 France 0.07 Finland 0.01 n
Heifers raising 0.16 France 0.19 Belgium 0.09
Hens* 0.47 Denmark 0.50 Greece 0.31
Pigs fattening 0.06 Italy 0.12 Greece 0.03
Poultry for fattening* 0.03 Italy 0.04 Portugal 0.01
Sheep and goats for milk 0.01 France 0.011 Finland 0.003
Sheeps and goats for fattening 0.0013 Denmark 0.0025 Greece 0.0004
Sows 0.31 France 0.35 Ireland 0.24
Suckler cows 0.14 France 0.18 Finland 0.07
Maximum Value Minimum Value
 
Source: own calculations; 2001 three year average calibration year; Luxembourg is modelled together with Belgium. 
Measurement units: kg per head and year. 
* Coefficients measured for 1000 heads. 
n Poor statistical representation of these regional activities. 
 
In section 3.3.2 the main manure management options considered for this calculation were listed. 
At this stage it is important to mention that in the UNFCCC common reporting format N2O 
emissions from manure management only include N losses in housing and storage systems (N 
fallen on pastures is explicitly excluded). This last emission source is not considered to be part of 
agricultural soil emissions and is reported in another position. Its calculation follows, however, a 
similar approach: 
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(3.13) ( )∑ ∑ ⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
=
=j
jr
pasturem
mjmjrr XCcMGMNOGraN ,
)(
,, *28/44***2  
Where: 
N2OGra = nitrous oxide emissions from manure fallen on grazings (in tonnes) 
 
Table (12) Estimations of nitrous oxide emission factors for manure excretion on grazings 
(average for the EU-15 and minimum and maximum average values for Member 
States) 
EU-15 Average
Bulls high weight 1.00 Germany 1.33 Denmark 0.35
Bulls low weight 0.38 Austria 0.52 Denmark 0.07 n
Calves female fattening 0.26 Spain 0.58 UK 0.03 n
Calves female raising 0.46 UK 0.56 Belgium 0.33
Calves male fattening 0.24 Spain 0.57 UK 0.01 n
Calves male raising 0.46 UK 0.56 Belgium 0.33
Dairy cows high yield 1.25 France 1.54 Belgium 0.73
Dairy cows low yield 0.77 Italy 0.94 Greece 0.45
Heifers high weight 0.77 Germany 1.05 Finland 0.42
Heifers low weight 0.25 France 0.51 Finland 0.06 n
Heifers raising 1.15 France 1.42 Belgium 0.69
Hens* 0.57 Denmark 0.61 Greece 0.38
Pigs fattening -
Poultry for fattening* 0.03 Italy 0.05 Portugal 0.02
Sheep and goats for milk 0.38 France 0.490 Finland 0.130
Sheeps and goats for fattening 0.0600 Denmark 0.1100 Greece 0.0170
Sows -
Suckler cows 1.04 France 1.32 Finland 0.54
--
- -
Maximum Value Minimum Value
 
Source: own calculations; 2001 three year average calibration year; Luxembourg is modelled together with Belgium. 
Measurement units: kg per head and year. 
n Poor statistical representation of these regional activities. 
 
In table (11) activities with a higher manure production per head (higher yields and average 
weights) present higher N2O coefficients. By comparing table (11) and table (12) it can be 
observed that N2O coefficients for manure excretion on grazings are much higher than the ones 
for manure management (as previously defined). This is due to the fact that the manure 
management type ‘pastures’ has a relatively high N2O conversion factor (0.02) and a high 
fraction of total management use (between 19 % and 38 % depending on the activity). Suckler 
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cows have a high emission coefficient, almost as high as the one for dairy cows but producing 
much less manure per animal due to a higher fraction of time on pastures. 
By adding up both coefficients per activity the overall manure management coefficient per 
activity can be derived (including emissions on pastures). As shown in table (12), pig production 
does not have a coefficient attached since all the production is assumed to take place in housing 
and storage systems and not on pastures. 
3.3.5 Nitrous oxide emissions from synthetic fertiliser application, organic animal waste 
and total fertiliser application 
An additional source of nitrous oxide emissions is mineral fertiliser application on the field. As 
already mentioned in this chapter, application of manure and anorganic fertiliser is allocated to 
crops according to calculated shares. This allows the differentiation of emission factors 
depending on the type of fertiliser applied. Based on several studies carried out in temperate 
regions of the world, the IPCC considers for synthetic and organic fertilisers an emission factor 
of 0.0125 kg of N2O-N per kg N (0.019 kg N2O per kg N). The following equation contains the 
approach followed in the calculation of N2O emissions from anorganic fertiliser application: 
(3.14) [ ] 28/44*****2 ,,,)(,, kr
k
krfirNfikrr XCdMFNutCorrNDOSynN ∑ ==  
Where: 
N2OSyn = nitrous oxide emissions from synthetic fertiliser application (in tonnes) 
Cd = nitrous oxide emission factor for N in mineral fertiliser (in kg N2O-N per kg N applied) 
MF = share of mineral fertiliser on total fertiliser application 
 
Total application of N in synthetic fertiliser per activity is estimated by calculating the total N 
application on crops (total N need by crops plus a regional over-fertilisation estimate, as 
previously seen) multiplied by the fraction of mineral fertiliser on total fertiliser application per 
crop activity. This weighting factor ( krMF , ) is calculated so that N in fertiliser statistical data 
published by FAOSTAT in the base year are met. Total emissions are therefore total N found in 
synthetic fertiliser application multiplied by an emission factor ( Cd ). 
N2O emissions are also produced from N content in organic waste from animals. Part of this 
manure is applied on crops (organic part of the N balance) and the rest is just ‘thrown away’ (if 
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N need by crops is fully covered)33. Emissions are therefore calculated according to the 
following equation: 
 
(3.15) [ ] 28/44***1(*2 ,)(,,)(,, kr
k
NfojrNfojrr XCeAmmOFNSOWasN ∑ == −=  
Where: 
N2OWas = nitrous oxide emissions from animal organic waste (in tonnes) 
Ce = nitrous oxide emission factor for N in manure application (in kg N2O-N per kg N applied), 
IPCC default emission factor 
 
Alternatively, total fertiliser application (synthetic and organic) can also be calculated according 
to the following equation: 
(3.16) 
( )[
] 28/44**
**)1/(**2
,
)(,,,,,
kr
k
graskrrkrfrfkrr
X
CeOFCdAmmMFMFNutCorrNDOAppN ∑ ≠+−=
 
Where: 
N2OApp = nitrous oxide emissions from total fertiliser application (in tonnes) 
 
In table (13) N2O emission factors per activity for synthetic fertiliser application are presented. 
N2O emission factors for total fertiliser application are also included for comparison purposes. It 
is important to note that although the latter source is not considered by the UNFCCC reporting 
guidelines it is, however, quite important from the current modelling perspective since it includes 
the fraction of total N in fertiliser handled in the model and therefore entering the N flow (it does 
not include the part of N in manure not taken up by crops). 
                                                 
33 It is important to note here that ‘managed manure’ (as previously defined in this chapter) is not included in the 
calculation of N2O emissions from animal waste in order to avoid a double-counting problem. 
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Table (13) Estimations of nitrous oxide emission factors for fertiliser application on crop 
activities: synthetic and total (average for the EU-15) 
N2O Synthetic 
Fertiliser
N2O Fertiliser 
Application
N2O Synthetic 
Fertiliser
N2O Fertiliser 
Application
Soft Wheat 2.58 2.96 Tomatoes e 2.63 2.82
Durum wheat 1.14 1.33 Other vegetables e 1.07 1.13
Rye 1.42 1.65 Apples e 0.45 0.48
Barley 1.41 1.63 Other fruits e 0.38 0.40
Oats 1.18 1.35 Citrus e 0.97 1.04
Maiz 2.16 2.52 Table grapes e 0.65 0.70
Other cereals 2.12 2.43 Table wine e 0.41 0.44
Paddy rice 2.95 3.31 Other wine e 0.42 0.45
Rape 1.94 2.13 Nurseries e 0.71 0.74
Sunflowers 1.01 1.12 Flowers e 1.46 1.53
Soya 3.07 3.47 Other crops e 5.55 5.85
Olives for oil e 0.42 0.45 Maize for fodder 0.66 2.88
Other oil e 2.86 3.17 Fodder root crops 0.29 1.85
Pulses 0.01 0.03 Other fodder on arable land 0.63 2.03
Potatoes 2.76 3.02 Non food production on set aside 1.60 1.75
Sugar Beet 2.08 2.29 Grass extensive 0.69 0.72
Tobacco e 1.71 1.90 Grass intensive 1.82 1.89
Other industrial crops e 5.56 6.10  
Source: own calculations; 2001 three year average calibration year. 
Measurement units: kg per head and year. 
e Activities not endogenously determined in the model: either econometrically estimated (vegetables, flowers, 
tobacco, fruits and perennial crops; see section 2.5.5) or residual positions (other industrial crops and other crops). 
 
By comparing both columns in table (13), it can be observed that most of the organic fertiliser 
applied on crops is going to maize for fodder, fodder root crops and other fodder on arable land 
(large differences between total fertiliser application and synthetic fertiliser application). Pulses 
cover a high fraction of their N need through biological fixation (see section 3.3.7) and therefore 
receive almost no synthetic fertiliser. Table (14) summarises the N2O emission coefficients for 
total ‘unmanaged’ manure produced by animal activities in the EU-15. Emissions per head are 
directly related to manure production (see also table (5)). 
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Table (14) Estimations of nitrous oxide emission factors for animal waste (average for the 
EU-15) 
N2O Animal 
Waste
Bulls high weight 0.76
Bulls low weight 0.29
Calves female fattening 0.19
Calves female raising 0.35
Calves male fattening 0.19
Calves male raising 0.35
Dairy cows high yield 2.52
Dairy cows low yield 1.55
Heifers high weight 0.59
Heifers low weight 0.19
Heifers raising 0.81
Hens * 10.66
Pigs fattening 0.09
Poultry for fattening * 0.70
Sheep and goats for milk 0.032
Sheeps and goats for fattening 0.005
Sows 0.45
Suckler cows 0.87  
Source: own calculations; 2001 three year average calibration year. 
Measurement units: kg per head and year. 
* Emissions measured for 1000 heads. 
 
3.3.6 Nitrous oxide emissions from crop residues 
Crop residues left on the field are also a source of N through decomposition and therefore 
subject to nitrous oxide losses. It is not a very important source of emissions in Europe but it is 
included in the NGHGIs and reported by Member States to the UNFCCC. In the following table, 
the main input data in the calculation of this emission source is shown: 
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Table (15) Selected crop residue statistics 
 Residue/Crop 
Product Ratio 
Dry Matter 
Fraction 
Nitrogen 
Fraction 
Soft Wheat 1.3 0.85 0.0028 
Durum Wheat 1.3 0.85 0.0028 
Rye 1.6 0.90 0.0048 
Barley 1.2 0.85 0.0043 
Oats 1.3 0.92 0.0070 
Maize 1.0 0.78 0.0081 
Other Cereals 1.4 0.88 0.0070 
Paddy Rice 1.4 0.85 0.0067 
Pulses 2.1 0.83 0.0150 
Rape 3.0 0.83 0.0150 
Potatoes 0.4 0.20 0.0110 
Sugar Beet 0.2 0.30 0.0110 
Source: adapted from IPCC, 2000, p. 4.58. Original data from Strehler, Stützle, 1987; for sugarcane Turn et al., 
1997; dry matter and nitrogen fraction data for oats, rye, sorghum, peas and peanuts from Cornell, 1994; and 
nitrogen fraction data for millet and soybeans from Barnard, Kristofferson, 1985. 
 
In this analysis a simple calculation procedure based on the IPCC methodology (Tier 1b method) 
is used since no data on crop residues for single activities and regional residue burning practices 
is available at a regional level. In the following equation, the potential crop residue 
decomposition is estimated and weighted with the default emission factor of 0.0125 kg of N2O-N 
per kg N ( Ce ) to calculate emissions: 
(3.17) 
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Where: 
N2OCro = nitrous oxide emissions from crop residues on the field (in tonnes) 
Yield = yield (tonnes of a crop product per hectare for each activity) 
RSCR = fraction of residue to crop product (share) 
CRDM = dry matter fraction of crop residue (share) 
CRNI = N fraction of crop residue (share) 
CRBU, CRFU, CRFE = fraction of crop residue burned, used as fuel or for animal feeding and, 
therefore, not left on the field 
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The amount of biomass entering the crop residue pool is calculated from regional crop 
production data by discounting the share of product harvested ( oRSCR−1 ). The N content of the 
remaining crop residue is estimated for different products by weighting it with its dry matter 
( oCRDM ) and N fraction factors ( oCRNI ). Additionally, residues that are burned on the field or 
used for fuel or feeding use are substracted34. Result estimates are shown in table (16), 
section 3.3.8. 
3.3.7 Nitrous oxide emissions from nitrogen-fixing crops 
Most plants make use of N in the form of ammonium or nitrate ions. The process of conversion 
from atmospheric N2 to available N is called nitrogen fixation. One specific way of N fixation is 
‘biological fixation’, where certain bacteria that live in symbiosis with legumes (peas, beans, 
clover, etc.) fix N in their roots and convert N2 into ammonium (NH4+). The ‘manufacture’ of 
nitrogenous fertiliser by crops adds some amount of N to the cycle which is also subject to losses 
in the form of N2O emissions through nitritification processes. In the current modelling 
approach, pulses are assumed to generate through biological fixation around 75 % of their N 
need, other fodder on arable land 10 % and grass and grazings 5 %. Although the N2O 
conversion coefficient for biological fixation is uncertain, the default IPCC emission factor of 
0.0125 kg N2O-N per kg N is generally accepted. 
In the next equation the approach followed in the quantification of these emissions is defined: 
(3.18) [ ] 28/44*****2 ,)()(,)(,, kr
k
pulseskNfirNfikrr XCeNfixNutCorrNDOFixN ∑ ====  
Where: 
N2OFix = nitrous oxide emissions from N coming from biological fixation by certain crops (in 
tonnes) 
3.3.8 Nitrous oxide emissions from atmospheric deposition 
An additional source of N in agriculture is atmospheric deposition. N compounds are carried by 
rainfall, fertilising agricultural soils and consequently enhancing nitrous oxide formation. N2O 
emission estimates in literature vary between 0.002 and 0.016 kg N2O-N per kg N added to the 
soil. Based on these studies, the IPCC proposed to take an emission factor of 0.01 kg N2O-N per 
kg N deposited on various ecosystems, including forests and grassland (IPCC, 1997, Table 4.23 
of the Reference Manual), as a representative coefficient for N deposited on land. The idea 
                                                 
34 These emissions do not enter agricultural emission from soils. 
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behind this is that part of the N losses from mineral and organic fertiliser volatilised in ammonia 
are transported offsite and become available again through rainfall for agricultural soils, thus 
indirectly generating N2O emissions. Cole et al. estimated that 0.75 % of the N released in 
ammonia losses from agricultural production evolves back to the atmosphere after deposition 
(Cole et al., 1995). The following equation defines the calculation of N2O emissions from this 
source implemented in the model: 
(3.19) 
[
] 28/44****
****2
,)(,,)(,,
,,)(,,
irNfoirNfoir
i
rirfirNfiirr
XCfAmmOFNS
CfAmmMFMFNutCorrNDOAmmN
==
=∑ +=
 
Where: 
N2OAmm = nitrous oxide emissions from N in ammonia losses deposited back on agricultural 
soils (in tonnes) 
i = production activity (animal or crop activity Æ k, j ∈ i) 
Cf = nitrous oxide emission factor for ammonia losses (in kg N2O-N per kg N applied) 
 
The CAPRI ammonia emission module in itself is based on N output from animals and includes 
uniform emission factors per animal activity taking into account differences in storage and 
housing systems between European Member States. The general approach applies factors 
derived from the European Emission Inventory Guidebook (2001 edition). Figure (8) shows the 
different ammonia sources covered in the model. 
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Figure (8) Structure of the ammonia emission module 
Nitrogen
from animals
Total crop
N Need
NH3Mineral N
N losses on
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NH3
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N losses in 
manure applicationNH3
 
Source: Adaptation of the NFM Model for CAPRI (Pérez et al., 2003). 
Note: white arrows determine ammonia losses (NH3) and black arrows N flows. 
 
First of all, the share of time spent on grassland and in the stable is obtained for each animal type 
and Member State. With this information ammonia losses on grassland/pastures and in the stable 
are calculated, the latter being further divided into liquid and solid housing systems. Secondly, 
manure produced in the stable is divided according to the storage type observed (‘covered’, ‘not 
covered’ or ‘no storage’), where again Member State specific coefficients determine NH3 losses. 
Finally, losses during application of manure and mineral fertiliser on the field are also calculated. 
All N losses from the mentioned sources are added up in order to calculate total N losses and 
used, as already explained, as input in the estimation of indirect N2O emissions. 
This approach is used in equation (3.19) to calculate indirect N2O emissions from atmospheric 
deposition (it covers only deposited N coming from ammonia emissions caused by the 
agricultural activity, ‘closed-system’ approach). However, it is important to note that this does 
not reflect the observed quantities of N fallen on agricultural land and, therefore, cannot be used 
directly by the model. On the one side, the share of ammonia emissions mentioned does not have 
to fall back again on agricultural land and, on the other side, N deposited on agricultural soils 
might also come from emissions in other sectors (e.g. industry). In order to model a consistent N 
balance, a second direct approach has to be adopted. This is based on regional data on N fallen 
on agricultural land ( krNatm , ). The information is condensed in the following equation: 
CHAPTER 3 
 65 
(3.20) [ ] 28/44***2 ,, kr
k
krr XCeNatmODepN ∑=  
Where: 
N2ODep = nitrous oxide emissions from N fallen on agricultural land through rainfall (in 
tonnes) 
 
Information on N deposition at Member State level (between 3 and 36 kg of N per hectare) and 
uptake rates per crop activity (50 to 58 %) are incorporated into the model. Available N per crop 
from atmospheric deposition is therefore calculated by combining the observed N coming from 
atmospheric deposition at a regional level and N absorption capacity per crop. For example, a 
hectare of soft wheat in Austria gets around 12 kg of N from rainfall, 103 kg being the total 
observed per hectare in 2001 (average). In practice, by considering additional sources of N such 
as atmospheric deposition and biological fixation, the amount of fertiliser needed in certain 
regions is lowered and the model becomes more realistic35. 
In table (16) nitrous oxide emission factors are reported for crop residues, biological fixation and 
atmospheric deposition on agricultural soils: 
                                                 
35 The rest of N coming from atmospheric deposition and not taken up by crops is also subject to ammonia 
volatilisation but considered as part of the N surplus in the system and not analysed separately (emission from 
soils). 
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Table (16) Estimations for selected activities of nitrous oxide emission factors for crop 
residues, biological fixation and atmospheric deposition (average for the EU-15) 
N2O crop 
residues1
N2O biological 
fixation
N2O atmospheric 
deposition 
(indirect) 2
N2O atmospheric 
deposition 
(direct)
Soft wheat 0.41 - 0.08 0.19
Durum wheat 0.13 - 0.06 -
Rye 0.66 - 0.04 0.25
Barley 0.40 - 0.04 0.16
Oats 0.56 - 0.03 0.12
Maize 1.04 - 0.09 0.14
Other cereals 0.93 - 0.07 -
Paddy rice 0.92 - 0.15 -
Rape 2.22 - 0.06 0.20
Sunflowers - 0.29 0.04 0.11
Soya - - 0.17 0.13
Pulses 1.39 - 0.0005 0.14
Potatoes 0.61 - 0.08 0.20
Sugar beet 1.51 - 0.07 0.21
Maize for fodder - 0.24 0.02 0.21
Fodder root crops - 0.06 0.01 0.20
Other fodder - 0.13 0.02 0.15
Grass extensive - - 0.02 0.17
Grass intensive - - 0.06 0.17  
Source: own calculations; 2001 three year average calibration year. 
Measurement units: kg per head and year. 
1 Only a selection of endogenous activities in the model relevant for the calculation of N2O emissions from 
agricultural soils is presented. 
2 These coefficients are also calculated for animal activities (ammonia losses from manure). 
 
Indirect N2O emissions from deposition of N released as ammonia are attached through a 
coefficient to animal (NH3 losses from manure) and crop activities (NH3 losses from mineral 
fertiliser application). However, for observed atmospheric deposition only crop activities are 
affected (N fallen on land). In the first case, N is ‘recycled’, i.e. ammonia emissions are 
produced in a first stage and nitrous oxide emissions in a second. In the latter case, N from 
atmospheric deposition is regarded as a new and independent source of nutrients36.  
                                                 
36 Both emission factors cannot be directly compared (see also comments in the following section about reporting 
and modelling issues). 
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3.4 Estimation of regional greenhouse gas emission inventories 
3.4.1 Defining the boundaries of the analysis: the ‘UNFCCC approach’ 
As previously mentioned, the UNFCCC follows a ‘closed-system’ approach so that only GHG 
emissions from agricultural sources are attributed to agriculture. This has two important 
implications for this study: the definition of the boundaries of the agricultural sector and the need 
for modelling tools able to consistently mimic this emission accounting approach. 
For consistency purposes with the UNFCCC approach, indirect emissions from fertiliser 
production and energy consumption will not be calculated in the model (see appendix 6 for a 
possible modelling approach). Similarly, emissions from machinery production processes and 
transport of agricultural products will also be excluded from the analysis since they are covered 
in other sectors. However, from the current modelling perspective the UNFCCC approach 
presents two problems. First, in the presented analysis nutrient requirement functions for crop 
activities are endogenously modelled. This implies that although emissions from activities 
exogenous to the model, and therefore not covered by these functions, can be ‘passively’ 
calculated, they will not be included in the endogenous response of the model (simulation stage). 
This is the case for nitrous oxide emissions from animal organic waste, as discussed in 
section 3.3.5. Secondly, a ‘consistent N flow’ is modelled by the supply component of CAPRI, 
all N sources and sinks being included. This means that N coming from other sectors of the 
economy through atmospheric deposition on agricultural soils can affect the behaviour of the 
model. This source is, however, not included in the NGHGIs for agricultural emissions (this was 
briefly discussed in section 3.3.8). 
Figure (9) gives an overview of the reported and modelled sources confronted with the current 
UNFCCC official reporting obligations. 
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Figure (9) Reported and modelled emission sources. 
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Source: the UNFCCC Reporting follows the IPCC Good Practice Guidance (IPCC, 2000). The CAPRI Codes for 
emission sources are defined in section 3.3 (see table (7)). 
1 Emission coefficients for these sources are given as fixed parameters by the IPCC (IPCC, 1997). They are included 
in CAPRI only for comparison purposes but are not further used in the modelling analysis. 
 
In this figure a discontinuous border is drawn for emission sources not covered in both reporting 
systems. Sources matching both reporting systems in their definition are linked with a 
continuous arrow (e.g. Tier 2 calculation of methane from enteric fermentation). In the case of 
major differences in the definition of the source, a discontinuous arrow is used (e.g. methane 
from rice cultivation). Some other sources are calculated in one reporting system but not used or 
calculated in the other (e.g. Tier 1 calculated emission sources). They are not further used in the 
modelling analysis and therefore isolated in the chart. Sources endogenously entering the 
simulation part of the model are linked with an arrow to the word “modelling”. 
 
All methane sources reported by UNFCCC parties are fully covered in the model. The only 
differences are found in emissions from rice cultivation which are modelled but are not subject to 
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the degree of differentiation that is available in the NGHGIs. Tier 1 emissions from enteric 
fermentation or manure management (fixed emission factors) are included in CAPRI only for 
comparison purposes but are generally not found in the NGHGIs (at least for most European 
countries and sources). 
In the case of nitrous oxide, differences are found in the definition of biological fixation and crop 
residues sources. The calculation for these sources is done in the model for a restricted number 
of crop activities. Emissions from cultivation of histosols and N leaching are reported to the 
UNFCCC but not calculated with CAPRI37. Emissions from total N in fertiliser applied to crops 
are covered in the model but not in the NGHGIs, as previously mentioned. Emissions from 
deposition of ammonia losses in the model match the rubric ‘atmospheric deposition’. 
Additionally, emissions from direct atmospheric deposition on agricultural soils (total N coming 
from rainfall) are calculated for modelling purposes (see discussion in section 3.3.8). 
3.4.2 Validation of results 
Once emission factors are carefully specified for all agricultural emission sources, inventories of 
GHG emissions can be consistently calculated across sources and/or regional units. At this stage 
it is important to compare the estimates obtained in the model with official UNFCCC statistics, 
as a data validation process. 
For modelling purposes the year 2001 is selected as the base year situation. A complete ex-post 
run of the model is therefore performed at Nuts 2 regional level, all equations of the model being 
solved simultaneously. The information obtained is aggregated at Member State level and 
compared to the official inventory data for agricultural sources reported to the UNFCCC38. A 
comparison is also included for sub-sources under the rubric ‘agricultural soils’39. In table (17), 
modelled results on methane and nitrous oxide emissions are reported at Member State level. 
                                                 
37 Since they are a considerable source of emissions, they will be exogenously considered for comparison purposes 
(see tables and figures in section 3.4.2). 
38 The European Environmental Agency collects annually information on GHG emissions and sources for 
agriculture submitted by European Member States to the UNFCCC and in line with the IPCC Guidelines (EEA 
data service, http://dataservice.eea.eu.int/dataservice, access: January 2004).  
39 Information provided by the Joint Research Centre of the European Commission in Ispra (Italy); courtesy of 
Mr. Adrian Leip, Climate Change Unit. 
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Table (17) Methane and nitrous oxide emissions from agriculture (EU-15 Member States) 
CH4 N2O CH4 N2O Total CH4 N2O CH4 N2O Total Totalc CH4 N2O Total Totalc
EU-15 8549.1 705.6 179.5 218.7 398.3 7658.8 511.1 160.8 158.5 319.3 380.7 -10.4% 0.5% -19.8% -4.4%
Austria 193.4 11.4 4.1 3.5 7.6 170.0 9.3 3.6 2.9 6.4 7.4 -12.1% 7.7% -15.3% -2.9%
Belgium 346.8 16.8 7.3 5.2 12.5 220.3 11.0 4.6 3.4 8.1 12.8 -36.5% 56.4% -35.6% 2.3%
Denmark 172.9 25.5 3.6 7.9 11.6 184.0 14.0 3.9 4.3 8.2 10.6 6.4% -14.6% -28.9% -8.0%
Finland 84.2 12.1 1.8 3.7 5.5 87.5 6.8 1.8 2.1 3.9 5.6 3.8% -0.5% -28.4% 0.9%
France 2087.5 176.0 43.8 54.5 98.4 1903.6 128.0 40.0 39.7 79.7 96.6 -8.8% 3.7% -19.0% -1.9%
Germany 1209.2 128.5 25.4 39.8 65.2 1190.3 96.9 25.0 30.1 55.0 64.6 -1.6% -0.7% -15.6% -1.0%
Greece 175.1 20.5 3.7 6.3 10.0 158.1 12.3 3.3 3.8 7.1 7.1 -9.7% -40.1% -28.9% -28.9%
Ireland 527.3 26.1 11.1 8.1 19.2 433.0 19.7 9.1 6.1 15.2 16.3 -17.9% -11.2% -20.7% -15.1%
Italy 871.1 78.2 18.3 24.2 42.5 701.3 52.6 14.7 16.3 31.0 38.7 -19.5% -1.0% -27.1% -8.9%
Netherlands 410.6 23.1 8.6 7.2 15.8 390.4 22.0 8.2 6.8 15.0 16.5 -4.9% 15.6% -4.9% 4.4%
Portugal 279.8 19.0 5.9 5.9 11.8 172.7 8.2 3.6 2.6 6.2 7.6 -38.3% -33.3% -47.4% -35.8%
Spain 1120.6 62.8 23.5 19.5 43.0 876.1 54.7 18.4 16.9 35.3 39.1 -21.8% 6.2% -17.8% -9.1%
Sweden 156.5 18.0 3.3 5.6 8.9 129.3 9.1 2.7 2.8 5.5 8.0 -17.4% -5.7% -37.5% -10.0%
United Kingdom 914.0 87.7 19.2 27.2 46.4 1042.3 66.5 21.9 20.6 42.5 50.0 14.0% 3.4% -8.4% 7.8%
% differences
UNFCCC CAPRI
1000 tonnes Mio tonnes CO2eq 1000 tonnes Mio tonnes CO2eq
(CAPRI / UNFCCC)
Mio tonnes CO2eq
 
Source: own calculations; 2001 three year average calibration year for CAPRI and year 2001 for NGHGIs; 
Luxembourg is modelled together with Belgium. 
c For comparison purposes nitrous oxide emissions are corrected by adding up histosols and nitrogen leaching 
emissions from NGHGIs (they are not modelled in CAPRI). 
 
Endogenously calculated methane emissions for the EU-15 lay 10.4 % below official data. For 
single countries, differences vary between -38.3 % for Portugal and 14 % for United Kingdom. 
These deviations may be due to differences in the specification of certain activities 
(e.g. grassland, set aside, etc.), chosen animal statistics40, inconsistencies in EUROSTAT 
agricultural statistics and/or reporting differences by single Member States since similar rules for 
calculation of methane emission factors are used. The modelled results seem, however, quite 
plausible since they do not deviate much for the EU-15 aggregate and are subject to strict 
regional consistency rules (advantage of the selected modelling approach). For nitrous oxide 
emissions, the situation is rather different. In this case, comparison is not that straightforward 
since specific rules for the calculation of emission factors are used by countries and, moreover, 
some sources from agricultural soils are not included in the model due to lack of data (see figure 
(9)) For single countries differences vary between -40.1 % for Greece and +56.4 % for Belgium. 
Deviations in total GHG emissions (expressed in carbon dioxide equivalents) vary between 
                                                 
40 Animal accounting (e.g. census) is not homogenous across countries. In the CAPRI model, data on slaughtering 
statistics are used. 
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-35.8 % for Portugal and 7.8 % for United Kingdom, with an average deviation of -4.4 % for the 
EU-15. 
In figure (10) these differences are expressed graphically in terms of global warming 
potentials (CO2eq). 
Figure (10) Comparison between model estimations and national greenhouse gas 
emission inventories for methane and nitrous oxide emissions in global warming 
potentials (EU-15 Member States) 
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Source: own calculations, 2001 three year average calibration year for CAPRI and year 2001 for NGHGIs; 
Luxembourg is modelled together with Belgium. 
Measurement units: Mio tonnes of CO2eq. 
Note: nitrous oxide emissions are corrected in these figures for comparison purposes (see table (17)). 
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From a different perspective, table (18) summarises emissions and differences with respect to 
official GHG emission inventories for single agricultural emission sources and sub-sources 
(EU-15 as an aggregate): 
Table (18) Greenhouse gas emissions from agricultural sources (average for the EU-15) 
CH4 N2O CH4 N2O CH4 N2O
4.  N2O Agriculture (corrected) 1 8549.1 705.6 7658.8 709.1 -10.4% 0.5%
4.  N2O Agriculture 8549.1 705.6 7658.8 511.1 -10.4% -27.6%
A.  Enteric Fermentation 6268.1 0.0 5820.9 0.0 -7.1%  -
B.  Manure Management 2155.6 69.6 1758.2 44.2 -18.4% -36.4%
C.  Rice Cultivation 111.4 0.0 79.8 0.0 -28.4%  -
D.  Agricultural Soils 7.0 634.9 0.0 466.9  - -26.5%
 --- Atmospheric Deposition (ammonia vol.) 0.0 37.2 0.0 48.7  - 30.8%
 --- Animal Production (N excretion on pasture) 0.0 89.8 0.0 93.8  - 4.4%
 --- Crop Residues 0.0 36.3 0.0 30.9  - -14.8%
 --- N fixation 0.0 14.4 0.0 7.7  - -46.8%
 --- Org fertiliser (Animal Waste) 0.0 92.8 0.0 104.9  - 13.0%
 --- Syn fertiliser (application) 0.0 166.3 0.0 180.9  - 8.8%
 --- Histosols 0.0 18.0  -  -  -  -
 --- Nitrate Leaching 0.0 148.2  -  -  -  -
 --- Other 0.0 31.8  -  -  -  -
E.  Prescribed Burning of Savannas 0.0 0.0  -  -  -  -
F.  Field Burning of Agricultural Residues 7.0 1.2  -  -  -  -
G.  Other 0.0 0.0  -  -  -  -
CAPRIUNFCCC % differences        (CAPRI / UNFCCC)
 
Source: own calculations; 2001 three year average calibration year for CAPRI and year 2001 for NGHGIs. 
Measurement units: 1000 tonnes. 
1 Nitrous oxide emissions are corrected for comparison purposes (histosols and nitrogen leaching as exogenous).  
 
Deviations in total methane emissions are mostly due to variations in manure management 
emissions (-18.4 %). One of the reasons is that the fraction of N in manure ‘managed’ by the 
model (part subject to ammonia losses) is lower than the one used by Member States, which do 
not always use IPCC default management parameters41. This is also reflected in nitrous oxide 
emissions (-13.4 % when summing up manure management and excretion on grazings, the latter 
being just an additional management type counted under agricultural soil emissions). There is 
also an over-estimation of N2O animal waste emissions (13 %) due to a higher amount of manure 
produced in the model (through manure-output functions) than in the statistics used by Member 
States. However, by correcting total nitrous oxide emissions for the missing sub-sources 
(histosols and N leaching), official inventory data are almost perfectly matched for the EU-15 as 
                                                 
41 Closer estimates could be obtained by using country specific manure management parameters in the model. This 
is, however, not exempt from problems since these coefficients would have to be internationally validated and 
would introduce uncertainty in the calculation. 
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an aggregate (0.5 %). A further disaggregation of emission sources and sub-sources at Member 
State level is given in appendix 7. 
In their construction, GHG emission inventories have been thoroughly examined by comparing 
emission factors and activity data for single countries used by NGHGIs (data obtained from 
national statistical bodies) and the model (data from EUROSTAT and FAOSTAT). The main 
remaining differences are due to statistical differences in activity data (e.g. application of organic 
fertiliser per Member State), coverage of polluting activities (e.g. atmospheric deposition) and 
use of different data and emission factors (e.g. crop residues)42. For this reason, model 
estimations cannot be considered as less accurate than official reporting data. As a consequence, 
the modelling approach can be validated, covering 100 % of methane emissions and around 
72 % of nitrous oxide emissions reported (without correction for histosols and N leaching 
sources). 
3.4.3 Interpretation of results 
Manure management emissions (methane und nitrous oxide), fertiliser application (nitrous oxide) 
and enteric fermentation (methane) are the most important sources of GHGs in European 
agriculture (see table (18)). Any effective mitigation policy should carefully cover these major 
sources and target the corresponding polluting activities, balancing emission coverage (number 
of sources regulated) and transaction costs. It should also look at the regional production 
structure, which can alter the ranking of most emitting sources. 
From the regional perspective, France and Germany are the Member States with the highest 
amount of estimated emissions (for methane 40 and 25 Mio tonnes of CO2eq respectively and for 
nitrous oxide 57 and 40). This is of course mainly related to their weight in European agriculture. 
In order to avoid this scaling problem, in the following two figures total methane and nitrous 
oxide emissions are assumed to be uniformly distributed on agricultural land within a Nuts 2 
region and are reported per hectare. The result is a useful environmental pressure indicator at a 
regional level that is independent of the production level and therefore isolates the polluting 
effect of a different regional production-mix: 
                                                 
42 A detailed analysis of these differences has been completed by the author for the expert meeting on improving the 
quality of greenhouse gas emission inventories for category 4D in September 2004 (Pérez, 2004a). 
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Figure (11) Methane emissions per hectare (Nuts 2 regions) 
   
Source: own calculations; 2001 three year average. 
Measurement units: tonnes of methane per hectare. 
 
In figure (11) regions that combine intensive pig or cattle production systems and have a small 
surface (high stocking density) present higher emission values. This is the case for the 
Netherlands and some northern regions of Spain. Estimated emissions per hectare vary between 
5 tonnes per hectare in Ile de France (FR100) and 267 tonnes per hectare in Gelderland (NL220). 
Germany, Ireland and South and Central England are characterised by medium-intensive cattle 
production systems (fodder produced to a large extent in the region) and show a more 
homogeneous range of values (between 50 and 70 tonnes of methane per hectare). 
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Figure (12) Nitrous oxide emissions per hectare (Nuts 2 regions) 
   
Source: own calculations; 2001 three year average. 
Measurement units: tonnes of nitrous oxide per hectare. 
 
A similar analysis for nitrous oxide emissions is shown graphically in figure (12). Estimated 
emissions per hectare vary between 0.8 tonnes per hectare in Corse (FR830) and 16.8 tonnes per 
hectare in Noord-Brabant (NL410). As in the case of methane, nitrous oxide emissions per 
hectare depend not only on the share of animal-producing activities but also on high-fertilising 
activities. The most polluting regions are found in the Netherlands and northern part of Germany 
(cattle production). Southern regions of Spain and Italy present proportionally higher emissions 
per hectare than in the case of methane due to the presence of fruits and vegetables, activities 
with a high fertiliser application per hectare. 
3.5 Conclusions 
In this chapter the accounting approach proposed by the IPCC is highlighted as the appropriate 
methodology for the calculation of sectoral GHG emissions and is consequently applied to the 
estimation of emission factors for agricultural sources in the CAPRI model. Twelve agricultural 
emission sources are individually modelled by following the proposed IPCC technical guidance 
(IPCC, 1997; IPCC, 2000) and estimated parameters/coefficients are compared with the existing 
literature. With this information on emission factors and activity data used by the model, national 
and regional GHG emission inventories (Nuts 2 level) are calculated for the year 2001 and 
validated through meticulous comparison with official NGHGIs. The presented modelling 
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methodology has some advantages for the estimation of GHG emissions from agricultural 
sources relative to the use of national independent studies (UNFCCC approach): (a) it enables a 
consistent and simultaneous analysis of emissions from crop and animal activities, (b) it makes 
use of transparent and accessible data sources and (c) it introduces an endogenous dose-response 
mechanism between production activities and emission sources which allows for further 
mitigation policy analysis. Nevertheless, as already mentioned, in this modelling approach not all 
emission sources can be covered, or fully covered, so that a certain trade-off between accuracy 
and applicability has to be accepted. In the following chapters, these estimates will serve as 
starting point for the analysis of mitigation policies. 
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CHAPTER 4 The Use of Emission 
Abatement Instruments: Tradable Permits 
as a Viable Option in Agriculture 
The problem is determining the best human signals and incentives to get 
people's net impact on the biosphere to be sustainable [The core of 
reflective pricing theory] (Jack Harich, sustainologist). 
4.1 Introduction 
The agricultural sector is a very heterogeneous sector. It involves many different production 
processes with strong physical and economical inter-linkages and has a highly disaggregated 
production structure. Consequently, efficient environmental policy needs to address a complex 
moving target since regulations on one activity or group of activities have indirect effects on 
others (pollution leakages might appear). Moreover, during the last 50 years, agriculture has 
proved to be a very sensitive political issue in Europe, resulting in a ‘chronically’ subsidised 
sector. Financial support has not been reduced although the contribution of agriculture to the 
European GDP has drastically decreased. This has provoked a distortion of the market forces 
driving the allocation mechanisms within the different common market organisations with 
noticeable economic losses as a consequence. In order to achieve a ‘more market-oriented 
agricultural policy’, economic instruments have to be chosen accordingly. Parallel to the 
ratification of new reform policy packages such as the ‘partial decoupling of CAP direct 
payments’ (Commission of the European Communities, 2003a), specific economic instruments 
in agri-environmental policy are expected to reduce market distortions43. 
In this chapter GHG emission standards and tradable permits, as the typical KP mitigation 
mechanisms, are analysed from a theoretical perspective. First, section 4.2 provides a brief 
history of the use of abatement instruments in pollution control. Section 4.3 gives a detailed 
review of the different types of abatement instruments found in the literature. In section 4.4, the 
basic economics of emission abatement are briefly revisited and the use of tradable emission 
                                                 
43 Most of the CAP reform efforts initiated in the last decade have been aiming at support deregulation, ‘with a view 
on stimulating European competitiveness’ (Commission of the European Communities, 1999). 
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permits in agriculture is justified by focusing on key theoretical aspects. Further, in section 4.5 
the problem of implementing tradable permits in agriculture is exposed. Section 4.6 draws some 
conclusions. 
4.2 Historical evolution of pollution abatement instruments 
Instruments for pollution abatement have been generally linked to the polluter-pays principle 
(PPP)44. The basic idea behind this principle is to make those who are responsible for causing 
environmental damage pay the costs of cleaning the environment, either directly by forcing them 
to adopt costly technologies or indirectly through the market mechanisms. During the 1970s and 
1980s environmental policy in Europe focused on direct regulation with non-compliance 
resulting in penalties. Command-and-control (CAC) instruments were used to address most 
environmental negative externalities such as urban air pollution, N leaching or methane 
emissions. As the name indicates, a CAC approach consists of a 'command' and a ‘control’ 
variable. Whereas the former sets a standard or maximum level of permissible pollution, the 
latter monitors and enforces the implementation of this standard. With these instruments, the PPP 
was fulfilled to a certain extent since polluters had to bear the costs of compliance, e.g. by 
producing less or by using different inputs and/or technologies. 
However, it is this characteristic of treating all polluters equally that pushed OECD countries 
during the 1990s to introduce different reforms in environmental policy regulation and to adopt 
market-based solutions (e.g. emission taxes or tradable permits). These instruments use market 
signals in the form of a modification of relative prices, or a financial transfer, to influence 
behaviour and reward environmental performance through the market (Egenhofer, 2003, p. 21). 
By doing this, a higher economic efficiency is achieved since polluters are allowed to vary their 
pollution level according to their marginal costs of abatement. Nevertheless, some problems 
linked to the application of these instruments might arise. Firstly it is not easy for policy-makers 
to justify the case that environmental performance can be achieved through eventually higher 
levels of pollution from specific sites (political problem) and, moreover, an inequitable 
redistribution of the abatement effort could take place since some producers might have a much 
more efficient production structure than others and would be therefore less affected 
economically by these instruments (targeting problem). 
                                                 
44 The polluter-pays-principle was first recognised as an internationally agreed principle by the OECD in 1972 and 
adopted by the EC in 1975 as the basic principle in environmental policy (OECD, 1994). 
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In this decade, the policy agenda is beginning to include a mixing of abatement instruments. The 
idea is to leave the concept of perfect optimality and introduce some adjustments on economic 
instruments in order to increase their applicability and acceptability (Egenhofer, 2003, p. 41). 
Examples of these are the introduction of minimum emission prices in permit markets (in order to 
reduce the risk of ‘hot air’45) or regional emission targets in tax systems (for ecological reasons).  
4.3 Types of greenhouse gas emission abatement instruments: 
command-and-control versus market-based approaches 
In environmental pollution control there are two types of instruments: standards or 
command-and-control instruments and economic or market-based instruments. For GHG 
emission abatement, there are basically three types of standards (Egenhofer, 2003; Austin, 1999): 
(1) ambient-quality standards, which define an environmental objective to be achieved in terms 
of the concentration of a specific pollutant in a certain area, (2) process or product standards, 
which are technology-based standards and delimit the technologies to be applied by potential 
polluters in the achievement of an environmental target or the characteristics to be fulfilled by 
the products used in the production process46 and (3) emission standards which focus on 
emissions of specific pollutants considered a proxy for environmental damages not easily 
measurable. An example of the current use of emission standards is the KP to the UNFCCC 
which foresees its combination with other market-based instruments. 
The most important market-based instruments in terms of their application to pollution 
abatement are taxes, subsidies and tradable emission permits (OECD, 1994). Charges and Taxes 
imply a payment made by polluters for every unit of pollution released into the environment, 
providing a solution to the failure of the free market which does not internalise this negative 
externality. Whereas taxes are compulsory contributions extracted for public purposes, charges 
or fees are imposed on users of certain public services (the one who benefits pays the bill and 
vice-versa). Since in the case of GHG emissions all economic sectors benefit from emission 
abatement, it is more appropriate to talk about taxes47. There are two different types of taxes: 
                                                 
45 ‘Hot air’ appears in emission markets which are not able to avoid that emissions are higher in the commitment 
period than in the reference situation, driven by the fact that emission restrictions are not binding for some 
polluters which act as sellers in the market. This is more likely to happen in an imperfect world market of GHG 
emissions, where potential sellers such as Russia and Central and Eastern European countries (current emissions 
much lower than in the reference period) but not potential buyers such as USA (current emissions much higher 
than in the reference period) participate. 
46 They are usually combined with other standards or market-based instruments, as bans on specific processes 
showing high potential risks of pollution. 
47 There is, however, some room for user charges related to global warming emissions, e.g. road user charges, but 
the boundaries of the definition and the externality targeted are in most cases not clearly defined. According to 
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product taxes and emission taxes. Product taxes affect products which cause emissions as they 
are manufactured, consumed or disposed of (OECD, 1994). In agriculture, there are several 
examples of product taxes, mainly applied to inputs such as fuels and fertiliser. Emission taxes 
imply a direct unitary payment on pollution output, in our case GHG emissions, and are also 
called green taxes since they are applied only on key polluting activities and have low 
distortionary effects on other economic activities. 
Direct subsidies arise from an inversion of the PPP since in this case polluters are given the right 
to pollute and are willing to change their behaviour in order to be compensated. Generally, 
subsidies for emission abatement take the form of soft loans, tax allowances and R&D payments. 
They try to induce a polluting sector to comply with an emission target by reducing its 
investment deficit on pollution control. In other words, direct subsidies can be thought of as 
negative taxes and are in theory paid proportionally according to the abatement effort 
(market-based instrument). 
Tradable emission permits and their economic mechanism are explained in detail in the 
following sections. A market of tradable permits is defined as an economic policy instrument 
under which ‘rights to discharge pollution or exploit resources can be exchanged’ (FAO and 
EEA definition). The basic tradable permit system is called cap-and-trade system, where an 
emission target is fixed (cap on emissions) for a number of emitters in one or various sectors. 
Emission allowances are distributed among emitters, either auctioned or ‘grandfathered’48, and 
may then be traded. This is shown graphically for two emitters belonging to the same sector in 
the (A) representation of figure (13): 
                                                                                                                                                             
the legislation some of these charges should actually be defined as taxes but the economic literature does not 
always reflect these conceptual differences. 
48 Grandfathering implies a distribution of allowances ‘for free’, usually based on historical individual records. 
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Figure (13) Graphical representation of cap-and-trade and baseline-and-credit permit 
markets 
 
 
In figure (13) - (A) two emitters belonging to a regulated sector ‘S’ (ES1 and ES2) receive an 
allocation of allowances for a commitment period which is 20% below their historical emissions 
in a reference period (four and five vertical units respectively). This objective can be seen from 
an aggregated perspective as the sectoral ‘target on emissions’ (EST = seven units). The position 
of these two emitters as sellers or buyers in the permit market can be observed in the current 
period or at the beginning of the commitment period, but might vary at the end of the period 
depending on individual behaviour. 
Additionally, there are baseline-and-credit tradable permit systems. For their design, a cap on 
emissions is a pre-requisite (‘trade’ is not necessary)49. In figure (13) - (B), the sector ‘S’ is still 
affected by a cap-and-trade system, but additionally an emitter belonging to sector ‘O’ (EO1), a 
                                                 
49 In the literature these two systems are frequently defined as independent ‘types’ of tradable permit markets. In 
reality, they are not independent since credits can only be distributed within a sector regulated through an 
emission cap. 
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sector not affected by the ‘cap’, can voluntarily achieve emission credits by over-complying with 
an individual target. Contrary to the previous case, which refers to past emissions, the emission 
baseline for this emitter is calculated based on a certain production plan with the current 
technology in the commitment period (four units in the graph). Credits can only be earned by 
investing in new abatement technology since variations in output (e.g. capacity expansion) 
would imply a variation in the baseline (ex-ante instrument). The credits generated by sector ‘O’ 
can be freely sold in sector ‘S’ and the emission cap for this last one is reduced by the 
corresponding amount, as shown in the figure50. Trade would, however, only take place between 
these sectors when a potential for it exists, i.e. only if the emission cap on sector ‘S’ is actually 
binding51.  
A drawback of baseline-and-credit systems is ‘uncertainty’ since credits are distributed 
according to ‘future behaviour’. Nevertheless, it opens up the participation possibilities to sectors 
not included in the current emission abatement policy (e.g. agricultural sector). 
There are also other abatement instruments used by policy-makers and usually applied as 
market-based elements of the previously described instruments. On the one hand financial 
enforcement incentives try to raise the costs of non-compliance by imposing penalties over a 
predefined target. They are a key variable in the success of any environmental policy since no 
policy objective can be achieved without an appropriate enforcement mechanism. 
Non-compliance penalties have been one of the most difficult issues to deal with in international 
negotiations. On the other hand renewable emission quotas impose obligations on polluters to 
use a certain amount of renewable resources as inputs in the production process. These quotas 
can be basically seen as market-based technology standards on polluters since firms are not 
obliged to adjust their production process completely but only partially (by using renewable 
resources). 
Standards and market-based instruments have been recently combined. As previously mentioned, 
these policy-mixes have been increasingly seen as a way of overcoming some of the 
disadvantages of economic instruments (Egenhofer, 2003). This has been basically applied to 
tradable permit markets, resulting in two main types of ‘hybrid’ instruments. Tax-permit 
                                                 
50 A ‘gateway’ is usually used to control the flow of incoming credits in these systems. It can vary across systems. 
51 A baseline-and-credit system allocates a pre-determined emissions profile to each participant and allows trade in 
the unused portion of that profile, known as emission 'credits'. Moreover, baseline-credit arrangements might be 
used to supplement a mainstream cap-and-trade system as a means of extending emission coverage to sources and 
activities that might otherwise be difficult to include in a trading system (Australian Greenhouse Office, 1999). 
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instruments impose limits on permit price variability by setting either a minimum and/or a 
maximum price per emission unit. On the one side, a minimum price might contribute to 
reducing the risk of ‘hot-air’ and introduces some stability in the permit price-building 
mechanism. Consequently, countries with very low marginal abatement costs would not have the 
possibility to launch an excessive amount of permits in the market at a very low price52. On the 
other side, a maximum price might contribute to increasing the acceptability in the initial stages 
of the system. This can be achieved by allocating an infinite amount of permits at a certain price. 
Both price limits would be acting for the different actors in the market as taxes on emissions and 
would restrict free trade of permits. Standard-permit instruments imply a combination of specific 
targets for several sectors or pollution sources, mainly already achieved in the past through 
Negotiated Environmental Agreements (NEAs) and the implementation in parallel of a tradable 
permits system. There are therefore two different objectives, an ‘absolute or overall target’ for all 
sources of pollution and regions included in the permit market and a ‘relative or specific target’ 
for single sources and/or regions which have already signed an NEA. These are therefore 
excluded from complying with the absolute target. Whereas trade is unrestricted for all sources 
covered by the absolute ‘cap’ on emissions (absolute target), it is only allowed with sources 
having a NEA (relative target) if there is no net flow of permits into the sources covered by the 
absolute target. This is achieved by separating both types of sources by a ‘gateway’ which only 
allows unrestricted trade between all actors as long as the marginal abatement costs for the 
sources covered by the absolute target are lower than for the ones having a NEA. These hybrid 
instruments will not be the subject of further analysis in the current study. 
4.4 Theoretical issues: from emission standards to tradable emission permits 
4.4.1 Economics of emission abatement 
The most important explanation for pollution is the absence of a sufficient set of private property 
rights for environmental resources (Hanley et al., 1997, p. 130). In order to correct this market 
failure, incentives to environmental pollution control are introduced by governments. As 
mentioned, for GHG emission control, standards, as the typical CAC abatement instrument, and 
tradable emission permits, as the newest economic abatement instrument, can be applied. In this 
section, the basic economic theory behind these two instruments is explained. 
                                                 
52 This can be caused by high emission disparities between the reference period and the current one driving to an 
excessive distribution of permits in the initial situation (e.g. Russia in an international trading system for GHG 
emissions under the KP). 
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Emission standards are quantitative limits on the emission or discharge of a potentially toxic 
substance from a source. The simplest form for regulatory purposes is a uniform emission 
standard, where the same limit is placed on all emissions of a particular polluter. This can be 
graphically shown for two regions in the following figure: 
Figure (14) Emission standards and trading of emission permits for two firms 
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Source: based on general environmental economics (Hanley et al., 1997, p. 112). 
 
In figure (14) basic microeconomics are applied to the case of two agricultural firms with 
differentiated marginal abatement cost curves (MACC1 and MACC2)53. In this graphical 
example, both firms are required to comply with a total emission objective ette arg  which is 
allocated between them based on historical emissions ( ss ee 21 + ). This emission target is smaller 
than the initial unrestricted emission level maxe  ( 02
0
1 ee + ), where MACs are zero (no abatement). 
Perfect knowledge about the shape of the MACCs is assumed. 
However, as stated in textbooks, a reduction in total abatement costs can be achieved by 
introducing emission pricing at the level *p  (total emissions do not change compared to the 
                                                 
53 Abatement costs are considered direct costs of abatement (revenue losses derived from production readjustment 
and possible expenses on new abatement technology), associated transfer losses (payments such as emission 
taxes) and associated transfer gains (such as emission subsidies, ‘negative costs’). 
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situation with individual emission standards). Emission pricing implies lower abatement costs 
for both firms (sum of the area under both firms’ curves), as graphically shown: 
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A specific case of emission pricing under a given constant level of emissions is emission 
permits. The idea behind this instrument is ‘to create a market of emission rights which are 
interchangeable and allow producers to pollute’. In the absence of intervention (optimality 
conditions), market forces will determine the price of permits and provide emitters with the right 
incentives to arrange emission levels so that a cost-minimising solution is reached. This implies 
that the costs faced for the last emission unit abated by these two agricultural firms (revenue 
losses or increases in variable costs derived from production constraints) will be equal at the 
optimum54. In the graphical case, firm 1 will buy permits from firm 2 ( sp ee 11 −  or 
ps ee 22 − ). By 
doing this, both polluters move to a market equilibrium where pp is paid for each emission permit 
and face lower abatement costs of complying with ette arg . The total amount of emission rights in 
the market is regulated to be pp ee 21 + . 
It can be observed that with rising emission levels MACs for polluters decrease. This means that 
an agricultural firm with a low abatement effort faces lower costs of eliminating an additional 
emission unit than with a high abatement effort. Whereas in the first case it will have access to 
cheaper and less effective methods of abatement to achieve a reduction objective, in the second 
case it would have to make use of very effective and expensive technologies to get a similar 
result. From the production perspective, agricultural firms facing already high levels of emission 
abatement will have less technological adaptation alternatives in the production process and will 
face higher costs for an additional abatement unit. 
4.4.2 Arguments in favour of the use of tradable emission permits 
CAC instruments are nowadays partially overtaken by market-based ones due to their specific 
characteristics. One of the major drawbacks of standards is the need of effective enforcement. 
Regulatory authorities must activate enough resources to increase non-compliance costs for 
                                                 
54 This analysis does not take into account the issue of transaction costs. This will be analysed in chapter 6. 
The Use of Emission Abatement Instruments: Tradable Permits as a Viable Option in 
Agriculture 
86  
polluters over the marginal costs of pollution abatement55. Another problem is that these 
instruments are static, which means that they need permanent regulatory update with high costs 
attached to laborious negotiations. Moreover, they lack the necessary incentives for 
technological improvement and are not cost-effective. Market-based instruments, on the other 
hand, create an ongoing incentive to reduce continually aggregate emissions by attaching an 
explicit price to them (Kennedy, Laplante, 1999). They rely on the market forces to achieve 
emission reductions indirectly. 
The implementation of permit markets for abatement of agricultural GHG emissions is defended 
based on the following arguments: 
− Cost-effectiveness (static efficiency). There is a common agreement in economic literature 
that market-based instruments such as emission taxes and tradable emission permits, perform 
better than CAC instruments in terms of cost-effectiveness (Baumol, Oates, 1971; Pearce, 
Turner, 1990, chapter 7; Hoel, 1998, p. 80). Instead of having to comply with a fixed 
emission target, emission pricing allows firms to choose a production program based on their 
individual costs of abatement (as graphically presented in figure (14)). By doing this, more 
abatement from ‘low-cost polluters’ is implicitly required, which minimises the programme’s 
cost to the society.  
This cost-effectiveness argument should especially hold in a market-oriented agricultural 
sector such as the European one since agricultural producers have to compete with each other 
and are subject to the rules of a competitive market (coverage of variable costs, 
price-building mechanism, bankruptcy laws, etc.). However, from this perspective there is no 
difference between emission taxes and tradable permits. Taxes put a price on emissions 
directly by a government decision and permits indirectly by forcing existing and would-be 
emitters to compete in the market for a limited supply of permits (Wills, 1992, p. 1). 
− Technological change (dynamic efficiency). In terms of dynamic incentives for the adoption 
of ‘green’ technology, market-based instruments also perform better than CAC instruments. 
By attaching an explicit price to emissions, they introduce an ongoing incentive for firms to 
reduce their emission level continually (Kennedy, Laplante, 1999, p. 1). The adoption of 
cleaner technologies allows a firm to achieve a lower MACC, i.e. less cost for every 
                                                 
55 It is important to note that control costs attached to non-compliance are reduced in the case of market-based 
instruments due to the fact that the market acts as a control variable (e.g. tax on nitrogenous fertiliser). Other 
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additional emission unit abated than in the previous situation. The outcome for a single firm 
in terms of incentives for technological change depends on the shape of the marginal damage 
curve, the number of firms in the market and the response of policy-makers56. 
− Regulatory Flexibility. This is ‘the ability of the government to review all regulations to 
ensure that, while accomplishing their intended purposes, they do not unduly inhibit the 
ability of small entities to compete’ (National Marine Fisheries Service, 2001, p. 1). This 
characteristic is quite important in the implementation phase of a new emission abatement 
instrument, where adjustments are needed in order to guarantee environmental effectiveness. 
An adjustment in the number of permits issued in the market (e.g. motivated by new 
scientific research in the measurement of the climate change effect or due to new 
international commitments) might be politically and administratively easier to face for the 
regulatory institution than a correction of the emission tax rate (at least from the legislative 
perspective). Permit trading schemes are also often preferred to taxes because emission rights 
can be allocated once a political process has decided upon the total level of emissions 
permitted. Emission levies are not able to guarantee ex-ante a certain limit on emissions in 
the regulated sector since the government does not have perfect information on the cost 
structure of the polluting firms and regular adjustments are necessary to keep the system 
under optimality conditions. Any such adjustments in permit markets will, however, imply 
some negative effects in the system from an economic perspective since intervention in the 
market will affect the investment plans of its players (emission permits as investment assets). 
− Enforceability. One of the primary goals of an environmental enforcement program is to 
change human behaviour so that environmental requirements are complied with (EPA, 
1992, pp. 1-2). In literature, there are cases of monitoring and enforcement costs being 
reported as higher for traditional CAC instruments than for market-based instruments 
(INECE, 1996, p. 194). Nevertheless, this is not a general picture since for market-based 
                                                                                                                                                             
transaction costs might, however, also appear, having to be analysed on a more comprehensive assessment. 
56 According to Milliman and Prince, emission taxes and auctioned permits are the better facilitators of technological 
change. However, their analysis suggests that under auctioned permits, technological innovation will occur more 
rapidly and does not depend upon control adjustment (Milliman, Prince, 1989, p. 257-259). This is due to the fact 
that taxes, if the new technology is not patented, will be subject to a regulatory control, making the optimal 
outcome dependant on the firm’s response (some distorting actions might take place, e.g. overstating of cost 
reductions to the regulator). Nevertheless, several authors state that in a general dynamic context with known 
marginal damage curves neither taxes nor permits are optimal if governments can not predict their changes. There 
is therefore no unique ranking of these two policy instruments. Moreover, Kennedy argues that it is not possible 
to achieve efficient pricing ex-post and at the same time create the right incentives for technology adoption 
ex-ante using a single instrument (Kennedy, Laplante, 1999, p. 9; Denicolò, 1999, p. 184-186; Requate, 
1998, p. 159). 
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instruments new forms of enforcement might be required, thereby increasing their costs. It is, 
however, not easy to compare emission abatement instruments by means of this criterion 
since it does not pertain directly to economics and depends also on other factors, such as the 
geographical boundaries or characteristics of the regulated sector. In the case of agriculture, 
GHG emissions are caused by rather complex functions and are difficult to attribute to 
specific activities (non-point source pollution) which might not favour the use of 
market-based instruments. However, from the institutional perspective tradable permits have 
been applied in the CAP for many years (Weingarten, 2001, pp. 14-15). 
The analysis in this section and the strong movement by some major global players in the last 
two decades towards the use of tradable permit markets in pollution control strongly suggest that 
emission permits might be preferred in the case of agriculture to various other types of 
instruments. However, the complete replacement of CAC regulation is unrealistic since 
(1) pricing might not be in all cases ‘socially’ acceptable, (2) there is still little experience on the 
static and dynamic efficiency effects of market-based instruments, (3) tradable permits require 
expensive systems of data collection and monitoring and (4) new types of monitoring and 
enforcement might be needed, these costs not being necessarily lower than for CAC regulations 
(INECE, 1996, p. 197). In chapter 6, these issues will be further discussed by looking at some 
policy implementation examples. 
4.5 The problems of introducing tradable emission permits in agriculture 
There are nowadays no specific implementation examples of GHG emission abatement 
instruments in agriculture. This is mainly because action against the negative effects of climate 
change has gained importance in the last decade and other sectors of the economy have been 
targeted first, as they present a higher share of CO2 emissions than agriculture (e.g. energy or 
industry). However, as already mentioned in section 2.2.3, some progress has been made by the 
UNFCCC towards international agreements on the inclusion of LULUCF activities in the GHG 
emission inventories. The aim is to gain some understanding of the complex chemical processes 
involved in the calculation of GHG emissions and sinks from agricultural production activities 
and to generate common accounting and calculation procedures (measurement stage). Later, 
some of the economic instruments already tested in other economic sectors could be applied to 
the agricultural case (implementation stage). 
In Europe there have been several examples of environmental standards which have had at least 
an indirect effect on GHG emissions from agricultural sources: the EU nitrate directive (Council 
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of the European Communities, 1991) or specific limitations on animal stocking densities and 
fertiliser application per within country-specific extensification schemes. Other general 
instruments at an inter-sectoral level such as fuel taxes and pesticides have also addressed this 
environmental externality and have had an indirect effect on the agricultural sector57. 
Nevertheless, besides the Dutch nutrient quota trading system (Vukina, Wossink, 1999) there 
have been to date no signs of market-based instruments being applied exclusively to agricultural 
emissions. 
4.6 Conclusions 
In this chapter a brief overview on the principal economic instruments of GHG emission 
abatement is given with a special focus on emission standards and tradable emission permits. 
CAC and economic abatement instruments are confronted from a theoretical perspective. It is 
shown, that CAC instruments have two negative effects: (1) they tend to increase costs by 
forcing firms to apply expensive technologies for compliance and (2) they do not always allow 
for the development of new technologies since there is an absence of financial incentives to 
exceed a control target (Stavins, 2001). In other words, emission standards do not achieve an 
economically optimal solution. Some arguments in favour of the use of tradable emission 
permits are highlighted, as well as the problem of introducing them as an emission control tool in 
the agricultural sector. 
In chapter 5, the use of marginal values in mathematical optimisation problems is thoroughly 
explained. This theory is applied to the calculation of MACCs for GHG emissions from 
agricultural sources as an alternative approach to the direct modelling of emission prices. 
Further, and based on this information, chapter 6 concentrates on the modelling of a feasible 
cap-and-trade tradable emission permit market in European agriculture. 
 
                                                 
57 Agricultural fuels are subsidised in most European countries and therefore instead of introducing incentives to 
abate, contribute to higher CO2 emissions. 
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CHAPTER 5 Calculation of 
Marginal Abatement Cost Curves 
A less-understood aspect of the economic costs of climate change is how 
global warming will raise—and likely already is raising— Texan’s 
insurance rates […].Ultimately, global warming already is imposing real 
financial costs on consumers, whether they realize it or not (Joe Ridout, 
public citizen). 
5.1 Introduction 
In chapter 4 emission standards and tradable permits have been analysed as competing 
instruments of GHG emission abatement in agriculture and their main economic features have 
been explained in detail. In this chapter, the principal element of decision behind emission 
abatement policy is addressed, namely the marginal abatement cost curve. Nowadays, it is 
increasingly important to articulate the differences in marginal costs of abatement between 
emitters. As explained in the previous chapter, a uniform abatement policy that does not consider 
the different cost structures of polluters might lead to significant economic losses. 
The problems related to the analytical calculation of the marginal abatement cost curve have 
driven economic modellers to develop different methodological approaches. Within this research 
work, an alternative estimation approach to the usual direct modelling of carbon prices is 
presented. This will allow for the calculation of basic information used in the comparison 
between abatement instruments in the following two chapters. Section 5.2 contains a brief review 
on the basic mathematical programming concepts used in the model and introduces the notion of 
‘shadow value’. The main two modelling approaches followed by economic modellers to 
estimate GHG emission abatement costs are then explained in section 5.3. In section 5.4, the 
technical solution followed in CAPRI is explained and in section 5.5 regional MACCs for GHG 
emissions from agricultural sources are estimated and results analysed. 
5.2 The meaning of marginal values in mathematical programming 
In mathematical optimisation Lagrange multipliers are a method for dealing with constraints. 
Joseph-Louis Lagrange stated the general principle for maximising a function of n variables 
when there are one or more equations between the variables (Lagrange, 1797, p. 198): ‘il suffira 
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d'ajouter à la function proposée les functions qui doivent être nulles, multipliées chacune par 
une quantité indéterminée ...’58. The Lagrange multiplier is found in Larew, 1919: ‘The lambda's 
appearing in this sum are the functions of x sometimes called Lagrange multipliers.’ 
The Kuhn-Tucker theorem is a generalization of the Lagrange multipliers. Albert W. Tucker and 
Harold W. Kuhn developed this theorem, a basic result in linear programming and published 
their findings in a volume of conference proceedings. They extended the Lagrange Multiplier 
Rule to allow for inequality constraints. A general constrained non-linear optimisation problem 
can be formulated as follows (Sydsaeter, Hammond, 2002, pp. 501-544): 
(5.1) cyxgtsyxf ≤),(..),(max  
where ),( yxf  is the objective function to maximize and cyxg ≤),(  the constraint. 
For this problem the following Lagrange function can be defined: 
(5.2) ( ) [ ]cyxgyxfyxL −−= ),(),(, λ  
where λ  is the shadow value or price of the restriction (price associated with increasing the 
right-hand side c  or constraint). 
At the optimum the following first-order conditions must hold: 
(5.3) 0),('),(' 11 =−=∂
∂ yxgyxf
x
L λ   ,  0),('),(' 22 =−=∂
∂ yxgyxf
y
L λ  
and the ‘complementary slackness’ condition has to be fulfilled: 
(5.4) ( )cyxgif <=≥ ),(00λ 59  or written  [ ] 0),( =− cyxgλ  
 
This means that, at the optimum, λ  and/or cyxg −),(  have to equal zero, or equivalently any 
one of them may be non-equal zero (complementary inequalities). Equations (5.3) and (5.4) are 
                                                 
58[Translated] ‘It will be enough to add to the function proposed the functions which must be null, multiplied each 
one by an unspecified quantity’. 
59 Two possibilities: cyxgif <= ),(0λ  and cyxgif =≤ ),(0λ . 
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often called Kuhn-Tucker conditions60. Additionally the constraint ( cyxg ≤),( ) has to be 
fulfilled by the possible set of values given by the first-order conditions61. 
This general application of the Kuhn-Tucker theorem can be also formulated in the following 
example, which is closer to the current programming problem in its primal version: 
 (5.5) 
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Where: 
y = objective function (e.g. agricultural income) 
xi = production level of activity i 
bl = level of constraint l (physical or economic) 
mgi = gross margin of activity i 
n, m = number of activities and constraints respectively 
ali = matrix of coefficients which link constraints and activities 
λl = marginal value or ‘price’ associated with the constraint l 
 
The Lagrange Function for this optimisation problem would therefore be: 
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Taking into account that a non-negativity restriction for ix  is also included in the problem, two 
complementarity slackness conditions can be derived in equations (5.7) and (5.8): 
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According to this expression, the first derivative of the objective function with respect to ix  must 
be smaller or equal to the value of its constraints (‘resource cost’). In other words, production of 
a certain activity will take place only when its gross margin is able to cover its opportunity costs 
(constraints valued with shadow prices). 
                                                 
60 These conditions are ‘essentially necessary’; the sufficiency is guaranteed through the concavity of the 
Lagrangian. 
61 The authors recommend not differentiating with respect to lambda and equalize to zero because the inequality 
could hold at the optimum (if not binding). This can be therefore substituted through the constraint as an 
additional equation (in practical terms the feasible set of optimal values has to be checked within the constraint). 
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From this, a complementary slackness condition can be derived so that a constraint gets a 
positive price ( 0>lλ ) only when it is scarce ( ∑
=
=
n
i
ilil xab
1
). In other words, the restriction is 
binding. On the other side a constraint gets a value of zero ( 0=lλ ) if it is not exhausted 
( ∑
=
>
n
i
ilil xab
1
). 
In mathematical programming models it is important to understand what information is hidden 
behind the shadow values of the restrictions. The supply component of the CAPRI model 
contains regional optimisation models where agricultural income is maximised subject to 
constraints. The idea of GHG emissions as an additional constraint with an attached shadow 
value depending on the emission level is exploited in the following sections. 
5.3 Modelling approaches to calculate marginal emission abatement costs 
5.3.1 Regulation of greenhouse gas emission abatement 
GHG emission abatement costs are considered ‘economic costs (in terms of income losses) faced 
by producers by complying with an emission abatement objective’62. Emission abatement in the 
agricultural sector can be regulated at different levels. Firstly, emission regulation can be 
indirectly implemented by banning or imposing restrictions on a specific polluting activity. This 
would lead to a ‘quota effect’ in the sector with production of this activity substituted by other 
activities, independently of their contribution to GHG emissions (if they are not further 
addressed by regulations). Secondly, emissions can also be directly regulated by designing an 
‘emission accounting system’ which tries to couple GHG emissions to all agricultural activities 
(weights per activity are included through emission factors). This would imply a restructuring of 
all production processes at the farm level so that activities with a lower contribution to farm’s 
income per emission unit (low revenue per tonne of CO2eq) would be more likely to be affected 
in terms of production reduction than ‘emission-efficient’ activities (high revenue per tonne of 
CO2eq). Moreover, variations in production intensity could also appear through increasing or 
decreasing yields. This direct emission accounting system is followed in the current study. 
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Abatement costs, production and economic effects of emission abatement will therefore depend 
on the exact definition of emission sources per activity (see section 3.3). 
5.3.2 Alternative modelling approaches 
Several economic models have covered the analysis of GHG emissions in different economic 
sectors. Amongst others, the following models have been used: for agriculture the ASMGHG 
and AROPAj models (described in section 2.4), for energy the POLES Model (mentioned in 
section 3.3) and for the transport and industry sectors general equilibrium models such as the 
EPPA (Emission Prediction and Policy Analysis)63 and RAINS (Regional Air Pollution 
Information and Simulation)64. They basically share two methodological approaches in the 
estimation of marginal abatement costs: one based on direct modelling of carbon prices and one 
based on shadow prices attached to emission abatement restrictions. 
The first approach is the one most applied (used by the ASMGHG, AROPAj and POLES 
models). In the optimisation problem, emissions are taxed with a price that enters as an 
additional input cost in the objective function. By varying this carbon price iteratively a different 
abatement response is achieved at the optimum, thus generating a MACC as a succession of 
equilibrium points. Usually polluters are assumed to face a uniform emission tax so that the 
modelling response is different for each of them. Nevertheless, price differentiation between 
polluters would be also possible65. 
The second and alternative approach is to include emission restrictions directly in the 
optimisation problem (used by EPPA and RAINS). The marginal abatement costs are 
approximated by the shadow values of the emission abatement constraints. Normally, this 
emission restriction is considered to be equal across polluters and expressed as a percentage of 
emissions in a reference period. This option results in different MACs for polluters that face a 
similar abatement target. MACCs can be constructed by changing the emission abatement levels 
iteratively and storing the shadow values. 
                                                                                                                                                             
62 In this study no investment costs for alternative abatement technologies are considered. A brief discussion of the 
issue is given in chapter 8. 
63 The EPPA Model has been developed within the Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Global Change at the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (http://web.mit.edu/globalchange/www/eppa.html). For regional analysis 
in the EU, a version called EPPA-EU is derived. 
64 The Regional Air Pollution Information and Simulation model (RAINS) and its application to the estimation of 
GHG emissions (GAINS) is owned by the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) and 
provides a consistent framework for the analysis of mitigation strategies for air pollutants 
(http://www.iiasa.ac.at/web-apps/tap/RainsWeb/). 
65 Remember that carbon prices and carbon emissions are closely related (theoretically explained in chapter 4). 
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For this study, both approaches have been analytically implemented and MACCs constructed for 
Nuts 2 regions. However, the second approach has been chosen based on the following criteria: 
(1) it allows direct modelling of emission standards at regional level, (2) it offers a more 
straightforward interpretation of results since emission abatement is considered as a binding 
restriction and not as an input cost and (3) it produces the necessary input data for further 
analysis on market-based abatement instruments with explicit consideration of transaction costs 
(tradable emission permits, see chapter 6). The inclusion of emission constraints can, however, 
be more problematic from the technical perspective since it implies a more complicated 
algorithm than the direct modelling of carbon prices through the derivation of the Lagrange 
function66. 
In the following table the different restrictions included in the supply module of CAPRI are 
listed. For each of them, a shadow value is generated in the optimisation process (zero if not 
binding). 
                                                 
66 In the current modelling approach several systematic infeasibilities due to the violation of neighbour restrictions 
were observed for high emission abatement targets. Nevertheless, this problem does not affect the current 
application since it remains within the feasible bounds. For additional research, the explicit use of carbon prices 
seems like an appropriate alternative. 
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Table (19) Restrictions in the supply model 
< 0
= 0
Coverage of animal requirements 
(animal requirement minus delivery in feedingstuff)
- fiber, dry matter
- energy, crude protein
<,= quotaQuotas (milk and sugar)
=, > or < 
policy objectiveSet Aside (obligatory, minimum and maximum)
= total arable landArea for crop production
= total grasslandArea for pastures and grazings
<,= 0
Minimum nutrient need covered by synthetic 
fertiliser
(corrected nutrient need minus import of mineral fertiliser)
<,= policy objective<,= policy objectiveGHG emission abatement (methane and nitrous oxide)
> 0
< 0
Dry matter intake 
(corrected dry matter intake minus delivery of dry matter in 
feedingstuff)
- maximum share
- minimum share
Animal
Activities
Crop ActivitiesRestrictions
 
 
These restrictions are of great importance for the construction of the MACCs since they have to 
be fulfilled at every point of it. As an example, the introduction of an emission abatement target 
in a region where the constraint on ‘minimum nutrient need covered by synthetic fertiliser’ is 
binding might lead to a depreciation of manure and indirectly to a drop in animal production 
since (1) manure is only applied so that the minimum application rate for mineral fertiliser is 
fulfilled and (2) crop activities making use of this minimum fertiliser amount have to remain in 
the regional production program67. 
5.4 Constructing marginal cost curves for emission abatement in CAPRI 
5.4.1 A multi-gas strategy: the use of global warming potentials 
For the construction of MACCs, different theoretical approaches can be adopted: selected 
abatement policy instruments on a single gas (e.g. standard on methane emissions), a 
single source (e.g. tax on nitrous oxide emissions from synthetic fertiliser application) or a 
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single region (e.g. standard for a sensitive area). These would give different MACCs as a result 
since a different emission coverage is in each case represented. Some of these targeted options 
have been addressed and implemented in the model but will not be subject of further analysis in 
this study (McInerney et al., 2004)68. 
An alternative and more general approach is to consider global warming potentials, i.e. carbon 
dioxide equivalents, as measurement units. By doing this, a uniform abatement policy can be 
modelled, all gases and sources being affected at the same time. A ranking for these can be 
immediately derived: on the one side, some sources have a higher share of total emissions 
(e.g. enteric fermentation) and, on the other side, some gases have a higher conversion factor 
than others (e.g. nitrous oxide). It is important to take these relationships into account when 
looking at results. 
5.4.2 Technical solution 
As already mentioned, the MACC is constructed by plotting the shadow values faced by the 
regional supply models against different abatement targets. This restriction ensures that 
emissions of the current production program do not exceed the regional emission standard. 
Technically, marginal abatement costs are calculated by introducing uniform emission standards 
as constraints in the regional aggregate programming models and by reducing them stepwise 
(Pérez, 2004b). The following equation summarises this analytical approach: 
(5.9) 
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Where: 
µ = shadow value of the emission abatement target 
E = upper bound on emissions 
λ = shadow value of the other restrictions 
G = allowed level of all other constraints in the model 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
67 A minimum share of mineral fertiliser on total fertiliser need is introduced in order to calibrate the model to the 
fertiliser consumption statistics published by FAOSTAT in the base year. 
68 Preliminary results for this paper were presented by the author of this thesis in the first CAPRI-DynaSpat Training 
Session (Zurich, 6th-9th September 2004). Support on modelling issues was also given along the project. 
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The shadow value of the emission constraint ( µ ) is equal to the regional marginal income loss at 
the restriction level. By repeating this optimisation problem several times for different emission 
standards, a series of points forming the shape of the MACC can be obtained. 
The MACCs are therefore calculated iteratively in CAPRI for Nuts 2 regional units. These 
emissions and costs can later be consistently aggregated at regional (Nuts 1), Member State or 
European level. The main determinants driving the level of GHG emissions are the production 
level of each activity (emissions partially coupled to production), the time perspective for global 
warming potentials (conversion factor to carbon dioxide equivalents) and the production 
intensity (restricted yield variation as a technological option). The theoretical shape of the 
MACC is shown in figure (15): 
Figure (15) Information flows used in the calculation of regional emissions 
Emission 
Abatement
(t CO2eq abated)
MAC
(€ / t CO2eq)
% emission abatement target
(emissions stepwise reduced)
Increase in marginal 
abatement costs due 
to a 1% emission 
reduction w.r.t. base 
year emissions
Increase in marginal 
abatement costs due 
to a 1% emission 
reduction w.r.t. base 
year emissions
If the MACC is convex, it is more 
costly to reduce a similar amount of 
emissions at higher levels of 
abatement (proportional increase of 
marginal costs)
If the MACC is convex, it is more 
costly to reduce a similar amount of 
emissions at higher levels of 
abatement (proportional increase of 
marginal costs) Allowance of technological 
change 
(lower MACC)
Allowance of 
technological 
change 
(lower MACC)
λstep
Estep
 
Source: modification of Pérez, 2003, p. 10. 
 
As graphically explained in figure (15) every positive environmental target (emission abatement) 
is linked to a positive shadow value. In the initial situation, the shadow value would be zero 
since no abatement is taking place (constraint not binding). The function is therefore constructed 
as a succession of equilibrium points. 
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In the graph it can be observed that higher emission abatement levels lead to higher shadow 
values (the function is upward-sloping)69. In the previous figure, higher changes in marginal 
abatement costs per abated unit are plotted (higher differences). Nevertheless, convexity is not, a 
priori, a requirement of the function. In section 5.5.2, this is analysed with selected regional 
results. 
Additionally, in figure (15), the possibility of technological change is presented as a way of 
introducing a certain degree of flexibility in the system, allowing the MACC to shift to the right 
(a lower marginal cost can be achieved for a certain emission abatement level). This is taken 
endogenously into account in the present modelling approach, through the allowance of some 
yield variation in the production process. 
5.5 Analysis of Results 
5.5.1 Assumptions 
In this chapter regional MACCs for the European agricultural sector are estimated for the year 
2001. This builds upon the calculation of GHG regional emission inventories from chapter 3. All 
regional supply models are solved ex-post several times with an incremental emission reduction 
(as a percentage of individual base year emissions) in order to cover a feasible range of 
abatement objectives70. The simplified approach taken here is shown in figure (16): 
                                                 
69 Please note that the MACC can be indistinctly presented as a downwards or upward-sloping curve depending on 
the variable presented on the x-axis (emissions or abatement respectively). 
70 Further policy analysis with consideration of endogenous price effects (market module) is carried out in chapter 7. 
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Figure (16) Iterative procedure followed for the calculation of marginal abatement cost 
curves 
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1 G summarises all other restrictions in the model (see table (19)). 
 
In the optimisation model an upper limit on emissions is introduced for each iteration 
( upItere _)( ). This emission restriction is calculated by reducing stepwise base year emissions 
by 1 %. All the equations in the supply component of the model are solved each time and the 
shadow values for the different regional models stored as points of the MACC. 
5.5.2 Marginal abatement cost curves 
Each point of the MACC represents the implementation of a single uniform regional emission 
standard based on 2001 emissions (base year). Although the KP prescribes emission reductions 
with respect to 1990 values, this base year is not chosen in the current approach for two reasons: 
(1) no information gain is achieved for the calculation of MACCs or technical comparison 
between abatement instruments and (2) for the agricultural sector less reliable information would 
be obtainable since the complete EAA from EUROSTAT (economic information for agricultural 
activities) are only available from 1994 onwards. 
In figure (17) MACCs for EU-15 Member States are presented. For its calculation, the model is 
iteratively solved for single Nuts 2 regions (15 iterations) and regional results are aggregated71. 
In the last step, a 15 % reduction is achieved72. 
                                                 
71 For the aggregation of shadow values or, in general, prices at an upper regional level (e.g. variable transaction 
costs or permit prices in chapter 6) GHG emissions are used as weights: sum of all shadow values of the 
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Figure (17) Marginal abatement cost curves for EU-15 Member States 
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Source: own calculations; modification of Pérez, 2003; year 2001; Luxembourg is modelled together with Belgium. 
Note: MACCs estimations for Nuts 2 regions are compiled in Appendix 8. 
 
The previous figure clearly shows that Member States face quite different MACs for a similar 
abatement objective. For an 8 % emission reduction, MACs vary between 57 € for Ireland and 
143 € for the Netherlands. For a 15 % emission reduction, MACs vary between 106 € for Ireland 
and 260 € for Denmark. Economically optimal adjustment in the regional models to the singular 
emission targets is achieved through production substitution and yield shifts. Since the model is 
calibrated to an observed regional production-mix in the base year, an optimum can only be 
reached through an expansion or contraction of these endogenous productive activities such as to 
fulfil the emission abatement goal and the rest of the restrictions in the model. 
Member States such as Denmark and the Netherlands have noticeably higher estimated MACCs 
than the rest. This is due to their specialisation in intensive crop production, with high mineral 
fertiliser application per hectare together with high-yield cattle production processes. High 
income per hectare of Grandes Cultures is observed in these countries (revenue plus premiums 
minus costs), mainly due to yields above the EU average. But at the same time N2O emissions 
                                                                                                                                                             
sub-regional models in a region multiplied by its CO2eq emissions divided by total CO2eq emissions in this region. 
As already mentioned, the minimum regional unit used in the model is the EUROSTAT Nuts 2 definition. 
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from synthetic fertiliser application are also quite high on a hectare basis since high yields are 
coupled to high fertiliser application, resulting in relative low income per ton of CO2eq for these 
activities (see examples in table (20)). This leads to higher production losses for these activities 
compared to animal activities (in terms of income per emission unit)73. 
The case of Finland is a singular one since it produces many ‘other animals’ (e.g. reindeer), 
which are not endogenously covered by the model but are an important income source. 
Furthermore, it has a low share of cereals in total area due to weather conditions. The supply 
effects of emission abatement concentrate, therefore, on a lower number of highly profitable 
activities, especially on cattle production (with quite high specific national premiums, as shown 
in table (20)). Income losses per abated emission unit are therefore higher in Finland than in 
other countries.  
 
Table (20) Results for selected Member States and activities: 85 % regional uniform 
emission standard 
EF N2OSYN Rev/ha Prem/ha Inc/ha Inc/t CO 2
eq EF CH4EN2 Rev/hd Prem/hd Inc/hd Inc/t CO 2
eq
Netherlands 1240.3 784.9 365.4 507.4 0.409 3363.3 3939.7 27.4 2226.9 0.662
Finland 781.0 414.3 211.4 327.0 0.419 3373.2 3904.2 894.8 2217.4 0.657
United Kingdom 903.0 850.1 371.1 592.2 0.656 3164.7 2893.8 17.6 1026.7 0.324
Spain 545.4 405.9 145.9 391.5 0.718 2908.7 2663.1 10.8 1606.0 0.552
Portugal 213.9 179.2 185.3 272.6 1.274 3012.6 2959.7 9.7 1250.2 0.415
Soft Wheat Dairy cows high yield
 
Source: own calculations, year 2001. 
EFN2OSYN = emission factor for N2O emissions from synthetic fertiliser application (tonnes of 
CO2eq per hectare or head) 
EFCH4EN2 = emission factor for CH4 emissions from enteric fermentation, IPCC Tier 2 method 
(tonnes of CO2eq per head) 
Rev/ha, Prem/ha, Inc/ha = revenues, premiums and income per hectare respectively (€) 
 
United Kingdom, Ireland, Spain and Portugal are able to contribute to the uniform emission 
standard at rather low costs. Crop production in UK and Ireland falls less sharply than in other 
countries as lower fertiliser application rates and higher income per emission unit are observed 
                                                                                                                                                             
72 Please note that a 15 % abatement target is equivalent to a 85 % emission standard. These two notions will be 
indistinctly used in this and the following chapters. 
73 In the model it can be observed that an x % increase in crop yields is linked to a much higher increase in 
emissions per hectare than a similar increase in animal yields with respect to emissions per head. In other words, 
it is more efficient in terms of GHG emissions to move to higher yield animals. 
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(see table (20)). A substitution of low-yield by high-yield dairy cows develops as the most 
efficient alternative (less GHG emissions per liter of milk). In general, income per head is lower 
in these two countries than in the previous mentioned examples. Spain and Portugal concentrate 
production losses on low income activities such as sheep and low yield cattle herds. In these 
cases, production is only maintained to receive financial support so that considerably lower 
regional income losses are suffered at the margin. Additionally, synthetic fertiliser application 
rates are quite low so no important activity cross-effects are observed. 
Technically observed, MACCs have to be upward-sloping since ‘a tighter (or additional) 
binding constraint is always linked to a higher (or additional) positive shadow value’ (model 
construction requirement)74. This can also be seen from an economic perspective. The abatement 
cost curve (ACC) is convex upward-sloping if higher abatement is linked to proportionally 
higher income losses. This is the case in the presented modelling exercise since income is 
maximised in the starting point and every additional abatement effort shifts income 
proportionally further away from the optimum with no abatement. In other words, only 
‘effective’ abatement takes place along the modelled ACC so that the emitter always moves 
away from its individual optimal production/emission decision. Since the MACC is the first 
derivative of the ACC, and the derivative of a convex upward-sloping curve is an 
upward-sloping curve, it can be concluded that the MACC has a positive slope. 
However, a priori, nothing can be said about the linearity or non-linearity of these curves. In 
order to analyse this, it is necessary to avoid aggregation. This is done in figure (18) by focusing 
on selected Nuts 2 regional supply models: 
                                                 
74 It is possible to make a constraint more restrictive or to introduce an additional emission constraint. In this last 
case, the additional restriction would get a positive shadow value, which has to be added to the old one in order to 
get the overall marginal effect on the objective function. 
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Figure (18) Marginal abatement cost curves for selected Nuts 2 regions 
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Source: own calculations; year 2001. The EUROSTAT codes for these regions are: Denmark, DK000; Wales, 
UKL00; Friuli-Venezia Giulia (IT330); Extremadura, ES430; Zeeland, NL340; and Brauschweig, DE910. 
 
The region with the highest income losses for the last abated emission unit under a 15 % 
emission abatement is Zeeland (NL430), with 419 € per ton of CO2eq. At the other end, for 
Extremadura (ES430) just 75 € per ton of CO2eq are estimated. The MACCs for these regions 
show convex, concave and linear sections: 
− Convexities. The MACC for Denmark is slightly convex along the whole range of modelled 
emission reduction levels (not easily observable on the figure). This is also the case for low 
abatement levels in other regions such as Zeeland (until 10 %), Friuli-Venezia Giulia (until 
6 %) and Braunschweig (until 7 %). This corresponds with the ‘expected’ reaction of the 
economic model: in order to comply with their individual emission standard the agents 
exploit first the ‘low-price’ options (production drops first for less profitable activities). 
Since these options become more and more scarce in every step, a higher share of more 
profitable activities has to contribute to the emission reduction, increasing in this way income 
losses per abated emission unit. This shape is typically shown in text books (see references in 
chapter 4). 
− Concavities. MACCs for Zeeland, Friuli-Venezia Giulia and Braunschweig are, however, 
concave after the abatement levels mentioned in the previous paragraph, i.e. the upward 
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movement of the MAC diminishes. This happens only at certain points75 and the effect is 
mainly provoked by the explicit introduction of maximum guaranteed areas for Grandes 
Cultures premiums in the model76. In the base year situation, these regions receive direct 
payments per activity above a regulated physical or monetary premium ceiling. This implies 
a shortening of premiums for the affected activities so that the ceiling is not exceeded. By 
introducing iteratively tighter emission abatement restrictions, some of these activities are 
reduced and become implicitly higher premiums up to the point where the maximum 
guaranteed area is achieved (inverse process). After this point, payments per hectare or head 
do not change anymore and income losses are no longer affected by this variable, making the 
MACC flatter. This is shown in figure (19). 
Figure (19) Combined effect of premium ceilings and emission abatement on agricultural 
income at the margin 
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In Zeeland, for example, the maximum guaranteed area for Grandes Cultures in 2001 is 
lower than the number of observed cropped hectares for these activities so that cereal 
premiums are linearly cut in the model to avoid an overshooting of the ceiling. However, at 
the 11 % emission abatement objective the area limit is reached and no further premium 
losses are suffered at the margin77. 
                                                 
75 Actually convexity is the general case along the optimality path followed by the MACC. Concavities are only 
found at certain points, where the slope of the objective function abruptly drops. 
76 Grandes Cultures are: soft wheat, durum wheat, barley, rye, oats, other cereals, maize, sunflowers, soya, pulses 
and maize for fodder. 
77 A further marginal effect on the objective function can be caused by activities falling to lower bounds (close to 
zero). In the case of Zeeland, suckler cows and heifers almost disappear after a 10 % emission standard. The 
variable in the model (number of animals in this case) might become in this case an increasing non-zero marginal 
value, so that an additional ‘quota-effect’ appears in the model. This effect is neglectable when aggregated over 
activities at lower levels of abatement (until 40%-50%) but should be considered in more radical scenarios and 
added up to the marginal value of the emission restriction. 
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− Linearities. For Extremadura and Wales, MACCs follow a more or less linear pattern. This is 
due to no big income differences between activities. Substitution effects play therefore a less 
important role in these regions. 
The aggregated observed effect is a convex section for low emission abatement levels followed 
by concavity afterwards. This is reflected for the EU-15 by an ‘S-shaped’ curve with a convex 
course until the 8 % abatement level. In figure (20), MAC differences are shown for the EU-15 
and selected regions, as an indicator for convexity or concavity. 
Figure (20) Marginal abatement cost curves and differences for selected Nuts 2 regions 
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Source: own calculations; year 2001. The EUROSTAT codes for these regions are: Sterea Ellada, EL240; Zeeland, 
NL430; and Halle, DEE20. 
 
In figure (20) it can be seen how MACs proportionally increase for Zeeland between a 5 % and a 
10 % emission abatement. However, the upward movement of the MACC slows down between 
10 % and 15 %. The MACC for Sterea Ellada is completely convex (at least up to a 15 % 
emission abatement) and concave for Halle. For an explanation of these shapes, see previous 
analysis at Member State level. 
5.5.3 Evolution of single greenhouse gases and emission sources 
As analysed in the previous section, the implementation of different emission standards has 
important implications in the optimal response of polluting activities at the regional level, 
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depending on the income distribution across them. These effects can also be indirectly observed 
on the development of GHGs and emission sources. With help of the following figures these 
issues are briefly analysed: 
Figure (21) Evolution of individual gases for different emission abatement targets 
(average for EU-15) 
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Source: own calculations; year 2001. 
 
Figure (21) shows the reduction paths of nitrous oxide and methane emissions for a 5 %, 10 % 
and 15 % abatement target (CO2eq). Methane clearly follows a higher trend than nitrous oxide, 
indicating that animal activities contribute more to the emission reduction than crop activities 
(with the exception of rice, methane is only produced from animals). The distribution of the 
economic burden can be observed across emission sources in figure (22) and figure (23): 
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Figure (22) Evolution of individual nitrous oxide sources for different emission 
abatement targets (average for EU-15) 
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Figure (23) Evolution of individual methane sources for different emission reduction 
targets (average for EU-15) 
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Source: own calculations; year 2001. 
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In the previous two figures it can be observed how emission sources linked to specific 
low-income activities such as manure excretion on grazings, biological fixation or rice 
cultivation, are more affected than the rest. Nitrous oxide emissions from excretion on grazings 
are reduced the most. They are mainly linked to suckler cows and sheep production, the latter 
being a low income production activity. N fixation and rice cultivation are respectively linked to 
the cultivation of pulses and rice. These sources bring, however, a quite small abatement 
potential in Europe. 
From this analysis of sources it can also be seen that methane is reduced more than nitrous oxide, 
indicating a higher burden on animal activities at the optimum. However, this does not give any 
information on how the income losses are distributed between crop and animal activities. This 
problem is implicitly analysed in chapter 7, where different abatement instruments are compared 
including price effects. 
5.5.4 Comparison with results from other studies 
In Europe there has been almost no work done on the estimation of costs of GHG emission 
abatement and most of what has been done has been focused on sectors other than agriculture 
(POLES, PRIMES and EPPA-EU models). Whereas POLES and PRIMES are partial 
equilibrium models and concentrate on the energy sector, the EPPA-EU is a general equilibrium 
model and estimates marginal emission abatement costs for the main sectors of the economy: 
electricity, transport, energy, other industries, households and agriculture (Viguier et al., 
2001, pp. 20-24). It also estimates ‘shadow prices for constraints on emission reductions’ but 
results are not directly comparable with the current study since agriculture is not disaggregated. 
Nevertheless, some estimates on marginal emission abatement costs from agriculture have been 
calculated with the AROPAj model (De Cara, Jayet, 2001). Although only a limited number of 
emission sources are considered, MACs for different emission reduction levels (5 to 20 %) are 
given for single Member States and can be easily compared with the results of this study. These 
estimates are presented in table (21): 
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Table (21) Comparison of marginal abatement cost estimates for EU-15 Member States 
GWPs1 MAC5% MAC10% MAC15% GWPs MAC5% MAC10% MAC15%
EU-15 319.3 60.3 119.5 171.3 224.3 150.8 227.5 280.4
Denmark 8.2 81.2 173.6 260.5 5.6 178.3 238.4 280.0
Netherlands 15.0 88.1 177.6 259.0 11.0 325.6 445.0 546.3
Finland 3.9 82.6 163.3 245.6 NE NE NE NE
Austria 6.4 71.1 144.0 215.3 NE3 NE NE NE
Italy 31.0 77.6 150.0 215.2 28.0 204.2 288.6 350.3
Belgium2 8.1 70.3 142.5 209.9 6.3 198.9 322.2 451.0
Germany 55.1 75.2 141.6 195.0 34.2 106.7 222.6 311.2
France 79.7 61.9 125.0 175.7 56.8 114.6 171.7 216.8
Sweden 5.5 59.9 108.6 159.9 NE NE NE NE
Greece 7.1 45.4 92.5 149.0 6.8 133.7 208.3 224.0
Portugal 6.2 43.9 89.5 130.5 8.6 84.0 140.9 187.9
Spain 35.3 40.2 81.4 120.8 18.0 177.9 219.6 267.6
United Kingdom 42.5 36.7 73.8 108.0 34.5 161.8 261.1 316.3
Ireland 15.2 35.3 71.9 105.9 14.6 91.7 183.4 196.3
(Pérez, 2004) (De Cara, Jayet, 2001)
 
Source: own calculations and De Cara, Jayet, 2001, p. 13. 
1 Initial emissions calculated in the model (Mio tonnes of CO2eq, three-year average 2001); not corrected to match 
NGHGIs (see chapter 3). 
2 In the CAPRI model Luxembourg is modelled together with Belgium. Results from AROPAj are aggregated for 
comparison. 
3 NE = data not estimated. 
 
Although this benchmark study uses the year 1998 as reference for the calculations, a systematic 
sub-estimation of GHG emissions is observed (30 % on average)78. MACs are, however, much 
higher than those estimated with CAPRI. These two effects might be interlinked since emission 
abatement on a smaller emission basis (emissions in the base year period) can be more costly in 
terms of income losses. This allows, together with a smaller coverage of sources, less flexibility 
in the modelling system to react to the constraint. In other words, emitters have a much lower 
range of production possibilities to comply with the emission restriction79. The ordering of 
countries follows with some exceptions a similar pattern in both modelling exercises 
(e.g. Netherlands, Belgium and Italy face costs above the average and Ireland and Portugal 
below). 
                                                 
78 Emissions are reported to be even higher in 1998 than in 2001 (2.4 % for methane and 15.4 % for nitrous oxide, 
according to the EEA data service). 
79 It is, however, not easy to analyse these differences since ‘different models have different assumptions’ and no 
comprehensive documentation is available. 
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5.6 Conclusions 
In this chapter, MACCs are constructed by plotting the shadow values faced by regional supply 
models for different emission abatement targets. Differences found in the course of MACCs for 
Nuts 2 regions in Europe underline the fact that a ‘non-uniform’ emission abatement strategy 
might be profitable in agriculture. This could be achieved by the introduction of market-based 
abatement instruments which are able to differentiate between abatement possibilities in each 
region. The idea behind this statement is that certain regions, especially those with low income 
per emission unit, are able to contribute to an emission abatement objective at rather low costs. 
This is tested in the following chapter with the direct modelling of tradable permits and their 
economic effects compared to a uniform emission standard. 
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CHAPTER 6 Modelling a Market of 
Tradable Emission Permits  
“Trading for the sake of trading is a ‘non-starter’ – to be effective it must 
result in real, tangible changes” (Douglas Russell, Global Strategies 
International). 
6.1 Introduction 
In previous chapters a way of estimating GHG emissions based on European activity data 
statistics has been presented and the introduction of emission standards for the construction of 
marginal abatement cost curves methodologically explained. Ex-post results on GHG emission 
inventories have also been thoroughly analysed for the EU-15 from a regional perspective. 
Furthermore, the main differences between emission abatement instruments have been described 
from a theoretical perspective. In this chapter, the information on MACs is applied to the explicit 
modelling of tradable emission permits within the CAPRI model. For this purpose, an emission 
trading module with the following characteristics is introduced: (1) cap and trade system, 
(2) ‘grandfathering’ of permits, (3) unrestricted trade between Nuts 2 regions and (4) direct 
modelling of transaction costs. This ‘emission-capping’ approach allows for direct comparison 
with the results obtained in chapter 5 with the application of uniform emission standards. 
In section 6.2 the European Climate Change Program (ECCP) and the Emissions Trading 
Directive are highlighted. In section 6.3, the proposed modelling exercise is designed, by taking 
into account the current legal context. The analytical approach followed is then described in 
section 6.4 and results presented in section 6.5. 
6.2 Current legislation  
6.2.1 Climate policy in the European Union 
The control of global warming emissions in the EU is a fairly new issue. From a historical 
perspective, three regulatory phases beginning in the early 90’s can be defined. 
In December 1991 the European Commission presented to the Council a ‘community strategy to 
limit carbon dioxide emissions and to improve energy efficiency’, based on the premise that 
reducing energy demand by increasing energy efficiency and promoting fuel-switching was the 
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best way to reduce CO2 emissions (Commission of the European Communities, 1992). Common 
action in this area was promoted through new research projects and programmes in specific areas 
(automobile industry, energy and renewable products). Within the following two years, the 
European Union adopted a monitoring mechanism on anthropogenic CO2 and other GHG 
emissions not controlled by the Montreal Protocol (Council of the European Communities, 1993, 
Dec. 1993/389/EEC)80 and approved the ‘ultimate objective’ of the UNFCCC (Council of the 
European Union, 1994, Dec. 94/69/EC). With these two documents, the main international 
agreements towards the reduction of GHG emissions were adopted by the European Community 
and its Member States. Additionally, the EU went somewhat further and, in 1996, launched a 
directive concerning integrated pollution prevention and control which laid down measures 
designed to prevent or reduce emissions in the air, water and land from certain polluting 
activities (Council of the European Union, 1996, Dir. 96/61/EC). This directive defined a 
framework for pollution prevention and control through which emission permits could be issued. 
In 2000, in a second regulatory stage, the Commission approved the ECCP with the goal of 
identifying and developing all the necessary elements of a common strategy to implement the 
KP. It was based on two pillars, a Green Paper on emission trading and the development of 
targeted measures to reduce emissions from specific sources. The Green Paper on emission 
trading was published by the Commission as preparation for the ratification of the KP 
(Commission of the European Communities, 2000b). It was conceived to be an ‘informative’ and 
at the same time ‘analytical’ tool to support the future involvement of the Community in this 
area. 
Finally, in December 2002, the KP was formally approved by the European Union (Council of 
the European Union, 2002, Dec. 2002/358/EC). With this decision an important step towards 
action was reached. Member States committed themselves to establish a ‘European emission 
bubble’ (foreseen in the article 4 of the KP) by which the obligations contained in the KP for the 
EU were considered ‘internal law’ (article 3). In order to achieve this commitment, the European 
Union was allowed to formulate an internal ‘burden-sharing agreement’ so that Member States 
would share their efforts towards the achievement of an overall emission abatement objective81. 
This decision led to the signature in 2003 of the ‘emission trading directive’. 
                                                 
80 This decision was first amended by Dec. 1999/296/EC (Council of the European Union, 1999) and further on 
replaced by Dec. 280/2004/EC (Council of the European Union, 2004a), ‘in order to take account of the 
developments on the international level and on the grounds of clarity’. 
81 The approval of the BSA by the Member States reflects the ‘subsidiarity principle’ in the Community, 
i.e. individual emission reduction objectives should be achievable for each country and avoid unduly burdening 
of ongoing industrialisation efforts by Member States. The Council agreed upon the contributions of each 
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6.2.2 The emission trading directive 
In October 2003 the EU adopted a proposal for a directive in ‘CO2 emission trading’ to be 
operable by January 2005 (Council of the European Union, 2003, Dir. 2003/87/EC). This 
directive established a scheme for trading GHG emission allowances within the EU in order to 
promote reductions of GHG emissions in a cost-effective and economically efficient manner 
(article 1). The following characteristics can be briefly highlighted: 
− It applies to a list of energy and industrial production activities and covers all GHGs included 
in Annex A of the KP.82 Nevertheless, according to the categories of polluting activities 
defined in Annex 1 of this directive, only CO2 emissions are effectively covered by the 
scheme. 
− It defines a coordinated Emission Trading Scheme (ETS) over all Member States. EU-wide 
trading instead of trading at the individual Member State level was a recommendation 
included in the Green Paper on emission trading (based on estimates from the PRIMES 
Model). 
− It foresees an implicit voluntary opt-in for other sectors through possible amendments 
(article 30). Whereas trading is first applied only to industrial and energy-producing 
activities, other sectors might be included in the future with a view to further improving the 
economic efficiency of the scheme83. This might be interesting for the agricultural and 
forestry sectors. 
− The issuing of permits must be coordinated with the existing trading schemes, such as the 
provisions included in the Directive 96/61/EC, where thresholds for certain polluting 
activities are defined and permits issued by individual Member States. The coordination of 
ETSs will be quite important in the future since the CDM and JI mechanisms will also imply 
a parallel issuing of permits84. 
                                                                                                                                                             
Member State to the overall 8% reduction commitment at its meeting of Environment Ministers of 15-16 June 
1998 in Cardiff (Commission of the European Communities , 2001, p. 3). The Council Conclusions set out the 
commitment of each Member State and state that the terms of this agreement will be included in the Council 
Decision on the approval of the Protocol by the European Community. 
82 For a list of GHGs see Appendix 4. 
83 The list of activities included in annex I of the directive might be subject to future revision. 
84 The so-called ‘linking directive’ (Council of the European Union, 2004b, Dir. 2004/101/EC) amends this 
‘emission trading directive’ and regulates the use of Certified Emission Units (CERs) from CDM projects and 
Emission Reduction Units (ERUs) from JI projects (see section 2.2.3 in p. 17). These CERs and ERUs may be 
allowed by a Member State only up to a certain percentage of the total allocation of permits to each installation. It 
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− For the two defined commitment periods, 2005-2008 and 2008-2012, each Member State 
shall develop a national plan stating the total quantity of allowances to allocate. Among other 
requirements, this plan should: (a) take into account the proportion of overall emissions that 
these allowances represent in comparison with emissions from sources not covered by this 
directive, (b) be consistent with the emission reduction potential of activities covered 
(annex 1 of the directive), (c) facilitate the fulfilment of the Community’s commitments and 
(d) be consistent with other legislative and policy instruments of the Community (annex 3). 
The allocation method is mainly ‘grandfathering’ with a minimum of 95 % for the first 
commitment period and 90 % for the second85. 
− Member States shall ensure that emitters surrender before the 30th April of each calendar 
year a number of allowances equal to the total emissions produced during the preceding year 
and that these are subsequently cancelled. 
6.2.3 Cases of implementation 
Trade of allowances has been already implemented in Europe for other environmental problems. 
Examples are quotas for ozone depleting substances (Montreal Protocol), fish catch quotas 
(Common Fisheries Policy) and milk quotas (Common Agricultural Policy). In all these cases, a 
certain degree of transferability has been introduced (Commission of the European 
Communities, 1992). 
6.3 Designing a market of emission permits in the European agricultural sector 
One of the objectives of this study is to design a feasible implementation strategy for a market of 
emission permits in European agriculture and simulate its economic effects within a regionalised 
agricultural sector model86. Since a feasible system must build on information that is easy to 
obtain, regional inventories for GHG emissions from agricultural sources in the year 2001 have 
been calculated based on IPCC emission factors and activity data from public European statistics 
(see chapter 3). This is the basic information needed in a market of emission permits where GHG 
                                                                                                                                                             
has to be specified in its national allocation plan and must take place through the issue and immediate surrender 
of one EU allowance (one EU allowance against one CER or ERU). 
85 The costs of free allocation are assumed by the Commission in order to secure support from the industry, or at 
least to limit the degree of opposition (Convery et al., 2001, p. 12). 
86 In this section farms, agricultural firms and regions might be used indistinctly in some theoretical explanations. It 
is important to notice that in the model Nuts 2 regions and not agricultural firms are the agents interacting in the 
market of emissions. However, each region is a consistent aggregation of individual farms so that the behavioural 
response is the same. 
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emissions are replaced by ‘emission rights’ on a one-to-one basis87. Moreover, the proposed ETS 
is intended to be in line with the current legislation, mainly the previously described 2003/87/EC 
emission trading directive. 
6.3.1 Allocation of allowances 
There are two possible permit allocation systems: auctioning and grandfathering. The emission 
trading directive and several examples of quota trading (e.g. milk quotas in Denmark) have been 
based on a distribution of permits free of charge and linked to historical emission records 
(grandfathering) This system presents some equity problems (who has the right to pollute), 
efficiency problems from the point of view of the public sector (revenues from ‘auctioning’ are 
not achieved) and might prevent newcomers from entering the market since they do not have 
historical emission records. Nevertheless, ‘grandfathering’ is defended on grounds of 
acceptability and low transaction costs. 
Following this trend, an emission trading market based on grandfathered allowances is proposed 
in this study for European agriculture. Agricultural producers would obtain, based on historical 
records, the ‘right’ to release a certain amount of GHG emissions88. The number of permits 
needed in the reference period would depend on various factors: the production-mix, the 
technology chosen (e.g. production intensity) and specific emission factors dependent on the 
geographical situation (climate region) and type of management system selected. A simple 
procedure of calculating the allocation of emission permits to a single firm in the reference 
period is shown in figure (24). 
                                                 
87 Allowances, permits, certificates or rights are used as synonyms in this study and refer only to GHG emissions 
(equivalent to 1 ton of CO2eq emissions). 
88 As already mentioned in the Green Paper (Commission of the European Communities, 1992, p. 9), emissions are 
linked to sources and are also reported by countries to the UNFCCC. Agricultural firms have several emission 
sources so that a market of emissions could also be extended to them (usually only a certain amount of activities 
are comprehended by a source). 
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Figure (24) Example of a permit allocation for an individual agricultural producer 
Activity 
data GWP
Number of permits 
allocated / needed
Ha, head 
or tonne
(tonnes 
CO2
eq)
(Permits = Mio tonnes 
CO2
eq)
NO2 CH4
High fertiliser application 3.5 0 100 1085 1
Low fertiliser application 2.5 0 0 775 1
High yield 4 160 40 4600 5
Low yield 3 100 0 3030 3
    Beef production Normal 0.7 30 40 847 1
    Grassland Normal 0.3 0 100 93 0
TOTAL 10430 10
Emission factor* 
(per activity)
(Kg Gas per ha, head 
or tonne)
    Soft Wheat
    Dairy production
Activity Technology
Activity 
data GWP
Number of permits 
allocated / needed
Ha, head 
or tonne
(tonnes 
CO2
eq)
(Permits = Mio tonnes 
CO2
eq)
NO2 CH4
High fertiliser application 3.5 0 100 1085 1
Low fertiliser application 2.5 0 0 775 1
High yield 4 160 40 4600 5
Low yield 3 100 0 3030 3
    Beef production Normal 0.7 30 40 847 1
    Grassland Normal 0.3 0 100 93 0
TOTAL 10430 10
Emission factor* 
(per activity)
(Kg Gas per ha, head 
or tonne)
    Soft Wheat
    Dairy production
Activity Technology
 
Source: based on Pérez, 2004b. 
Note: in this table activity data and emission factors are close to reality but symbolic. They might represent any 
European agricultural firm or regional unit in the current modelling exercise. Emission factors for activities are 
generally positive but some room could be left for activities which are also able to enhance carbon (e.g. afforestation 
activities). 
* Further differentiation at emission source level could be introduced (in the figure emission factors are aggregated 
per activity and GHG). 
 
This ‘accounting card’ would provide the regulatory institution with the necessary information to 
allocate in the initial situation emission certificates to agricultural producers (issuing of permits) 
and, at the same, time would serve as annual controlling tool for the latter, which would have to 
take into account the purchasing costs of additional permits in their production plans (demand of 
permits). In order to calculate the total number of certificates, activity levels are simply 
multiplied with their corresponding regional specific emission factors which should be calculated 
and published according to IPCC international standards. The accounting process mimics the 
calculation of NGHGIs and is therefore consistent with the KP reporting obligations (see chapter 
3). The additional administrative burden for the agricultural firms would be relatively low, as 
these data are already needed when asking for direct income support or calculating nutrient 
balances at farm level. 
More agricultural activities, some possibly also acting as sinks (e.g. fallow land), GHGs and 
management typologies could also be identified in an eventual implementation of this approach 
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(e.g. organic production). However, these technologies will not be considered in the current 
modelling study due to lack of data89.  
6.3.2 Trade of emissions 
The Green Paper on emission trading contemplated the possibility of implementing a market of 
permits at Member State level (decentralised approach) or at EU level, Member States trading 
with each other (Commission of the European Communities, 2000b). For the energy and industry 
sectors, the 2003/87/EC Directive approved an EU-wide trading system based on efficiency 
grounds. For the European agricultural sector, a further disaggregation level is proposed in this 
study and producers chosen as agents in the market of permits. This is currently translated into 
an inter-regional permit trading scheme90. This approach would be easily applicable to the 
European agricultural sector since similar EU-wide policy schemes have been largely 
implemented within the current Common Agricultural Policy and information at farm and 
regional level systematically collected (e.g. nitrate directive or milk quotas). Emission 
restrictions would be technically incorporated as a quota system on all ‘polluting’ agricultural 
activities. Agricultural producers would therefore be allowed to trade allowances with each other 
in order to minimise their income losses. 
This trading system could be slightly modified so that agents other than agricultural firms would 
be considered. This approach would be based on the current European sugar market regime, 
where sugar quotas are owned by regional processing firms and not by agricultural firms. 
Trading of permits could therefore be restricted to some ‘bottleneck-agents’ in agricultural 
markets such as slaughtering houses, dairies and co-operatives. Emission permits attached to 
animals activities such as methane from enteric fermentation or manure management could be 
allocated to regional slaughtering houses and/or dairies and emission permits attached to land to 
local co-operatives, which regulate the flow of cropped products91. In figure (25) - system (1), 
this approach is presented: 
                                                 
89 With this approach the existence of additional ways of reducing GHG emissions at farm level is not neglected, 
e.g. through changes in feeding for ruminants or different ploughing techniques. However, modelling these 
options is beyond the scope of the current modelling system. Further research in this area was included by the 
author in the recommendations of the last ‘expert meeting on improving the quality of greenhouse gas emission 
inventories for category 4D’ (Joint Research Centre, 2004; URL: 
http://carbodat.ei.jrc.it/ccu/pweb/leip/home/ExpertMeetingCat4D/index.htm). Moreover, some further discussion 
on this topic is included in chapter 8. 
90 CAPRI is an aggregated model and Nuts 2 regions the least disaggregation level for the current analysis. 
Modelling at farm or farm-type level is therefore not considered. 
91 Fixed emission factors based on heads of live animals, tonnes of product and hectares of cropped land. 
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Figure (25) Alternative emission trading schemes for the agricultural sector 
 
FXn = farm in region X 
 
In system (1) five farms, one slaughtering house, one dairy and a co-operative are presented for 
each of two representative regions (A and B). These farms produce agricultural goods and 
deliver them to the last three agents (they serve as ‘bottlenecks’ in the system), who receive the 
permits and are allowed to trade with each other (sugar market approach). The aim of this system 
is to reduce control costs. 
This system presents the problem that not all agricultural products are delivered to the 
afore-mentioned agents. As an example, many agricultural products are not always distributed 
through co-operatives and this makes the analysis inconsistent. Furthermore, transaction costs of 
trading at farm level might not be very high since agricultural firms already deliver the necessary 
activity data within the current regulations and are subject to periodical controls by CAP 
authorities. Therefore, direct trading between farms is proposed in this study as a feasible 
approach. This is shown in figure (25) - system (2), where permits are allocated to agricultural 
firms and trading is allowed between them. The cancelling of ‘used’ emissions from the previous 
year takes place directly by the regulatory institution. 
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6.3.3 Internalisation of transaction costs 
Transaction costs are those costs that arise from initiating and completing transactions, such as 
finding partners, holding negotiations, consulting with lawyers or other experts, monitoring 
agreements, etc. (Coase, 1937). These costs have to be acknowledged in an ETS since a 
continuous transfer of property rights takes place in such a market. In figure (22), the typical 
transaction cost components found in a KP emission trading mechanism are listed: 
Table (22) Definition of transaction cost components linked to the Kyoto Protocol emission 
trading scheme 
Search costs Costs incurred by investors and hosts as they seek out partners for 
mutually advantageous projects (e.g. market brokerage fees) 
Negotiating 
costs 
Includes those costs incurred in the preparation of the market 
(e.g. legal and insurance fees charged for participation in the market) 
Monitoring 
costs 
Costs needed to ensure that participants are fulfilling their obligations 
(e.g. costs of annual verification) 
Enforcement 
costs 
Costs of administrative and legal measures incurred in the event of 
departure from the agreed transaction 
Source: modification of Eckermann et al., 2003, p. 2 based on PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2000 
 
Emission trading also requires the formation of the necessary institutions. This is naturally 
linked to the presence of ‘not-negligible’ transaction costs, an important issue that has often not 
been taken into account in policy simulations and might have a significant effect on trading 
(Kerr, Maré, 1995, p. 23; Stavins, 1995, p. 144). The recently approved directive on emission 
trading does not include any reference to this issue. 
A feasible solution for an emission trading market in agriculture could be based on a central data 
base listing all permit holders in the scheme and their current permit endowment. An internet 
portal and a calling centre would be required to manage permit transactions. With this purpose, 
an internalisation of transaction costs is proposed in this study. This approach is based on 
stock-market trading, costs being paid ‘per transaction’ additionally to the permit price. This 
issue is considered to be very important in the current analysis for the sustainability of the 
scheme to be correctly evaluated. 
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Transaction costs can be derived from different estimates found in the literature for similar 
emission abatement projects92. Compared to a situation without transaction costs, purchase costs 
for permit buyers would rise and the trade volume would decrease. Consequently, a uniform 
permit price equal to the average MAC across firms would not be achieved (Eckermann et al., 
2003, p. 3). This issue is further analysed in section 6.5. 
6.3.4 Introduction of enforcement penalties 
Penalties have to be introduced if emissions outweigh the number of permits allocated to the 
agricultural firm. Equally, a penalty should be introduced in the case of faulty or missing 
declarations. The current EETS foresees excess emission penalties of 40 € and 100 € per tonne of 
CO2eq for the first and second commitment period respectively (2003/87/EC Directive, 
article 16).  
In a trading system penalties put an upper-limit on permit prices. In the current study, they are 
not needed since agents behave rationally (no cheating is considered). Model estimates can 
however be used to establish possible excess emission penalties in agriculture. 
6.3.5 Summary of characteristics 
To summarise, the proposed ETS for European agriculture considers: (1) a distribution among 
agricultural producers of permits free of charge and linked to historical emission records 
(grandfathering), (2) inter-regional emission trading at European level, (3) explicit transaction 
costs and (4) no enforcement penalties. 
6.4 Methodological developments: technical implementation of a market for 
agricultural emissions in CAPRI  
6.4.1 The CAPRI Emission Trading Module 
The modelling of tradable emission permits has been implemented in the CAPRI model in a 
separate module since a simultaneous solution for all Nuts 2 regions was technically not feasible. 
With this purpose, an analogous iterative approach to the one explained in the previous chapter 
(see figure (16)) is proposed, where the permit trading module endogenously determines which 
are the optimal emission targets to introduce in the regional supply models. Nuts 2 regions are 
                                                 
92 As Stronzik recognizes in the additional report to Working Group 4 (Stronzik, 2001), almost no work has been 
done in the estimation of transaction costs for ETSs since this is a relatively new instrument. For that reason, 
estimations for specific evaluated CDM and JI projects are used as proxies in this study. 
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therefore allowed to trade emission permits which each other, facing different transaction costs 
depending on trade taking place between national agents (within a Member State) or between 
agents across borders (within the EU-15)93. Moreover, additional costs for setting up the 
necessary institutions (fix transaction costs) are also included in the decision-taking process. 
Technically a two-stage approach is followed. Firstly, a uniform emission standard is introduced 
in the regional supply models, delivering a vector of binding emission targets and a vector of 
non-negative marginal abatement costs per region (as already explained in section 5.5). 
Secondly, an economically optimal distribution of permits is achieved in a parallel permit trade 
module. With this purpose, three identities are used: 
− ‘Emission targets’ are considered ‘permit allowances’ (1 ton of CO2eq = 1 permit), with no 
cost attached to their distribution (“grandfathering” assumed). 
− ‘Marginal abatement costs’ equal ‘permit prices’ (MAC = PermitP).  
− ‘Marginal abatement cost curves’ are approached through ‘permit demand functions’ 
(regional supply models behaving as consumers of emission permits). 
In the permit trading module regional supply models are allowed to trade their permit allowances 
between them so that the total amount of permits in the market is held constant and the total rent 
from trading is maximised. At the market clearing point transaction costs should account for the 
remaining differences in regional permit prices94. This can be graphically shown in figure (26) 
for two regions (analogous to figure (14) in section 4.4.1). 
                                                 
93 It is considered realistic to assume lower transaction costs in the first case since trade between emitters ‘within a 
country’ is comparably cheaper in terms of the administrative burden. 
94 In the absence of transaction costs a uniform permit price for all regions would be achieved at the optimum 
(equi-marginality principle). 
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Figure (26)  Graphical representation of a permit trade model for 2 regions 
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Source: based on Pérez, 2004b. 
 
In figure (26) the ETS modelled in CAPRI is simplified and presented for two agents (regions 
A and B) with two different permit demand functions defined by parameters rα  and rβ . In the 
initial situation (before trading), each region receives an amount of permits representing a 
binding limit on emissions ( irAllowP ) and has to pay a positive price for the last emission unit 
abated ( irPermitP ). Through the trading mechanism an optimum is achieved where the total 
variation in the area below both individual permit demand functions is at its maximum: 
(a+b)-(c+d) in the graph. At this point the ‘consumer rent’ from permit trading is maximised95. 
The regional permit allowance moves in the final situation to frAllowP  at the cost of 
f
rPermitP  
                                                 
95 Technical note: in this modelling approach the change in the total area below the ‘permit demand functions’ 
between the initial and final emission levels is maximised, which leads to a minimisation of total emission 
abatement costs (these functions are actually cost functions). This approach differs than the one taken in a 
conventional quota trade model, where the quota rent is maximised as the total area below the quota demand 
function at the final emission level (‘consumer rent’). Moreover, it allows explicit modelling of transaction costs 
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per emission certificate. At the optimum the remaining differences in regional permit prices 
correspond to variable transaction costs, which are assumed to be paid by the permit buyer (in 
this case region A). 
For the modelled multi-regional case, the permit trading module is analytically constructed as a 
maximisation problem: 
(6.1) 
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subject to several restrictions: 
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Where: 
 Obje = welfare from emission trade 
 α, β = intercept and slope of the regional permit demand function 
 AllowPi = initial distribution of permits (initial upper-bound imposed on emissions) 
 AllowPf = final distribution of permits for the region (after trading) 
 PermitPi = initial permit price (shadow price of the emission restriction, µ in chapter 5) 
 PermitPf = final permit price (after trading) 
 BuysIn = permits bought by region r from national regions (same Member State) 
 BuysOut = permits bought by region r from foreign regions 
 SalesIn = permits sold by region r to national regions (same Member State) 
 SalesOut = permits sold by region r to foreign regions 
 VarTC_Inst = unitary transaction costs linked to the pre-implementation and implementation 
of the scheme (institutional transaction costs) 
                                                                                                                                                             
and prices without requiring bilateral permit trade flows and additional spatial arbitrage conditions (net-trade 
approach). 
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 VarTCIn = unitary transaction costs directly linked to trade within the same Member State 
(e.g. brokerage fees) 
 VarTCOut = unitary transaction costs directly linked to trade with foreign regions 
(e.g. brokerage fees) 
 
In the optimisation problem presented in equation (6.1) the sum of the areas below the regional 
permit demand functions between the initial and the final situation is maximised. This is 
achieved by moving away from irAllowP  to 
f
rAllowP . The area change below the permit 
demand functions is comprehended by the objective function and divided in two terms: a triangle 
( ( ) ( )irfrfrir AllowPAllowPPermitPPermitP −− **5.0 ) and a rectangle 
( ( ) frirfr PermitPAllowPAllowP *− ). For region A, these are graphically presented in figure (26) 
by areas ‘a’ and ‘b’ respectively. Variable transaction costs enter as economic restrictions for 
permit buyers and are substracted from the obtained rent. 
The constraints of the problem are: 
(1) Equation (6.2): the total amount of permits allocated to a region in the market has to be 
equal to the initial allocation plus purchases minus sales. 
(2) Equation (6.3): total permit sales to foreign regions has to be equal to total permit 
purchases from foreign regions (international permit trade balance). 
(3) Equation (6.4): total permit sales and permit purchases between national regions in a 
Member State have to be equal (national permit trade balance). 
(4) Equation (6.5): the initial permit price has to belong to the permit demand function and can 
be defined through the intercept, the slope and the initial allocation of permits. 
(5) Equation (6.6): the permit demand function has to pass through the estimated permit price, 
which is defined through the intercept, the slope and the new amount of permits used by 
the regional supply models. 
This approach is analogous to a consumer rent maximisation problem: agricultural producers 
behave as consumers and demand permits according to their marginal willingness to pay given 
by the individual permit demand functions. With fixed output prices trade of emission 
allowances must lead to income gains compared to a no-trade situation (solely the uniform 
emission standard, as described in chapter 4). 
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6.4.2 Technicalities 
Linear permit demand functions 
For technical reasons, a proxy for changes in marginal abatement costs or permit prices96 is 
implemented through linear permit demand functions. These functions relate regional GHG 
emission abatement and marginal abatement costs. They are a linear approximation of the 
marginal abatement cost curves and, therefore, modelled to pass in each iteration through the 
initial regional permit price ( irPermitP ) which results from the application of the uniform 
regional emission standard at the starting point and that estimated in the final situation 
( frPermitP ). 
Iterative approach 
It is important to remember that the presented ‘emission trade model’ would deliver in just one 
step the optimal demand of permits per region (transaction costs considered) if the estimated 
permit demand functions would correspond to the real MACCs. This is not the case in CAPRI 
since these curves are not modelled by an explicit functional form (and therefore are not linear) 
but represented through a set of estimated points. Moreover, even assuming that the MACCs 
would be linear and the true slopes known at the optimum, the solver demonstrated to have 
difficulties achieving a feasible optimum for all Nuts 2 regions at the same time. For these two 
reasons, the equilibrium is approached in an iterative way: 
− In the first iteration a set of permit allowances and their corresponding permit prices are 
estimated in the regional supply models (first stage in section 6.4.1, p. 122). By fixing an 
arbitrary intercept and slope for all linear permit demand functions, the problem is solved and 
a ‘maximum rent from trading’ achieved. 
− In the second iteration the information delivered by the trading module (solved in the first 
iteration) in the form of regional permit allowances ( frAllowP ) is re-used by the regional 
supply models as emission restrictions to calculate a new vector of shadow values. With this 
information intercepts and slopes for the permit demand functions can be already estimated 
since two equilibrium points coming from the supply model (points belonging to the real 
MACCs) are already available: 
                                                 
96 Remember that in this analysis permit price and MAC are used indistinctly, they are related 1 to 1. Transaction 
costs are considered an economic restriction in the model (price wedge) and not directly included in the permit 
price. 
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(6.7) 97 ( ) ( )1212 // −−−− −= steprsteprsteprsteprr emissionemissionµµβ  
  11 * −− −= steprr
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rr emissionβµα  
By doing this, the regional linear permit demand functions are re-shaped and through 
emission trading a new vector of permit allowances and prices estimated. 
− The process is iteratively repeated until no noticeable price changes are observed between the 
results delivered by the supply model and the permit trading module for a vector of permit 
allowances (the value of the objective function of the permit trading module is at its 
maximum). At this stage, the final equilibrium is achieved. 
This internal solution path is shown graphically in figure (27) for selected regions. Those facing 
high MACs (Region A in our previous graphical example) enter the permit market as buyers and 
those with low MACs (Region B) as sellers. By exchanging permits the first group of regions are 
able to relax their emission constraint and reduce the permit price paid for the last emission unit. 
At the equilibrium point MACs are only differentiated by transaction costs. 
Figure (27) Trade of emission permits between selected regions (internal solution path) 
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Source: own calculations; simulation scenario 85 % emission standard plus emission trading; year 2001. 
 
                                                 
97 Notation from equation (5.9). 
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Fix transaction costs 
When estimating the economic benefits of an ETS, it is quite important to estimate transaction 
costs in relation to the size of the trading scheme planned. With this purpose, fix transaction 
costs (e.g. annual costs related to the specific institutional set-up) are internalised in the current 
modelling exercise and, therefore, assumed to enter the objective function as a variable 
additional cost for permit buyers. The objective is to model a ‘self-financing permit trading 
scheme’, i.e. buyers choose to pay a permit price at the optimum such as to cover the variable 
and fix transaction costs attached to the permit market. In order to include these costs in the 
optimisation, the iterative mechanism is used and they are re-distributed in every step according 
to the following equation: 
(6.8) ( )∑ −− +=
r
stepstep BuysOutBuysInInstTCInstVarTC 11/__  
Where: 
 TC_Inst = fix transaction costs attached to the institutional set-up (total € per year) 
 BuysInstep-1 = level of permits bought from national regions at the equilibrium point 
 BuysOutstep-1 = level of permits bought from foreign regions at the equilibrium point 
 
By doing this, fix transaction costs are introduced as variable in the objective function 
( InstVarTC _ ). This reflects the fact that the number of permits traded also depends on the 
amount of fix transaction costs to internalise (they are indirectly related, i.e. trade shrinks by 
increasing fix transaction costs). 
6.5 Analysis of results 
6.5.1 Definition of modelling parameters 
− In this chapter a 15 % reduction of 2001 European GHG emissions is modelled as ‘cap’ for a 
European inter-regional trading scheme. This means that 85% of regional 2001 emissions 
are allocated as permits to each Nuts 2 region (see first iteration in figure (28), p. 132) and 
trade is between them allowed. This facilitates the comparison with the model results 
obtained in the previous chapter (see last point of the regional MACCs in figure (17), p. 102). 
− Market effects are further excluded so that prices remain exogenous and efficiency effects 
derived from the use of instruments of abatement can be directly observed in the regional 
supply models. In chapter 7, this modelling approach is extended to consider price effects 
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(trade between the main trade blocks in the world is included) and different mitigation 
instruments for a similar emission reduction objective (uniform emission cap) are analysed. 
− As mentioned earlier in this chapter, variable and fix transaction costs are introduced in this 
modelling exercise as marginal costs. Variable transaction costs are mainly brokerage fees 
and are paid by permit buyers. In the current study, they are assumed to be 5 € for purchases 
within a Member State (trade with national agricultural producers) and 10 € for purchases 
from abroad (trade with foreign agricultural producers). These values are based on estimates 
from various studies which report handling fees in international trading schemes to be 
between 2 and 10 % of the transaction value (compilation by Eckermann et al., 2003, p. 16). 
For the selection of the ‘appropriate’ values in relation to the final permit price, a simple 
‘sensitivity analysis’ for different values is carried out with the model (the impact of different 
transaction costs on trading are presented in appendix 10). Moreover, a further 10 Mio € are 
assumed as institutional costs of the trading scheme (2 Mio € per year with 5 years 
amortisation). These are also assumed to be supported by permit buyers and therefore 
distributed over transactions. They are defined based on information found in the literature 
for CDM and JI projects in different economic sectors and project sizes (compilation by 
Eckermann et al., 2003, pp. 6-8). 
6.5.2 Inter-regional flows of permits 
By implementing the afore-mentioned parameters in the model, a market of 271 million permits 
is simulated98. From these, 6.9 Mio permits result to be effectively traded between Nuts 2 
regions, representing a 2.5 % of the total. This amount defines the size of the trading market and 
is linked to the heterogeneity of marginal abatement costs and the level of transaction costs. The 
distribution of allowances and trade flows between Member States is presented in table (23): 
                                                 
98 Exactly 85% of 2001 estimated global warming emissions in the EU-15 (319 Mio tonnes of CO2eq, as reported 
in table (17)). 
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Table (23) Permit transactions between EU-15 Member States 
 Initial Permit 
Price *
(Std 85%)
Euro Euro 1000 Units 1000 Units 1000 Units 1000 Units 1000 Units 1000 Units
European Union 171.3 157.6 271393 952 5984 5984 6936 6936
Denmark 260.4 161.2 7448 0 469 0 469 0
Netherlands 259.0 161.2 13554 0 786 0 786 0
Finland 245.6 161.2 3546 0 198 0 198 0
Austria 215.3 161.2 5714 0 240 0 240 0
Italy 215.2 160.9 27573 37 1205 0 1242 37
Belgium 210.0 160.8 7119 4 276 0 279 4
Germany 195.0 160.8 48496 5 1704 0 1709 5
France 175.7 159.5 68821 690 1102 0 1792 690
Sweden 159.9 159.1 4714 12 5 0 17 12
Greece 149.0 154.2 5999 33 0 52 33 85
Portugal 130.5 151.9 5091 5 0 163 5 168
Spain 120.8 151.8 28358 90 0 1681 90 1771
United Kingdom 108.0 151.2 33141 76 0 2982 76 3058
Ireland 105.9 150.9 11819 0 0 1106 0 1106
Total 
amount of 
permits
Final Permit 
Price
Total 
Sales
Purchases 
inland **
Purchases 
abroad
Sales 
abroad
Total 
purchases
 
Source: own calculations; simulation scenario 85 % emission standard and emission trade; year 2001; Luxembourg 
is modelled together with Belgium; further regionalised results can be found in appendix 9. 
* Initial permit prices are in line with the MAC15% results in table (21). 
** Purchases inland are equal to sales inland for a Member State. 
 
There is a group of Member States that face very high initial MACs and act only as buyers in the 
market: Denmark, Netherlands, Finland and Austria. It is rational for these countries to increase 
emissions in order to achieve a lower abatement cost. By doing this, permits can be achieved at a 
lower price. These countries end up using 4 % to 6 % more permits than in the initial allocation. 
A second group of countries is comprised by Italy, Belgium, Germany, France, Sweden and 
Greece. Purchases also take place but in smaller proportion relative to the initial situation (1 % to 
4 % more permits than in the initial allocation). However, the picture in these countries is not 
homogeneous since several regions face lower MACs than the national weighted average and 
sell permits. Some Nuts 2 regions sell permits at a national level (e.g. Sardegna in Italy and 
Midi-Pyrenées in France) and even to foreign regions (e.g. Ipeiros in Greece). 
The last group of countries is formed by Portugal, Spain, United Kingdom and Ireland, in which 
mainly permit selling takes place. Regions in these countries face MACs below the average 
equilibrium point of the EU-15. Some permit purchases are still observed but only from national 
regions. 
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6.5.3 Income effects of trading: comparison of tradable permits and emission 
standards  
On the one side, permit buyers (regions with high MACs in the initial situation) have to pay for 
the permits they need (in order to emit more) and support the transaction costs originated by the 
trading scheme. On the other side, permit sellers (regions with low MACs in the initial situation) 
see their rent increased by the revenues coming from permit transactions. For the former group 
of regions, purchase costs are however compensated at the trading market clearance point by 
lower total abatement costs and, as a consequence, higher production possibilities (the emission 
constraint is ‘relaxed’). On the contrary, the latter group of regions see their revenues increase 
from permit sales and over-compensate higher abatement costs with this new source of income.  
By plotting the internal solution path on an aggregated level for Member States in figure (28), it 
can be observed how the average weighted MAC in the European Union falls from 171.3 € to 
157.6 € through emission trade. Regional differences in prices are minimised along the solution 
path so that after iteration 6 almost no changes are observed. 
Figure (28) Trade of emission permits between Member States (internal solution path) 
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Source: own calculations; simulation scenario 85 % emission standard and emission trade; year 2001; Luxembourg 
is modelled together with Belgium. 
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In chapter 4 it was argued from a theoretical perspective that tradable emission permits are 
preferable to emission standards based on efficiency grounds. This issue is re-examined here, 
where the overall impact from both abatement instruments on regional agricultural income is 
simulated. With this purpose, the results of the afore-parameterised simulation for emission 
trading are confronted with a simulation for a EU-wide regional uniform emission standard. In 
order for results to be comparable, the latter is set exactly to the ‘emission cap’ used for the 
market of tradable permits. The results at Member State level are shown in table (24): 
Table (24) Income effects of emission trading for EU-15 Member States 
Agricultural 
income 1
Revenues/costs 
from emission 
trade*
Total Income Agricultural income
Revenues/costs 
from emission 
trade 2
Total Income 3
Mio Euro Mio Euro Mio Euro Mio Euro Mio Euro Mio Euro
165567.54 0 165567.54 166198.21 -66.6 166217.9
-5920.67 -5920.67 630.67 564.06
3697.18 0 3697.18 3735.19 -44.4 3737.7
-108.34 -108.34 48.01 3.61
4112.55 0 4112.55 4208.47 -75.7 4211.6
-261.73 -261.73 95.92 20.27
21766.98 0 21766.98 22179.44 -274.7 22217.0
-1412.37 -1412.37 412.46 137.72
2848.98 0 2848.98 2898.51 -38.6 2901.3
-174.13 -174.13 49.53 10.89
10903.64 0 10903.64 11052.07 -126.6 11056.5
-356.64 -356.64 148.43 21.83
34831.65 0 34831.65 35070.56 -181.2 35089.1
-992.78 -992.78 238.91 57.71
3953.94 0 3953.94 3933.24 24.5 3930.4
-9.21 -9.21 -20.70 3.79
26104.67 0 26104.67 25912.43 253.3 25887.3
-565.27 -565.27 -192.24 61.06
8953.98 0 8953.98 8949.72 7.7 8946.9
-215.54 -215.54 -4.26 3.44
30383.43 0 30383.43 30638.28 -194.4 30652.2
-836.80 -836.80 254.85 60.45
3093.61 0 3093.61 2959.46 166.9 2945.3
-143.11 -143.11 -134.15 32.76
1534.15 0 1534.15 1578.31 -31.9 1580.1
-111.00 -111.00 34.16 2.22
1970.51 0 1970.51 1972.7 -0.9 1975.1
-175.07 -175.07 2.19 1.25
11412.27 0 11412.27 11109.85 449.5 11087.5
-558.67 -558.67 -302.42 147.08
85% emission standard + trade [2001]
differences to :  85% emission standard [2001]
European Union
Italy
Greece
Spain
85% emission standard [2001]
Belgium
differences to : GHG Inventories Base Year [2001]
United Kingdom
Sweden
Finland
Denmark
Germany
France
Ireland
Portugal
Netherlands
Austria
 
Source: own calculations; year 2001; Luxembourg is modelled together with Belgium. 
1 In cursive differences to original income data in the base year situation: no emission restriction (in Mio €). 
2 In cursive differences to original income data in the 85 % emission standard scenario (in Mio €). 
3 Total income is equal to agricultural income (from the supply regional models) plus revenue minus costs from 
emission trading. 
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In the first three columns, the 85 % emission standard simulation scenario is represented. All 
Member States suffer income losses derived from the implementation of the emission standard 
(between -1412 Mio € for Germany and -9 Mio € for Portugal) compared to the base year 
situation (no emission restriction). As already analysed in previous chapters, these income losses 
are very heterogeneous in percentage and depend on the marginal abatement costs faced by 
regions. In this first scenario, total income equals agricultural income since no revenues or costs 
from trading take place (middle column). 
With the implementation of emission trading between Nuts 2 regions, income losses still remain 
with respect to the base year situation (the emission cap is still binding) but efficiency gains are 
achieved with respect to the uniform application of the emission standard (agricultural income 
increases by 630 Mio €). These revenues are however dampened by the costs of the trading 
scheme, i.e. negative rents coming from transaction costs (-66 Mio €), as defined before. For the 
EU-15 as a whole, 564 Mio € are estimated as total efficiency gains99. On the one side, sellers 
are able to compensate income losses from production substitution effects through permit rents: 
for example, the United Kingdom moves from potential losses of -302 Mio € to 147 Mio € gains 
through permit sales). On the other side, buyers cover purchase costs of permits through higher 
revenues from production: for example Germany moves from potential income gains of 
412 Mio € to 138 Mio € through permit purchases. All Member States are “better-off” through 
permit trading (consistent with microeconomic theory). 
Looking at the results, it could be argued that the optimal distribution of emission targets at 
regional level could be achieved through regional non-uniform emission standards, if the 
information on MACCs would be available. By doing this, no transaction costs from permit 
trading would have to be paid, thereby increasing the overall efficiency effect of abatement 
policy. Nevertheless, this would imply that the regulatory institution has to update the 
information on marginal costs every year so that the overall emission goal is permanently 
achieved. Transaction costs from permit trading can therefore be seen as the price to pay for a 
permanent optimal response of the agents in the emission market. 
6.6 Conclusions 
In this chapter a deep analysis of the current European legislation on climate policies is offered. 
The legislative efforts achieved in Europe towards the implementation of the KP flexible 
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mechanisms are analysed with special focus on the EETS. A feasible strategy is designed and 
modelled within the CAPRI modelling system with the idea of a transfer of efficiency gains 
derived from this instrument to European agriculture, which is not currently included in the 
EETS. The potential effects of tradable emission permits on agricultural income are then 
compared with those achieved by a uniform emission standard. From this modelling perspective 
some interesting conclusions can be extracted: (a) emission trading proves to be a cost-effective 
solution for Member States due to the heterogeneity of their marginal abatement costs and (b) the 
income effects of this instrument depend heavily on the transaction costs linked to its 
implementation.  
In the following chapter a set of simulation scenarios for European agriculture in the context of 
variable prices are carried out. The economic and environmental effects of a ‘future KP-like 
agreement’ on emission abatement from agricultural sources, based on 2001 reference emissions, 
is discussed. The previously analysed mitigation instruments and a specific ‘burden-sharing 
agreement for agriculture’ are compared with each other. 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
99 Note that in this comparison between instruments prices are held constant, so that efficiency gains and income 
gains are the same (no price interference). In the following chapter, this assumption will be relaxed and several 
simulation scenarios analysed. 
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CHAPTER 7 Comparison between 
Emission Abatement Instruments including 
Price Effects 
"Man shapes himself through decisions that shape his environment" 
(Rene Dubos). 
7.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapters the implementation of emission standards and tradable emission permits 
in European agriculture has been defined, modelled and analysed, by means of 
cost-effectiveness, within a ‘fixed price’ approach. Two important conclusions were obtained: 
(1) the implementation of GHG emission abatement imposes a real economic burden on 
agricultural producers and (2) these income losses might be reduced by using economic 
instruments such as tradable emission permits. In this chapter, these two conclusions are revised 
from a wider perspective, i.e. European agriculture has an influence and at the same time 
depends on the evolution of world agricultural markets. With this purpose, different mitigation 
instruments are analysed under the assumption of variable prices for a 15 % abatement objective 
with respect to base year emissions (consistent with the analysis carried out in chapter 6). 
Moreover, a welfare analysis is carried out by considering welfare effects of these instruments on 
agricultural producers, consumers, taxpayers and processing industry. 
In section 7.2 three alternative simulation scenarios are constructed, following the main KP 
emission mitigation mechanisms. In section 7.3, results are analysed by focusing on supply, 
price, income and welfare indicators. 
7.2 Definition of simulation scenarios 
7.2.1 Structure of the modelling approach 
As already mentioned, in CAPRI an iterative approach is chosen in order to solve the different 
components of the model, namely regional supply models, market model, premium allocation 
(consideration of premium ceilings) and young animal markets. Figure (29) presents graphically 
the model structure followed when introducing emission abatement measures: 
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Figure (29) Running a modelling scenario under consideration of greenhouse gas 
emission abatement 
Activation of permit trading module
Input data for the calculation of GHG emission coefficients
IT
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N
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P
Supply model equations (maximisation subject to constraints)
Calculation of GHG emission factors at activity level
Aggregation of GHG emission sources at regional level
Market model equations (constrained non linear system)
Equations of the emission trading module
Solving the supply regional models and premium allocation
Solving the market model
Initialisation of parameters for emission abatement
Reporting tool for iterative information (e.g. MACCs)
Solving young animals trading module
Aggregation of data on emissions
Reporting of data (emissions and rest indicators)
Solving model under emission constraints (standards, trading)
 
Source: CAPRI Modelling System 
 
On a first stage the necessary input data for the different modules of the model are included. In 
this case, special consideration is made to the calculation of GHG emission inventories per 
activity and region, as explained in chapter 3. Moreover, the equations of the supply, market and 
permit trade models are defined. On a second stage, the iteration loop is started and the solve 
statements for the different modules included in the system. As already mentioned, in each 
iteration the market model interacts with the regional supply models via prices-quantities, trying 
to reach the economic optimum. Within this mechanism a young animal trade module, a 
premium distributor and an emission trade module are solved. On a third stage, the estimated 
information is stored (last step), aggregated to different regional levels and reported100. 
                                                 
100 Several reporting tools are used in CAPRI in the analysis of results: a JAVA mapping tool, xml tables and xsl 
graphical tools (copyright: Wolfgang Britz).  
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7.2.2 Base and reference scenario 
A three-year average around the year 2001 is selected as the ‘base situation’ for simulation 
purposes. This corresponds with the results already analysed in chapter 3, where regional GHG 
emission inventories were modelled. In the current analysis, no projections to the future are 
simulated, in order to avoid further exogenous information influencing the results of the model 
(population growth, inflation, development of preferences, etc). Therefore, all simulation 
scenarios will refer to the year 2001, base and reference scenario being the same101. For this year, 
all behavioural equations in the model are calibrated to observed statistical data. 
7.2.3 Simulation scenarios 
The following three scenarios are constructed: 
− Simulation scenario 1: 85 % regional uniform emission standard (85-STD). A similar 
abatement target as the one taken in the previous chapter is considered, prices being now 
considered as endogenous variables. With this purpose, all Nuts 2 regions in the model are 
constrained to emit 15 % less GHG emissions than in the reference situation. The model is 
run during 15 iterations in order to achieve a situation ‘sufficiently close’ to the equilibrium 
point (prices and quantities not changing anymore). 
− Simulation scenario 2: burden sharing agreement for the agricultural sector (85-BSAA). The 
‘burden of emission abatement’ is distributed across Member States (non-uniform emission 
standard). This mechanism was allowed by the KP to parties acting jointly such as the 
European Union (see footnote 81, p. 114). The EU ‘burden-sharing agreement’ was an 
important internal decision in the international climate change negotiations. In this 
simulation study, however, only agricultural emissions are considered so that the same 
general agreement does not apply102. In table (25), the evolution of GHG emissions from 
agricultural sources since 1990 is presented and a possible BSA for agriculture (85-BSAA) in 
2001 designed for modelling purposes. 
                                                 
101 A simulation in the future would not add any significant additional information to the current approach since no 
specific commitment on agricultural emission abatement has been adopted to date. However, with the CAPRI 
model several studies have been done in the past for scenarios in the medium-term. 
102 The targets approved in the official BSA range from emission increases of 40 % and 20 % for Portugal and 
Spain, to emission decreases of -40 % and -23 % for Luxembourg and Denmark respectively. They refer to 
emissions from all sectors, so that no relation with agricultural emissions can be derived. Additionally, the current 
study presents the limitation of considering only ‘binding emissions’ so that emission increases w.r.t. the base 
year cannot be justified from an economic perspective (if marginal abatement costs are zero in the reference 
situation). 
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Table (25) Evolution of emissions since 1990 and emission abatement targets for simulation 
scenarios 1 and 2 (EU-15 Member States) 
% differences SIM 1: 85-STD SIM 2: 85-BSAA
1990 2001 1990* 2001 2001-1990 2001-2001 2001-2001
EU-15 428.0 398.3 342.9 319.3 -6.9% -15% -15%
Austria 8.1 7.6 6.9 6.4 -6.7% -15% -10%
Belgium 12.7 12.5 8.2 8.1 -1.7% -15% -10%
Denmark 14.3 11.6 10.0 8.2 -17.7% -15% -5%
Finland 6.9 5.5 4.9 3.9 -19.0% -15% -10%
France 104.8 98.4 84.7 79.7 -5.9% -15% -15%
Germany 81.7 65.2 69.4 55.0 -20.6% -15% -10%
Greece 8.4 10.0 6.2 7.1 15.2% -15% -5%
Ireland 17.9 19.2 14.2 15.2 6.8% -15% -25%
Italy 42.8 42.5 31.3 31.0 -0.9% -15% -5%
Netherlands 17.5 15.8 16.6 15.0 -9.7% -15% -5%
Portugal 12.3 11.8 6.5 6.2 -4.9% -15% -20%
Spain 37.4 43.0 30.8 35.3 14.6% -15% -20%
Sweden 9.5 8.9 5.9 5.5 -6.1% -15% -10%
United Kingdom 53.7 46.4 49.0 42.5 -13.2% -15% -30%
UNFCCC CAPRI
 
Source: own calculations; 2001 three year average calibration year for CAPRI and years 1990 and 2001 for 
NGHGIs; Luxembourg is modelled together with Belgium. 
Measurement units: Mio tonnes of CO2eq. 
* The CAPRI values for 1990 are calculated backwards by assuming the same differences found in the NGHGIs. 
They are just reported in this table for comparison purposes and no further used in the analysis. 
 
As presented in the figure, in scenario 1 (85-STD) a 15 % emission reduction is modelled for 
all European regions. Scenario 2 considers a similar target in average for the EU-15, but 
differentiates emission abatement targets between countries: (1) Regions in the United 
Kingdom and Ireland face a 30 % and 25 % abatement target respectively, due to their 
relative low marginal abatement costs (see chapter 5); (2) Portugal, Spain and France, 
countries where restructuring is necessary and low abatement efforts have been achieved in 
the past, become a 20 %, 20 % and 15 % target respectively; (3) Nuts 2 regions in Austria, 
Belgium and Luxembourg, Finland, Germany and Sweden are forced to emit 10 % less 
emissions than in the reference situation, following a trend below the average; (4) Denmark, 
Greece, Italy and the Netherlands are only affected by a -5 % abatement target, due to their 
high marginal abatement costs.103 
                                                 
103 It is important to note that this ‘burden-sharing agreement’ for agriculture is arbitrarily designed in this study by 
taking into account marginal abatement costs and the development of emissions in the past. It should provide a 
‘half way’ point between a uniform standard and an optimal distribution of abatement targets (obtained through 
the use of tradable emission permits). 
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− Simulation scenario 3: cap-and-trade permit system (85-TRD). In this case, a 85 % emission 
standard is again simulated but with additional trade of emission permits. The design of this 
permit market is analogous to the one presented in chapter 6: cap-and-trade, inter-regional 
dimension and explicit consideration of transaction costs (see definition of modelling 
parameters in section 6.5.1, p. 129). As in the previous two simulation scenarios, the market 
component of the model is in this case activated so that prices are allowed to vary until an 
equilibrium is achieved. 
7.3 Analysis of results  
7.3.1 Greenhouse gas emissions 
The analysis begins equally for the three simulation scenarios: GHG emissions are constrained 
to be 15 % below base year emissions (85 % emission standard). The distribution of the 
abatement burden among regions can vary depending on the instrument selected. In the 
following figure, the estimations of GHG emissions from individual agricultural sources are 
presented for the defined simulation scenarios: 
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Table (26) Variation in greenhouse gas emissions at source level for simulation scenarios 
1, 2 and 3 (average for the EU-15) 
Total Amount per ha
Impact in 
CO2
eq Total
Amount per 
ha Impact in CO2
eq Total Amount per ha Impact in CO2
eq
6468.4 47.9 135836.3 6450.7 47.8 135464.1 6454.7 47.8 135548.8
-15.5% -15.5% -15.5% -15.8% -15.8% -15.8% -15.7% -15.7% -15.7%
437.3 3.2 135556.9 438.9 3.3 136045.9 438.2 3.2 135844.3
-14.5% -14.3% -14.5% -14.1% -14.0% -14.1% -14.3% -14.3% -14.3%
4900.1 36.3 102902.4 4904.1 36.3 102986.0 4884.3 36.2 102570.6
-15.8% -15.8% -15.8% -15.8% -15.8% -15.8% -16.1% -16.1% -16.1%
1533.9 11.4 32211.9 1501.9 11.1 31539.0 1527.4 11.3 32075.1
-12.8% -12.8% -12.8% -14.6% -14.6% -14.6% -13.1% -13.1% -13.1%
34.4 0.3 722.0 44.7 0.3 939.1 43.0 0.3 903.1
-56.9% -57.6% -56.9% -44.0% -44.1% -44.0% -46.1% -45.8% -46.1%
41.0 0.3 12709.4 41.2 0.3 12772.0 41.5 0.3 12872.4
-7.3% -9.1% -7.3% -6.9% -6.1% -6.8% -6.1% -6.1% -6.1%
74.5 0.6 23086.2 74.0 0.6 22946.5 73.3 0.5 22710.5
-20.6% -20.3% -20.6% -21.1% -20.3% -21.1% -21.9% -21.7% -21.9%
152.5 1.1 47258.0 153.5 1.1 47590.0 152.6 1.1 47318.6
-15.7% -15.7% -15.7% -15.2% -14.9% -15.2% -15.6% -15.7% -15.6%
93.4 0.7 28956.2 93.5 0.7 28979.4 93.9 0.7 29120.5
-10.9% -11.5% -10.9% -10.9% -11.5% -10.9% -10.4% -10.3% -10.4%
26.9 0.2 8343.6 27.1 0.2 8411.7 27.2 0.2 8432.8
-13.0% -13.0% -12.9% -12.3% -13.0% -12.2% -12.0% -13.0% -12.0%
6.3 0.1 1941.1 6.3 0.1 1959.6 6.3 0.1 1943.7
-18.4% -16.7% -18.3% -17.6% -16.7% -17.6% -18.3% -16.7% -18.2%
42.8 0.3 13262.6 43.2 0.3 13386.7 43.4 0.3 13445.9
-12.2% -11.1% -12.2% -11.4% -11.1% -11.4% -11.0% -11.1% -11.0%
SIM 2: 85-BSAA [2001]
% deviation to: NGHGIs base year [2001]
N2O from synthetic fertiliser
N2O from excretion on grazings
N2O from manure management
CH4 from rice production
CH4 total emissions
N2O total emissions
N2O from atmospheric deposition
N2O from biological fixation
N2O from crop residues
N2O from organic animal waste
SIM 3: 85-TRD [2001]
% deviation to: NGHGIs base year [2001]
CH4 from manure management
CH4 from enteric fermentation
SIM 1: 85-STD [2001]
% deviation to: NGHGIs base year [2001]
 
Source: own calculations; year 2001. In cursive % differences in total emissions, amount per hectare and impact in 
CO2eq w.r.t. the base year. 
Measurement units: ‘total emissions’ are in 1000 tonnes of gas, ‘amount per hectare’ in tonnes per hectare and 
‘impact in CO2eq’ in 1000 tonnes of CO2eq. 
 
It can be observed how methane emissions (mainly from animal production activities) are 
slightly more affected than nitrous oxide emission. These results are directly linked to the supply 
changes presented in the following section and consistent with the evolution of individual 
emission sources presented in section 5.5.3 (last abatement target in figure (21) to figure (23)). In 
this case, though, different results are obtained due to the price effects coming from the market 
component of the model: methane emissions are less affected (changes between 15.5 % and 
15.8 % depending on the scenario) and nitrous oxide emissions more (changes between 14.1 % 
and 14.5 %). It can be noticed that, through price endogeneity, the burden of emission abatement 
is more uniformly distributed among emission sources. 
In the following table the regional emission abatement targets endogenously obtained after 
reaching an optimum in the emission permit market are reported.  
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Table (27) Final emission abatement targets for simulation scenario 3 (EU-15 Member 
States) 
SIM 3: 85-TRD [2001]
European Union -15.0%
Austria -9.8%
Belgium -7.0%
Denmark -6.8%
Finland -8.5%
France -13.9%
Germany -11.8%
Greece -6.0%
Ireland -26.8%
Italy -7.5%
Netherlands -8.0%
Portugal -21.6%
Spain -17.4%
Sweden -11.8%
United Kingdom -28.3%  
Source: own calculations; year 2001; Luxembourg is modelled together with Belgium. 
Measurement units: % reduction of CO2eq. 
 
These ‘optimal’ regional emission abatement targets are aggregated for Member States in this 
table and can be directly compared to the ones assumed in the burden-sharing agreement 
(see table (25)). 
7.3.2 Agricultural supply 
The overall effect of emission abatement measures on agricultural markets is a reduction in 
production. This is not very surprising since only a structural response is allowed from regional 
supply models in the fulfilment of the emission target. Nevertheless, this effect can vary across 
activities depending on the emission weight attached by the ‘emission accounting system’ 
(income/emission relationship) and regions depending on the substitution possibilities found in 
each regional model (agricultural income is always maximised subject to constraints). In table 
(28), the supply effects on the main activity aggregates are presented for the EU-15: 
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Table (28) Supply details for activity aggregates (average for the EU-15) 
Hectares or 
herd size Yield Supply
Hectares or 
herd size Yield Supply
Hectares or 
herd size Yield Supply
1000 ha or 
heads
kg /ha or 
head
1000 t
1000 ha or 
heads
kg /ha or 
head
1000 t
1000 ha or 
heads
kg /ha or 
head
1000 t
33003.36 5601.91 184881.75 33386.51 5613.63 187419.37 33282.27 5621.65 187101.14
-12.02% -1.14% -13.02% -11.00% -0.93% -11.83% -11.28% -0.79% -11.98%
4697.04 2954.25 13876.26 4738.35 2960.82 14029.42 4754.1 2963.58 14089.15
-11.53% 0.00% -11.53% -10.75% 0.23% -10.55% -10.46% 0.32% -10.17%
6740 35686.73 240528.62 6749.87 35809.61 241710.3 6763.87 35829.38 242345.15
-2.68% 0.20% -2.49% -2.54% 0.55% -2.01% -2.34% 0.60% -1.75%
66328.47 2305.29 152906.34 66472.05 2299.25 152835.59 66303.65 2300.67 152542.78
-18.88% 15.88% -6.00% -18.70% 15.58% -6.04% -18.91% 15.65% -6.22%
19849.43 228.42 4533.93 19550.65 232.75 4550.33 19433.14 229.14 4452.91
-26.95% 15.58% -15.57% -28.05% 17.77% -15.27% -28.48% 15.94% -17.08%
Oilseeds
Other arable crops
All cattle activities
Beef meat activities
SIM 3: 85-TRD [2001]
% deviation to: NGHGIs base year [2001] % deviation to: NGHGIs base year [2001] % deviation to: NGHGIs base year [2001]
SIM 1: 85-STD [2001] SIM 2: 85-BSAA [2001]
Cereals
 
Source: own calculations; year 2001; In cursive % differences in hectares or herd size, yield and supply w.r.t. to the 
base year situation. 
 
A slight extensification effect can be observed for cereals in all three scenarios (reduction in 
yields). At the optimum it is profitable for agricultural producers to reduce the amount of 
fertiliser applied (and indirectly N2O emissions) and maintain some production on land which 
otherwise would have been abandoned, i.e. the drop in supply is higher than the drop in hectares 
of cultivation. This effect is less accused for ‘other arable crops’ such as pulses, potatoes and 
sugar beet. For cattle and beef meat activities, however, higher yields are modelled. For the latter 
group, it is optimal from an ‘emission accounting perspective’ to heavily increase yields (up to 
18 %) and further reduce the cattle herd (up to -17 %). Through this intensification effect 
animals become more efficient in terms of GHG emissions (higher income obtained per emission 
unit). 
In the previous table it is also shown that in scenario 1 (85-STD) higher drops in crop production 
are estimated. The introduction of non-uniform standards, explicitly through a 
burden-sharing-agreement (85-BSAA) or implicitly through emission trading (85-TRD), implies 
a relaxing of the emission constraint at the regional level and indirectly production is less 
affected. 
7.3.3 Prices 
As mentioned before, prices are now considered an endogenous variable for simulation purposes. 
This means that world markets have an influence on European agricultural markets and, 
therefore, monetary variations in supply are not anymore equivalent to variations in income, as 
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presented in the previous two chapters. The following two tables show the effect on agricultural 
prices (consumer and producer prices) for the modelled abatement mechanisms: 
Table (29) Variation in consumer and producer prices for selected primary products 
(average for the EU-15) 
Consumer 
Price
Producer 
Price
Consumer 
Price
Producer 
Price
Consumer 
Price
Producer 
Price
0.80% 15.57% 0.73% 14.05%
0.68% 19.29%
0.98% 7.90% 0.89% 7.35%
0.79% 15.25%
0.96% 7.89%
0.29% 7.29%
0.70% 19.66%
0.30% 7.49% 0.27% 6.67%
0.53% 15.01%
0.85% 19.46% 0.65% 14.96%
21.84%
0.17% 2.81% 0.19% 3.22%
0.84% 19.20%
0.16% 2.71%
22.51%
0.01% 1.72%
16.79%
0.03% 2.75%
0.39% 15.54% 0.35% 18.83% 0.38% 17.56%
0.03% 2.98%
8.81% 6.98%
97.63%
0.00% 3.43% 0.00% 2.95%
8.38%
0.00% 2.93%
98.29%
45.54% 99.36%
42.47% 100.13% 36.63% 84.31%
39.23% 85.23% 44.13%
21.79% 5.69% 18.54%
41.18%
21.65%
40.88% 81.26%
2.60%
48.76%
2.48%
49.35% 36.91%
2.77%
Durum wheat
Rye and meslin
Barley
6.66%
41.67% 78.95% 43.23% 86.07%
6.74%
Poultry meat
Cow and buffalo milk *
Sheep and goat milk *
Sugar beet *
Beef
Veal
Pork meat
SIM 1: 85-STD [2001] SIM 2: 85-BSAA [2001] SIM 3: 85-TRD [2001]
Sheep and goat meat
Pulses
Potatoes
Oats
Grain maize
Paddy rice *
Soft wheat
 
Source: own calculations; year 2001; differences w.r.t. prices in the base year situation. 
* These products are processed in the model; consumer prices for processed products are reported in table (30). 
 
Table (29) shows the main variations in consumer and producer prices for primary products. It 
can be observed how producer and consumer prices increase for the main activities in all three 
scenarios, especially for animal products. This effect has to be considered parallel to the supply 
effects explained in the previous section and is due to the market barriers applied by the EU on 
agricultural markets. Amongst other measures, tariff rate quotas for cereals and beef remain 
binding in the different simulation scenarios (MFN tariffs are quite restrictive compared to 
preferential tariffs). These make imports quite ‘steaky’ and indirectly transfer the burden to 
exports, which drop heavily in order to fulfil internal demand (see structure of the market model 
in section 2.5.4). Consequently, demand slightly shrinks and consumer prices increase. 
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Table (30) Variation in consumer prices for processed products (average for the EU-15) 
SIM 1: 85-STD [2001] SIM 2: 85-BSAA [2001] SIM 3: 85-TRD [2001]
Butter 14.23%
Skimmed milk powder 20.70%
Cheese 10.16%
Fresh milk products 11.49%
10.57% 13.23%
17.23% 19.90%
8.14% 9.59%
11.82% 10.73%
Cream 14.05% 10.45% 13.07%
Concentrated milk 13.54% 13.95% 12.66%
Whole milk powder 13.51% 13.91% 12.62%
Soya oil
Sugar
4.77% 4.38% 4.71%
2.71% 2.22% 2.69%
1.37% 1.33% 1.36%
Rice milled
 
Source: own calculations; year 2001; differences w.r.t. prices in the base year situation. 
 
There is also a general increase in prices for processed products. Nevertheless, these are lower 
than the price increases of the raw agricultural products applied in their production (e.g. sugar 
beet prices increase by 7 to 9 % and processed sugar by 1.3 to 1.4 %). Therefore, the processing 
industry suffers a negative welfare effect since it has to pay much higher input costs (the price 
increase of the raw material is not completely transferred to the processed product). 
At this stage, from the analysis on supply and prices it can be extracted: (1) that consumers 
suffer high economic losses through the implementation of an emission constraint on agricultural 
production (consumer prices increase) and (2) that these losses are lower in the case of 
‘non-uniform’ emission abatement scenarios (85-BSAA and 85-TRD) than in the case of a 
‘uniform’ standard (85-STD). Nothing conclusive can however be said about how agricultural 
producers are affected since they produce less but at higher prices. In order to further analyse the 
welfare effects of emission abatement measures, these two variables are combined in the 
following section and agricultural income per activity estimated. 
7.3.4 Income details 
Agricultural income is constructed as the sum of revenues (production multiplied by price) and 
premiums minus input costs. In table (31), income details for selected activities are presented. 
CHAPTER 7 
 147 
Table (31) Income details for selected activities (average for the EU-15) 
Revenues Costs Premiums Income Revenues Costs Premiums Income Revenues Costs Premiums Income
697.15 300.54 329.52 726.13 692.75 299.12 330.15 723.78 700 300.77 330.2 729.44
9.14% -1.45% 3.42% 11.30% 8.45% -1.92% 3.62% 10.94% 9.58% -1.38% 3.63% 11.80%
550.84 259.43 298.3 589.72 543.14 258.67 298.52 582.99 554.09 260.12 299.6 593.57
10.53% -1.99% 0.53% 11.18% 8.99% -2.27% 0.60% 9.92% 11.18% -1.73% 0.96% 11.91%
3204.77 736.12 356.93 2825.58 3190.41 737.52 355.17 2808.06 3208.59 738.73 354.96 2824.82
4.96% 1.23% 1.62% 5.53% 4.49% 1.42% 1.12% 4.88% 5.08% 1.59% 1.06% 5.50%
1967.85 1011.5 70.06 1026.4 1837.76 989.31 68.65 917.11 1999.32 1052.8 68.63 1015.19
92.86% 51.75% 4.83% 144.03% 80.11% 48.42% 2.72% 118.04% 95.95% 57.94% 2.69% 141.36%
1432.13 1066.44 185.63 551.32 1366.14 1043.18 184.1 507.06 1452.99 1113 184.49 524.47
115.40% 70.25% 12.58% 171.08% 105.47% 66.54% 11.65% 149.32% 118.54% 77.69% 11.89% 157.88%
SIM 3: 85-TRD [2001]
% deviation to : NGHGIs base year [2001] % deviation to : NGHGIs base year [2001] % deviation to : NGHGIs base year [2001]
SIM 1: 85-STD [2001]
Other arable crops
All cattle activities
Beef meat activities
SIM 2: 85-BSAA [2001]
Cereals
Oilseeds
 
Source: own calculations; year 2001. 
Measurement units: € per hectare or head. 
In cursive % differences w.r.t. revenues, total costs, premiums and income in the base year. 
 
An interesting result of the model is that for most agricultural activities and scenarios income 
increases. Considerable production losses per activity are therefore over-compensated by 
increases in prices. In the previous table, it can be observed that, whereas revenues increase 
between 11 % and 12 % for crop activities, variable costs remain more or less constant or even 
drop. Moreover, premiums also contribute to a higher income level due to less pressure on 
regional premium ceilings (less ‘premium cutting’ is necessary to meet the national premium 
ceiling, as explained in figure (19), p. 106). For animal activities, this effect is even stronger. For 
example, cattle activities more than duplicate income w.r.t. the base year situation. 
From the perspective of the different abatement mechanisms, income gains are generally higher 
in the first scenario (85-STD) than in the two latter (directly derived from the price 
development). However, nothing conclusive can be said since this effect depends on the relative 
competitiveness of the different crop activities in each scenario. For some aggregates, such as 
cereals and cattle activities, income increases are higher in the 85-TRD scenario than in the 
85-BSAA. 
Summarising, consumer losses and producer gains are observed in all three scenarios. In order to 
get a general picture, these two indicators are integrated in the following section within a 
consistent welfare analysis. Public sector expenditure (welfare losses from taxpayers) and profits 
from the dairy and oil-crushing processing industry are also considered. 
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7.3.5 Welfare effects 
The welfare measure in CAPRI is based on production and consumption shifts of agricultural 
primary goods, as well as an aggregate of ‘all other goods’104, driven by price changes. Its main 
elements are producer surplus, consumer surplus and budgetary expenditures (paid by 
taxpayers). Additionally, profits from the oil-crushing and dairy processing industry are included 
(Pérez, Wieck, 2004): 
− Consumer surplus is calculated by using the money metric indirect utility function (Varian, 
1992, p. 110). The money metric measure is the minimal expenditure needed to incur by 
consumers in order to reach the utility level of the simulation year at prices of the reference 
situation (= calibration point). Final consumption is modelled by a generalised Leontief 
expenditure function, allowing the explicit derivation of this indirect utility function. 
Changes in consumer prices derived by the implementation of an emission abatement 
instrument affect the money metric, giving an indirect measure of consumers’ welfare 
change. 
− Producer surplus is calculated as agricultural income according to the gross value added 
concept of the Economic Accounts of Agriculture (output revenues minus input costs). The 
current analysis explicitly includes direct payments and revenues/costs from permit trading 
(scenario 85-TRD).  
− Profits of the processing industry. Production of processed products from the dairy and 
oilseed industry is approached in CAPRI through the derivative of a normalised quadratic 
profit function (one input product and several processed products). Production of milled rice 
is calculated through fix processing factors (one raw product and one processed product). 
− Budgetary expenditure comprise of all direct payments for agricultural commodities 
(premiums) as well as export subsidies and costs for intervention purchases. 
The main welfare effects observed for the EU-15 are resumed in table (32): 
                                                 
104 This ‘bundle of goods’ closes the demand balance. 
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Table (32) Welfare effects (average for the EU-15) 
SIM 1: 85-STD [2001] SIM 2: 85-BSAA [2001] SIM 3: 85-TRD [2001]
differences to: NGHGIs base 
year [2001]
differences to: NGHGIs base 
year [2001]
differences to: NGHGIs base 
year [2001]
35542.07 35596.96 35464.59
-1956.44 -1901.55 -2033.92
4354880.43 4359747.4 4356338.21
-42174.38 -37307.41 -40716.6
330326.12 322002.14 334291.92
53671.32 45347.34 57637.12
146042.86 145194.06 150025.26
10415.98 9567.18 14398.38
27928.57 27953.55 27880.7
-2531.72 -2506.74 -2579.59
95.07
95.07
212211.84 204761.64 212052.3
40723.63 33273.43 40564.09
64219.98 67457.54 64325.9
-5851.27 -2613.71 -5745.35
4595770.18 4596369.62 4597251.82
-5345.58 -4746.14 -3863.94
4601115.76
Agricultural income 171488.21
Profit of processing industry 70071.25
276654.8
Input costs 135626.88
Premiums 30460.29
NGHGIs base year 
[2001]
Budgetary expenditure
Money metric
37498.51
4397054.81
Output revenues
Transaction costs from permit trading
TOTAL WELFARE
 
Source: own calculations; year 2001. 
Measurement units: Mio € (in cursive differences w.r.t. the base year). 
Note: in the table total welfare is defined as positive transfers to consumers (money metric) + agricultural income 
(output revenues - input costs + premiums - transaction costs from permit trading) + profits from the processing 
industry - budgetary expenditures (transfers from taxpayers). 
 
As previously observed at activity level, agricultural income (= producer surplus) increases in all 
simulation scenarios. Whereas in the 85-STD scenario 40.7 Bio € are estimated as economic 
transfers to producers, in the 85-BSAA and 85-TRD 33.3 Bio € and 40.6 Bio € are achieved (for 
the latter transaction costs of permit trading included). This positive effect is due to the general 
increase in producer prices. On the other side, transfers to consumers (money metric utility 
measure) diminish due to an increase of consumer prices: -42.2, -37.3 and -40.7 Bio € in the 
defined scenarios respectively. Since public expenditure remains more or less constant 
(-2 Bio €), the effect on total welfare is mainly determined by the difference between gains 
achieved by producers and losses suffered by consumers and processing industry. 
The total welfare effect is estimated negative for all simulation scenarios: -5.3 Bio € in 85-STD, 
-4.7 Bio € in 85-BSAA and -3.8 Bio € in 85-TRD. It is interesting to see, that whereas 
agricultural income is highest in the 85-STD scenario (‘quota-effect’), welfare losses are 
minimised with the introduction of tradable emission permits. It can be therefore extracted that 
the introduction of emission permits achieves a more efficient solution than emission standards 
from an overall perspective (uniform or non-uniform). 
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It is important to highlight that the presented welfare analysis does not take into account the 
benefits obtained by future generations through a ‘better environment’, i.e. only ‘private welfare’ 
is considered. Welfare effects derived from the reduction of GHG emissions do not enter this 
calculation since their estimation goes beyond the scope of this study (e.g. reduction of damage 
costs from emission abatement). It is however important to remark this aspect since it is the key 
of climate policy: most of the directly observed economic losses might be outweighed by future 
environmental benefits. 
7.4 Conclusions 
In this chapter three typical KP emission abatement instruments are simulated in European 
agriculture: a regional uniform emission standard, a specific burden-sharing-agreement for 
agriculture and a market for emission permits. They are compared in the year 2001 by looking at 
supply, income and environmental effects. Through the introduction of price variability, a 
consistent analysis of welfare effects on consumers, agricultural producers, taxpayers and 
processing industry is allowed. 
The results show how production restrictions in European agriculture, indirectly introduced 
through emission abatement policy, might lead to welfare gains for agricultural producers. This 
‘quota effect’ is caused by the isolation of European agricultural markets from world markets 
through effective barriers to trade (import tariffs, export subsidies and tariff rate quotas). The 
decrease in domestic production plus a parallel restriction on imports increase pressure on 
internal demand, with higher producer and consumer prices as a consequence. From an overall 
perspective, total (private) welfare is estimated to be negative. This effect is however dampened 
with the introduction of tradable emission permits. 
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CHAPTER 8 Discussion 
“Kangaroos offer a clue to global warming: researchers believe it might 
be possible to use bacteria found in the stomachs of kangaroos to reduce 
methane output from cows and sheep” (BBC News World Edition, 3rd of 
January 2002). 
8.1 Limitations of the current research study 
8.1.1 Uncertainty about the global warming effect across time 
The global warming effect is still the ‘big unknown’ in emission abatement policy. Whereas 
climate change is ‘certified’ by the majority of the scientific community (not yet without 
discussion), nobody is capable of estimating the real dimension of it. Emission factor estimates 
are continuously updated, trying to reflect the new scientific findings. As a consequence, current 
policy proposals do not consider a ‘full internalisation’ of the environmental damage caused by 
GHG emissions on future generations. In other words, no proper discounting of economic effects 
in the future is carried out, due to lack of reliable estimates. 
In the current study, emission factors published by the IPCC in 2000 have been used to estimate 
GHG emissions from agriculture. Nevertheless, the IPCC already published in 2001 an update of 
these and the UNFCCC re-calculated national GHG emission inventories in 2004. It is important 
to take into account these issues when comparing results since the sensitivity of the economic 
model used relies heavily on these parameters. 
8.1.2 Carbon sinks 
In GHG emission abatement accounting of carbon absorption by certain activities has been 
allowed. This issue has become very important in the current international negotiations and in 
some cases has been the trigger for dispute (e.g. USA decided not to sign the KP because its 
1990 reference period would not cover massive re-forestation efforts carried out in the 80’s). In 
the last UNFCCC meeting of the subsidiary bodies (June 2004, Bonn), further agreement was 
achieved on the estimation of carbon sinks from agriculture and forestry. 
In the current analysis ‘carbon sinks’ have not been considered for the calculation of GHG 
emission inventories since the UNFCCC approach has been followed and they are not yet 
Discussion 
152  
included in the common reporting format (CRF tables). However, several models have done this 
in the past and some emission factor estimates are already available in the literature. 
8.1.3 Shadow value approach 
Mathematical programming models rely on assumptions which might not always hold in reality. 
The current mathematical programming approach is logically not an exception and some hurdles 
have to be recognized in its application to the estimation of marginal abatement costs. In CAPRI, 
agricultural supply is modelled by using PMP calibration techniques. Whereas income is directly 
obtained by multiplying producer prices and quantities and adding up direct payments, costs for 
agricultural activities are calibrated in the base year to the Economic Accounts of Agriculture in 
order to ensure that ‘regional revenue is exhausted’. This is achieved through quadratic cost 
functions which rely on some exogenous direct and crossed point-elasticities. 
In this study MACs have been indirectly estimated by shocking the model with an additional 
restriction. As already mentioned, the shadow value of this emission restriction can be 
interpreted as the marginal effect on the objective function. This effect depends partially on the 
regional cost structure assumed and can be slightly affected by the price elasticities used by the 
model. Nevertheless, continuous research on sensitivity issues has been carried out by the 
CAPRI team and model results, especially marginal values from restrictions, have proved to be 
quite robust to exogenous shocks in the system. Comparability with other models should, 
however, take into account these issues. 
8.1.4 Production technologies 
In the version of the model used for this study, limited yield variability for crop and animal 
activities has been allowed (apart from the activities which are explicitly modelled on different 
technological intensities, e.g. dairy cows high and low yield). This introduces an extensification 
or intensification effect at the margin which might indicate the trend of an agricultural activity 
reacting to an exogenous shock (e.g. policy reform). Other models work with explicit 
agricultural production technologies or management options (e.g. organic farming, tillage 
intensity or different crop rotations). These are at the moment not considered in the model due to 
data restrictions (in Europe there is still little regional data on agricultural management options). 
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8.2 Greenhouse gas emission abatement and Common Agricultural Policy 
reform 
The latest CAP Reforms have had a relevant side-effect on the shrinking of GHG emissions from 
the European agricultural sector. After the reduction of intervention prices for subsidised 
activities, mainly cereals, and the implementation of environmental regulations in Agenda 2000 
(e.g. set-aside, afforestation measures, nitrate directive, etc.), some extensification effects have 
been observed. Moreover, the decoupling options introduced by the recently adopted CAP 
Reform (Council of the European Union, 2004c) are expected to intensify this effect: whereas 
agriculture in rural areas is protected from abandonment for its environmental benefits, 
subsidisation leading to over-production is avoided. The reduction of Agenda 2000 direct 
payments and administrative prices and the introduction of modulation and partial decoupling 
mechanisms for subsidised agricultural activities will probably lead to somewhat similar effects 
than the enforcement of GHG emission abatement in European Agriculture, namely a reduction 
in production (in the first case due to an ‘ironing of inefficiencies’ and in the second case due to 
the linkage between emissions and agricultural production) and an overall increase in 
agricultural income (in both cases due to increases in producer prices, border protection being 
maintained). Nevertheless, the production and income effects of the CAP reform on single 
activities and regions will certainly not be the same. Whereas emission abatement instruments 
will increase the burden on activities with a low emission/income relationship and regions with 
low substitution possibilities (as presented in chapter 7), policy reform will mainly affect 
previously subsidised activities (e.g. cereals). Moreover, the direction of change for total welfare 
might be of different sign. Whereas in the current study a reduction in welfare is predicted 
(driven by higher consumer prices), the adopted policy reform is expected to lead to welfare 
gains if overall budgetary support is maintained105. 
The parallel consideration of the CAP 2003 policy reform in the current analysis of abatement 
measures would definitely change the reference scenario assumed (indirect link between 
‘decoupling of premiums’ and ‘level of GHG emissions’). Although some simulation analysis 
has been done with the CAPRI model in this direction (Pérez et al., 2003), the environmental 
effects of policy reform in the medium-term have not been considered within the current analysis 
in order to avoid the introduction of additional assumptions. 
                                                 
105 This is however difficult to predict (e.g. support might decrease in real terms in the period of application) and not 
the objective of this study. 
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8.3 Emission mitigation technologies in agriculture 
GHG emission mitigation measures can be categorised into (1) structural measures, 
(2) management measures and (3) technological measures (Oenema et al., 2004). In the current 
study, the first category has been analysed by looking at the indirect changes in land use caused 
by the explicit introduction of instruments of emission abatement. Structural variables of 
agriculture such as the type or size of farming are affected by environmental regulation. 
However, as in other sectors, management changes and technological innovation in agriculture 
have a high mitigation potential and might be a key issue in the future106. These can effectively 
target GHG emissions from agricultural sources, as presented in the following examples: 
− Methane emissions from enteric fermentation can be reduced by optimising the lifetime of 
dairy cows (higher replacement rate) or improving feeding (diet manipulation). 
− Manure management emissions (methane and nitrous oxide) can be targeted by reductions in 
livestock density, manipulation of storage systems (e.g. promotion of aerobic digestion by 
high-C additives), introduction of end-of-pipe systems (e.g. filters or ventilation systems) and 
bio-gas production. 
− Methane emissions from rice production can be minimised by shortening the flooding 
periods in the year. 
− Nitrous oxide emissions from manure excretion on grazings can be reduced by restricting 
cattle grazing or by applying nitrification inhibitors on pastures. 
− Nitrous oxide emissions from synthetic fertiliser application can as well be minimised by 
improving soil drainage or by using nitrification inhibitors. 
This non-exhaustive list of mitigation options is not addressed in the current study due to lack of 
data (partially related to the problem highlighted in section 8.1.4). Nevertheless the future 
implementation of emission abatement policies in agriculture should take them into account and 
develop appropriate controlling and sanctioning instruments. 
                                                 
106 Oenema differentiates between management measures, which focus on improving resource use efficiency and 
refer to the tactical and operational management decision, and technological measures, which require significant 
capital investment. In this chapter, both are considered together as an alternative to structural measures. 
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8.4 Environmental effectiveness and the problems of regulating an ‘emission 
bubble’ in European agriculture 
In this study agricultural production has been considered as an indirect emitter of GHGs and 
therefore targeted from a sectoral perspective. This corresponds to a direct application of the 
polluter-pays-principle: only those who pollute bear the environmental costs of pollution. From 
this perspective, agriculture is an emitter of methane (from animal production, manure 
management and rice cultivation) and nitrous oxide (from agricultural soil management 
practices). It would therefore be justified to focus pollution control on activities for which GHGs 
are a by-product and extrapolate this approach to other sectors and regions in the world so that 
all agents contributing directly to the climate change externality would be included in a global 
GHG emission abatement system (upstream approach). Moreover, in order to minimise 
transaction costs, it would also be possible to consider only producers with a minimum pollution 
level so that an important share of emissions is covered by the system (e.g. US sulphur dioxide 
trading scheme). 
However, this problem can also be observed from the demand side: consumers of certain 
polluting goods are, through their consumption, indirectly responsible for the emission of GHGs. 
Agriculture is an important consumer of mineral fertilisers, fuel or machinery, products which 
have attached GHGs as by-product in their production processes (mainly carbon dioxide). It 
could therefore be argued that agricultural firms, as single consumers of these goods, should bear 
the external costs of production (downstream approach)107. This approach could also be used to 
regulate emissions at a sectoral level and sectors be considered by environmental policy as 
independent entities. In order to keep transaction costs low, only important sources, or in this 
case applications, could also be considered so that a sufficient amount of emissions is included in 
the system (similar pattern as in the previous approach). 
These approaches have direct implications on the environmental effectiveness of the economic 
emission abatement instrument selected depending on the size of the targeted externality. In the 
case of a global emission abatement scheme (aim of the KP), both approaches would be probably 
justified in terms of effectiveness (no leakages since all produced or consumed emissions are 
involved) and efficiency (derived from the introduction of emission pricing). However, the first 
approach would be preferred in terms of feasibility since producers are much less than 
                                                 
107 The household sector would have to pay in this system for emissions linked to food production. 
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consumers. The issue of transaction costs was already discussed in chapter 6 for the case of an 
emission permit market targeting agricultural producers. 
Nevertheless, the case of the European Climate Change Program is a different one, its aim is ‘to 
internalise a global externality within certain physical borders’ (bubble policy). The issue of 
‘abatement accounting’ has to be analysed more carefully since the import-export share of 
environmental polluting products might change across time. This implies that emission leakages 
could appear by targeting abatement on a pollution-producing sector (upstream approach) if 
Member States have the possibility of freely import ‘high polluting’ products from non-EU 
countries108. If this is the case, emissions could then be shifted to other world regions and not 
abated from a global perspective (environmental target not achieved). This problem could be 
minimised by choosing a downstream approach so that emissions are accounted from a demand 
perspective. The domestic demand for these products would have to drop parallel to the amount 
of emissions allowed in the scheme, this constraint being reflected on price increases 
(e.g. household demand for electricity). For products for which demand is fairly elastic, some 
further control would have to be introduced to avoid a possible export increase (emission leakage 
towards other non-EU countries). 
These considerations are quite important when considering an ‘emission bubble’ and also affect 
the agricultural sector. Some examples of emission leakage in agriculture from an upstream 
perspective could come through higher imports of products for which a high application of 
mineral fertiliser is needed (e.g. vegetables and flowers). From a downstream perspective 
emission leakage could come through increases in exports of young animals (produced but not 
consumed as adult animals within the European boundaries). 
 
                                                 
108 This expression refers to products for which a high amount of GHGs is emitted in their respective production 
process. 
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CHAPTER 9 Summary and 
Conclusions 
"In the long term, economic sustainability depends on ecological 
sustainability" (America’s Living Oceans, Pew Oceans Report, 2003). 
 
9.1 Modelling of European greenhouse gas emission inventories 
In this research study the CAPRI model, a widely applied agricultural model, is used as the main 
tool for estimating GHG emissions from agricultural sources. The approach followed makes use 
of the information on emission factors published by the IPCC (IPCC, 1997; IPCC, 2000) and 
activity data from public data bases (NEWCRONOS and REGIO domains of EUROSTAT). The 
presented modelling methodology has some advantages for the estimation of GHG emissions 
from agricultural sources relative to the use of national independent studies: (a) it enables a 
consistent and simultaneous analysis of emissions from crop and animal activities, (b) it makes 
use of transparent and accessible data sources and (c) it introduces an endogenous dose-response 
mechanism between production activities and emission sources which allows for further 
mitigation policy analysis.  
Twelve agricultural emission sources are individually modelled: methane from enteric 
fermentation, manure management and rice production, and nitrous oxide from manure 
management, manure excretion on grazings, application of synthetic fertiliser, organic animal 
waste, application of total fertiliser on the field, crop residues, biological fixation, ammonia 
losses and atmospheric deposition. With this information, GHG emission inventories at Nuts 2 
level are estimated for the year 2001 and validated through meticulous comparison with official 
NGHGIs.  
EU-15 methane emissions are estimated to be 7.7 Mio tonnes in the year 2001, laying 10.4 % 
below official data. The main emitters are France and Germany, with 1.9 and 1.2 Mio tonnes 
respectively. Deviations with respect to official data may be due to differences in the 
specification of certain activities, inconsistencies in the EUROSTAT agricultural statistics and/or 
reporting differences by single Member States since similar rules for calculation of methane 
emission factors are used. For nitrous oxide emissions, estimates for the EU-15 are 0.5 Mio 
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tonnes and match in average UNFCCC statistics. In this case, comparison is not that 
straightforward since specific rules for the calculation of emission factors (especially for 
emissions from agricultural soils) are used by Member States. Measured in carbon dioxide 
equivalents, GHG emissions from agriculture are 380.7 Mio tonnes, with an average deviation of 
-4.4 % for the EU-15. In this calculation, the endogenous emissions calculated by the model are 
corrected in order to cover some other sources not modelled (histosols and N leaching). Overall, 
100 % of methane emissions and 72 % of nitrous oxide emissions are covered by the current 
modelling approach (see table (17) in section 3.4.2). 
Looking at emission sources, enteric fermentation is the main source of methane (5.8 Mio 
tonnes) and application of synthetic fertiliser application the main source of nitrous oxide 
(0.18 Mio tonnes). Deviations in methane emissions are, however, mostly due to variations in 
manure management emissions (-18.4 %). One of the reasons is that the fraction of N in manure 
‘managed’ by the model is lower than the one used by Member States, who do not always use 
IPCC default values for their GHG emission inventories. This is also reflected in nitrous oxide 
emissions (-13.4 % when summing up manure management and excretion on grazings). There is 
also an over-estimation of N2O animal waste emissions (13 %) due to a higher amount of manure 
produced in the model (through manure-output functions) compared to the statistics used by 
Member States (see table (18) in section 3.4.2). 
To summarise, on the one side, a slight under-estimation of methane emissions with respect to 
official NGHGIs can be observed. On the other side, nitrous oxide emissions in some big 
countries such as France, United Kingdom and Spain are slightly over-estimated but no clear 
pattern is observed. The modelled results seem, however, quite plausible since they do not 
deviate much for the EU-15 aggregate and are subject to strict regional consistency rules 
(advantage of the selected modelling approach). 
9.2 Differences in marginal emission abatement costs across European 
regions 
MACCs are a decisive tool of policy analysis since they deliver the necessary information to 
regulate emission abatement. They might help policy-makers in two ways: (1) estimating the 
economic effects on individual agents of command-and-control abatement instruments and 
(2) estimating the total mitigation effect of a market-based abatement instrument. MACCs are 
modelled in CAPRI by estimating the shadow values faced by regional supply models for a 
certain emission abatement target. 
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Member States face quite different MACs for a similar abatement objective. For an 8 % emission 
reduction, MACs vary between 57 € for Ireland and 143 € for the Netherlands and for a 15 % 
emission reduction MACs vary between 106 € for Ireland and 260 € for Denmark. Economically 
optimal adjustment in the regional models to the singular emission targets is achieved through 
production substitution and yield shifts. Since the model is calibrated to an observed regional 
production-mix in the base year, an optimum can only be reached through an expansion or 
contraction of these endogenous productive activities such as to fulfil the emission abatement 
goal and the rest of the restrictions in the model. Some Member States such as Denmark and the 
Netherlands have noticeably higher estimated MACCs than the others. This is due to their 
specialisation in intensive crop production, with high mineral fertiliser application together with 
high-yield cattle production processes. Income per hectare of Grandes Cultures (revenue plus 
premiums minus costs) in these countries is quite high, mainly due to yields above the EU 
average. But at the same time nitrous oxide emissions from synthetic fertiliser application are 
also quite high since high yields are coupled to high fertiliser application with the result of low 
income per ton of CO2eq. This leads to higher production losses for these activities compared to 
animal activities (more profitable in terms of income per emission unit). 
9.3 Efficiency gains of tradable emission permits 
In general, acknowledging that "something must be done" to avoid irreversible environmental 
degradation in the future it seems economically rational to minimise economic losses of this 
emission mitigation action from a sectoral perspective. Robust, detailed and consistent modelling 
tools are applicable to the climate change externality and can be useful for the policy-making 
process. With this purpose a market of emission permits in European agriculture is regarded as a 
feasible option and efficiency gains with respect to other abatement instruments estimated. 
Emission trading is modelled with the following characteristics: (1) cap and trade system, 
(2) ‘grandfathering’ of permits, (3) unrestricted trade between Nuts 2 regions and (4) direct 
modelling of transaction costs. 
With the implementation of emission trading between European regions, income losses still 
remain with respect to the base year situation (the emission cap is still binding) but efficiency 
gains are achieved compared to the application of a uniform emission standard (agricultural 
income increases by 630 Mio €). These revenues are however dampened by the transaction costs 
linked to the emission trading scheme. For the EU-15 as a whole, 564 Mio € are estimated as 
efficiency gains. On the one side, sellers are able to compensate income losses from production 
substitution through permit rents: for example, United Kingdom moves from potential losses of 
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-302.4 Mio € to 146.7 Mio € gains through selling of permits). On the other side, buyers cover 
purchase costs of permits through higher revenues from production: for example Germany 
moves from potential income gains of 412.4 Mio € to 137.7 Mio € through buying of permits. 
All Member States are “better-off” through permit trading (consistent with microeconomic 
theory).By plotting the internal solution path for Member States, it can be observed how the 
average weighted MAC in the European Union falls from 171.3 € to 157.6 €. 
To summarise, some relevant observations can be extracted: (a) emission trading proves to be a 
cost-effective solution for Member States due to the heterogeneity of marginal abatement costs 
and (b) the income effects of this instrument depend heavily on the transaction costs linked to its 
implementation. 
9.4  Emission abatement including price effects 
An important issue of emission abatement policy is the distribution of welfare effects between 
consumers and producers when trade policy measures are explicitly modelled and price 
variability is allowed. With fixed prices, model results show that any emission abatement policy 
in the agricultural sector imposes an economic burden on producers, which have to reduce 
production in order to fulfil individual emission targets. Nevertheless, by introducing price 
variability this effect does not hold anymore since income depends not only on production 
changes but also on output prices. In this study, modelling results show how production 
restrictions in European agriculture, indirectly introduced through emission abatement policy, 
might lead to welfare gains for agricultural firms (‘quota effect’). This is caused by the isolation 
of European agricultural markets from world markets through effective barriers to trade (import 
tariffs, export subsidies and tariff rate quotas as binding constraints). Reductions in domestic 
production and parallel restrictions on imports increase pressure on internal demand with higher 
producer and consumer prices as a consequence. 
At an aggregated level, agricultural income (= producer surplus) increases in all simulation 
scenarios. Whereas in a uniform emission standard scenario 40.7 Bio € are estimated as 
economic transfers to producers, in a non-uniform emission standard (burden sharing 
agreement) and a market of emission permits 33.3 Bio € and 40.6 Bio € are achieved (for the 
latter transaction costs are included). This positive effect is due to an increase in producer prices. 
On the other side, transfers to consumers (money metric utility measure) diminish due to an 
increase of consumer prices: -42.2, -37.3 and -40.7 Bio € in the defined scenarios respectively. 
Since public expenditure remains more or less constant (-2 Bio €), the effect on total welfare is 
mainly determined by the difference between gains achieved by producers and losses suffered by 
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consumers and processing industry, the latter due to higher input costs. Total welfare is 
estimated negative in all simulation scenarios. It is, however, interesting to see, that whereas 
agricultural income is highest in the uniform emission standard scenario (‘quota-effect’), welfare 
losses are minimised with the introduction of tradable emission permits. It can be therefore 
extracted that the introduction of emission permits achieves a more efficient solution than 
emission standards from an overall perspective. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1 Summary of Montreal Protocol Control Measures 
Ozone Depleting Substances Developed Countries Developing Countries 
Chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) Phased out end of 1995a Total phase out by 2010 
Halons Phased out end of 1993 Total phase out by 2010 
Carbon tetrachloride Phased out end of 1995a Total phase out by 2010 
Methyl chloroform Phased out end of 1995a Total phase out by 2015 
Freeze from beginning of 1996b Freeze in 2016 at 2015 base level 
35 % reduction by 2004 Total phase out by 2040 
65 % reduction by 2010  
90 % reduction by 2015  
Hydrochlorofluorocarbons 
(HCFCs) 
Total phase out by 2020c  
Hydrobromofluorocarbons 
(HBFCs) Phased out end of 1995 Phased out end of 1995 
Freeze in 1995 at 1991 base 
leveld 
Freeze in 2002 at average 
1995-1998 base level 
25 % reduction by 1999 20 % reduction by 2005e 
50 % reduction by 2001 Total phase out by 2015 
70 % reduction by 2003  
Methyl bromide (horticultural 
uses) 
Total phase out by 2005  
Bromochloromethane (BCM) Phase out by 2002 Phase out by 2002 
a With the exception of a very small number of internationally agreed essential uses that are considered critical to 
human health and/or laboratory and analytical procedures. 
b Based on 1989 HCFC consumption with an extra allowance equal to 2.8 % of 1989 CFC consumption. 
c Up to 0.5 % of base level consumption can be used until 2030 for servicing existing equipment. 
d All reductions include an exemption for pre-shipment and quarantine uses. 
e Review in 2003 to decide on interim further reductions beyond 2005. 
Source: Australian Government, 2004. 
 ii  
Appendix 2 Annex I countries of the UNFCCC 
Australia Germany Norway 
Austria Greece Poland 1 
Belarus 1 Hungary 1 Portugal 
Belgium Iceland Romania 1 
Bulgaria 1 Ireland Russian Federation 1 
Canada Italy Spain 
Czechoslovakia 1 Japan Sweden 
Denmark Latvia 1 Switzerland 
EU Lithuania 1 Turkey 
Estonia 1 Luxembourg Ukraine 1 
Finland Netherlands UK and North Ireland 
France New Zealand USA 
Source: Annex I of the UNFCCC (UN, 1992b). 
1 Countries that are undergoing a transition process to a market economy. 
  iii 
Appendix 3 Annex II countries of the UNFCCC 
Australia Greece Portugal 
Austria Iceland Spain 
Belgium Ireland Sweden 
Canada Italy Switzerland 
Denmark Japan Turkey 
EU Luxembourg UK and North Ireland 
Finland Netherlands USA 
France New Zealand  
Germany Norway  
Source: Annex II of the UNFCCC (UN, 1992b). 
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Appendix 4 Greenhouse gases and sources in the Kyoto Protocol 
GHGs  Sectors /Source categories 
Carbon Dioxide  Energy 
Methane  Fuel combustion 
Nitrous Oxide  Fugitive emissions from fuels 
Hydrofluorocarbons  Industrial processes 
Perfluorocarbons  Solvent and other product use 
Sulfur hexafluoride  Agriculture * 
  Waste 
Source: Annex A of the Kyoto Protocol (UN, 1997). 
* Comprehended in the current modelling analysis are emissions from enteric fermentation, manure management, 
rice cultivation and agricultural soils (see chapter 3). 
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Appendix 5 Emission Reduction Commitments in the Kyoto Protocol 
Australia 108 Hungary 1 94 Poland 1 94 
Austria 92 Iceland 110 Portugal 92 
Belgium 92 Ireland 92 Romania 1 92 
Bulgaria 1 92 Italy 92 Russian Federation 1 100 
Canada 94 Japan 94 Slovakia 1 92 
Croatia 1 95 Latvia 1 92 Slovenia 1 92 
Czech Republic 1 92 Liechtenstein 92 Spain 92 
Denmark 92 Lithuania 1 92 Sweden 92 
EU 92 Luxembourg 92 Switzerland 92 
Finland 92 Monaco 92 Ukraine 1 100 
France 92 Netherlands 92 UK and North Ireland 92 
Germany 92 New Zealand 100 USA 93 
Greece 92 Norway 101   
Source: Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol (UN, 1997); percentage reduction with respect to 1990 emissions. 
1 Countries that are undergoing a transition process to a market economy. 
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Appendix 6 Indirect greenhouse gas emissions not included under the 
rubric ‘agriculture’ of national greenhouse gas emission inventories 
App. 6.1. Carbon dioxide emissions from diesel consumption in machinery use 
The most important source of carbon dioxide in agriculture is machinery use (tractors, harvesting 
machines, etc). Little for not to say no attempts have been made to model CO2 emissions from 
diesel consumption in agriculture per activity109. CO2 emission estimates from fuel consumption 
in Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (liquid, solid, gaseous and biomass) are reported by 
Member States under the rubric ‘energy’. They are therefore included in the GHG emission 
inventories as part of the energy sector, but not disaggregated. 
Recent research in this field has been mainly focused on the mitigation options derived by the 
use of bio-fuels in agriculture (Schneider, McCarl, 2003) which are not the objective of this 
study. The problem is that few data on technological application of machinery to different 
agricultural activities is available up to date at a regional level. In this modelling exercise, 
information on energy costs covered in the European Accounts of Agriculture (EUROSTAT) 
and engineering information on diesel consumption per crop activity (KTBL, 2002) are 
combined to estimate CO2 emissions from machinery application on agricultural fields. 
Additional information on subsidised diesel costs for Member States is used to match both 
sources (Commission of the European Communities, 2003b). Moreover, an average technology 
for each phase of the cropping system is assumed for all European countries and differences in 
emissions per hectare across regions are explained by different subsidisation policies and land 
use.  
From the methodological point of view, a cross entropy approach is used to consistently 
calculate agricultural fuel consumption by including support points based on information on 
diesel consumption per activity and percentage of diesel costs on total energy costs This 
information is directly used to calculate regional diesel consumption and CO2 emission units 
(KBA, 2000). 
                                                 
109 The EEA does not provide any information in its online data service on CO2 emissions for the agricultural sector 
but some data on CO2 from agricultural soils for Finland (http://dataservice.eea.eu.int/dataservice/, accessed on 
June 2004)  
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(9.1) [ ]∑=
i
irrirr XCgDPEGDieCO ,, **/2  
Where: 
CO2Die = carbon dioxide emissions from diesel burning on machinery (in tonnes). 
EG = fuel costs per activity (in € per hectare or head) 
DP = agricultural fuel price (in € per litter) 
Cg = carbon dioxide emission factor (in kg CO2 per litter of diesel consumed) 
 
This analysis presents a highly valuable pressure indicator which can be used, as previously 
indicated, for other research objectives. Its principal weakness refers to the lack of national data 
on cropping technologies (tillage, harvesting, etc). It should be considered as a reference point 
for the rest of emission sources calculated in the model (it is subject to the same assumptions and 
data sources: energy costs, land management variables, etc). 
App. 6.2. Carbon dioxide and nitrous oxide emissions from fertiliser production 
An important indirect source of GHG emissions in European agriculture are production 
processes of mineral fertilisers. Based on the work done by Molina (Molina, 2004), carbon 
dioxide and nitrous oxide emissions factors are estimated for the three main types of mineral 
fertilisers applied in Europe: nitrogenous, phosphate and potash fertilisers. 
The structure of the fertiliser sector in Europe is characterised by an increasing dependency of 
foreign production. Fertiliser consumption has changed during the last years forcing the fertiliser 
industry to adapt itself not only due to market fluctuations but also to new environmental 
policies. In 1985, the EU-15 imported 9.8 Mio tonnes of fertilisers and exported 11.4 Mio 
tonnes. Step by step this trend has been changing over time and from 1989 onwards Europe 
became a net importer of fertilisers (3.4 million tonnes in 2001). 
Technical progress in agriculture has been coupled to the wide-spread use of anorganic 
fertilisers. They have contributed to an increasing improvement on yields but at the same time 
have raised some health and environmental concerns. From an environmental perspective, the 
main negative externalities attached to its production are carbon dioxide and nitrous oxide 
emissions. Both these pollutants are classified by the IPCC as climate relevant gases and, 
therefore, will be the centre of this analysis. For simplicity, no distinction is made regarding 
domestically produced or imported fertiliser and uniform emission factors matching current 
European production technology are assumed. For the purpose of this modelling exercise, 
consumption is assumed to be equal to production, reference emissions being calculated based 
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on FAO consumption statistics (demand side of the problem) and emission factors on production 
ones. In this analysis, farmers are ‘charged’ with the environmental burden of their own 
consumption pattern. 
In the following equations carbon dioxide and nitrous oxide emissions are calculated based on 
total mineral fertiliser application, which takes into account demand of nutrients by crops 
( fkrND ,, ), correction for N losses through ammonia volatilisation from mineral fertiliser 
application ( rAmmMF ) and for observed over-fertilisation practices ( frNutCorr , ) 
(9.2) ( )∑ ∑ ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
−=
k
kr
f
frkrfrfkrr XChAmmMFMFNutCorrNDdCO ,,,,, **)1/(**Pr2  
(9.3) ( )∑ ∑ ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
−=
k
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f
frkrfrfkrr XCiAmmMFMFNutCorrNDdON ,,,,, **)1/(**Pr2  
Where: 
CO2Prd = nitrous oxide emissions from mineral fertiliser production (in tonnes) 
N2OPrd = nitrous oxide emissions from mineral fertiliser production (in tonnes) 
Ch = carbon dioxide emission factor for mineral fertiliser produced (in kg per ton of fertiliser 
produced) 
Ci = nitrous oxide emission factor for mineral fertiliser produced (in kg per ton of fertiliser 
produced) 
 
In table (33) balanced average emission factors for nitrogenous, phosphate and potash fertiliser 
production are reported. This table shows emission data, including CO2eq from N2O, of fertilisers 
production processes (tonnes of CO2eq per tonne of nutrient). It make sense to calculate 
emissions per nutrient and not per manufactured products since many regional statistics about 
fertilisers consumption are not ordered by specific fertiliser types but by nutrients. 
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Table (33) Emission factors for average and modern technology production of nitrogenous, 
phosphate and potash fertilisers and fertiliser production data (average for the EU-15) 
CO2eq average 
technology
CO2eq 
modern 
technology
Production
Ammonium Nitrate 6.80 3.00 1359
Ammonium Phosphate (N) 3.34 0* 21
Ammonium Sulphate 3.10 1.28 760
Ammonium SulphateNitrate 7.51 3.28 12
Calcium Ammonium Nitrate 6.87 3.02 2698
Other Complex Fert (N) 9.61 3.80 1734
Other Nitrogenous Fert 4.76 2.23 762
Urea 1.33 0.91 1288
Nitrogenous Fertilisers 6.06 2.62 8634
Concent Superphosphate (TSP) 0.27 0* 177
Ground Rock Phosphate (triple) 0.17 0* 134
Single Superphosphate 0.18 0* 145
Oth Complex Fert (P2o5) 2.84 0* 1795
Other Phosphate Fertil 2.84 0* 35
Basic Slag 0.27 0* 5
Phosphate Fertilisers 2.32 0* 2289
Muriate Over 45% K2o (MOP) 0.33 0* 5086
Potash Fertilisers 0.33 0* 5086  
Source: Molina, 2004; 0.057 tonnes of CO2 per Giga-Joule for natural gas combustion assumed (currently used by 
85 % of European factories); 2001 three year average. 
Measurement units: tonnes of CO2eq per tonne of nutrient for emission factors and 1000 tonnes of nutrient for 
production data. 
* Note: zero and even negative values are due to reductions in emissions by energy recycling (mainly achieved in 
other sectors, e.g. heating). For the current ‘sectoral’ analysis, only a positive data set is used. 
 
According to Jenssen and Kongshaug (Jenssen, Kongshaug, 2003), 58 % of total GHG emissions 
from fertiliser production are N2O and the rest CO2. In order to calculate N2O emission factors 
for nitrogenous, phosphate and potash fertiliser production, the previous coefficients are 
multiplied by 0.58 and divided by 310 (global warming potential). CO2 emission factors are just 
obtained by multiplying by 0.42 (see table (34)). 
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Table (34) Average carbon dioxide and nitrous oxide emission factors for nitrogenous, 
phosphate and potash fertilisers (average for the EU-15) 
Average 
technology
Modern 
technology
Average 
Technology
Modern 
Technology
Average 
Technology
Modern 
Technology
Carbon dioxide 2543.65 1101.42 970.36 0* 0.14 0.07
Nitrous oxide 11.33 4.91 4.32 0* 0.62 0.31
Nitrogenous Fertiliser Phosphate Fertiliser Potash Fertiliser
 
Source: Molina, 2004; 2001 three year average calibration year. 
Measurement units: kg per tonne of nutrient. 
 
Nitrogenous fertilisers’ production is the main source of emissions, being at the same time the 
most applied fertiliser type in agriculture. A ton of nutrient produced implies a loss of 2.5 tonnes 
of CO2 and 11 kg of N2O considering the current average technology used in Europe. 
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Appendix 7 Estimated greenhouse gas emissions from agricultural 
sources and comparison with reported emission inventories at Member 
State level 
App. 7.1. Methane Emissions 
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4.  CH4 Agriculture 7658.83 169.99 220.31 183.98 87.47 1903.56 1190.33 158.09
A.  Enteric Fermentation (Tier 2) 5820.88 143.76 180.71 140.88 74.44 1267.46 997.34 131.01
B.  Manure Management (Tier 2) 1758.15 26.23 39.60 43.10 13.03 632.27 192.99 22.96
C.  Rice Cultivation 79.80 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.84 0.00 4.11
D.  Agricultural Soils 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
E.  Prescribed Burning of Savannas
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
F.  Field Burning of Agricultural Residues
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
G.  Other 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Other CH4 Indicators in CAPRI 
(endogenous)
A.  Enteric Fermentation (Tier 1) 5741.87 141.23 187.12 123.18 64.44 1335.98 866.66 133.79
B.  Manure Management (Tier 1) 1518.48 23.23 35.36 38.75 10.85 542.69 162.13 20.90  
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4.  CH4 Agriculture 7658.83 433.00 701.31 390.40 172.74 876.07 129.33 1042.26
A.  Enteric Fermentation (Tier 2) 5820.88 382.94 568.82 324.03 112.36 637.47 110.29 749.39
B.  Manure Management (Tier 2) 1758.15 50.06 88.72 66.37 55.45 215.45 19.04 292.87
C.  Rice Cultivation 79.80 0.00 43.77 0.00 4.93 23.15 0.00 0.00
D.  Agricultural Soils 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
E.  Prescribed Burning of Savannas
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
F.  Field Burning of Agricultural Residues
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
G.  Other 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Other CH4 Indicators in CAPRI 
(endogenous)
A.  Enteric Fermentation (Tier 1) 5741.87 406.32 538.85 273.55 119.66 686.21 99.59 765.30
B.  Manure Management (Tier 1) 1518.48 43.01 77.60 56.33 48.74 196.58 15.60 246.71  
Source: own calculations, 2001 three year average calibration year for CAPRI and NGHGIs for year 2001. 
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App. 7.2. Nitrous Oxide Emissions 
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4.  N2O Agriculture (corrected) 717.72 12.93 26.97 22.18 12.26 187.10 131.78 10.45
4.  N2O Agriculture 519.71 9.89 11.71 14.39 7.05 132.60 101.05 10.45
A.  Enteric Fermentation 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
B.  Manure Management 43.20 1.08 1.37 2.06 0.53 9.43 9.63 0.24
C.  Rice Cultivation 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
D.  Agricultural Soils 476.51 8.8 10.3 12.3 6.5 123.2 91.4 10.2
 --- Atmospheric Deposition (ammonia vol.) 50.30 1.01 1.23 1.67 0.50 11.75 10.01 0.72
 --- Animal Production (N excretion on pasture) 61.79 1.43 1.50 1.09 0.65 18.05 11.57 0.34
 --- Crop Residues 30.92 0.69 0.39 1.14 0.58 10.03 8.18 0.48
 --- N fixation 7.67 0.15 0.18 0.16 0.13 1.97 1.17 0.16
 --- Org fertiliser (Animal Waste) 151.82 3.11 3.87 4.15 1.44 37.00 26.02 3.41
 --- Syn fertiliser (application) 174.02 2.42 3.17 4.13 3.22 44.38 34.46 5.10
 --- Histosols (EXOGENOUS) 18.04 0.00 0.00 0.23 3.75 0.00 10.59 0.00
 --- Nitrate Leaching (EXOGENOUS) 148.17 3.04 0.00 7.41 1.45 50.94 20.14 0.00
  --- Other (EXOGENOUS) 31.80 0.00 15.26 0.15 0.01 3.55 0.00 0.00
E.  Prescribed Burning of Savannas 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
F.  Field Burning of Agricultural Residues 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
G.  Other 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Other N2O Indicators in CAPRI (endogenous)
 --- Application of fertilizer (incl. overfertilisation) 214.70 3.07 4.63 5.81 3.82 56.27 43.19 5.73
 --- Fertilizer Production 119.46 1.65 2.10 2.64 2.14 30.77 22.25 3.55
 --- Atmospheric Deposition (rainfall) 18.52 0.71 0.52 0.53 0.15 4.64 4.86 0.30  
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4.  N2O Agriculture (corrected) 717.72 24.26 77.16 27.83 12.45 64.68 17.36 90.31
4.  N2O Agriculture 519.71 20.80 52.30 23.12 8.03 52.70 9.49 66.13
A.  Enteric Fermentation 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
B.  Manure Management 43.20 1.34 4.81 3.01 0.75 3.94 0.76 4.23
C.  Rice Cultivation 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
D.  Agricultural Soils 476.51 19.5 47.5 20.1 7.3 48.8 8.7 61.9
 --- Atmospheric Deposition (ammonia vol.) 50.30 1.56 6.96 2.61 0.89 5.32 0.76 5.31
 --- Animal Production (N excretion on pasture) 61.79 3.53 6.43 2.86 0.93 4.42 1.00 7.99
 --- Crop Residues 30.92 0.23 2.25 0.45 0.19 2.24 0.78 3.30
 --- N fixation 7.67 0.42 0.78 0.37 0.12 0.75 0.18 1.13
 --- Org fertiliser (Animal Waste) 151.82 6.89 16.06 8.18 2.98 15.33 2.15 21.22
 --- Syn fertiliser (application) 174.02 6.82 15.00 5.63 2.18 20.70 3.86 22.95
 --- Histosols (EXOGENOUS) 18.04 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.05 0.31
 --- Nitrate Leaching (EXOGENOUS) 148.17 3.47 19.98 0.00 4.41 11.56 2.43 23.33
  --- Other (EXOGENOUS) 31.80 0.00 4.77 4.71 0.00 0.43 2.39 0.53
E.  Prescribed Burning of Savannas 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
F.  Field Burning of Agricultural Residues 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
G.  Other 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Other N2O Indicators in CAPRI (endogenous)
 --- Application of fertilizer (incl. overfertilisation) 214.70 7.48 19.82 7.44 2.87 24.89 4.71 24.98
 --- Fertilizer Production 119.46 4.53 11.70 3.59 1.63 15.45 2.44 15.00
 --- Atmospheric Deposition (rainfall) 18.52 0.50 1.46 0.75 0.10 1.25 0.15 2.60  
Source: own calculations, 2001 three year average calibration year for CAPRI and NGHGIs for year 2001. 
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App. 7.3. Comparison with reported greenhouse gas emission inventories 
for Member States 
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4.  N2O Agriculture (corrected) 2% 13% 60% -13% 2% 6% 3% -49%
4.  N2O Agriculture 100.0% -26% -13% -30% -44% -42% -25% -21% -49%
B.  Manure Management 9.9% -38% -53% -12% 45% -59% -1% -54% -74%
D.  Agricultural Soils(2) 90.0% -25% -3% -32% -49% -39% -26% -15% -48%
 --- Atmospheric Deposition (ammonia vol.) 5.3% 35% 169% --- 45% 22% 18% 32% ---
 --- Animal Production (N excretion on pasture) 12.7% -31% 111% --- 17% 21% -5% 98% -97%
 --- Crop Residues 5.1% -15% 40% --- -80% 13% 5% 114% -73%
 --- N fixation 2.0% -47% -58% --- -78% 634% -74% 14170% 501%
 --- Org fertiliser (Animal Waste) 13.2% 64% 68% --- 25% 71% 48% 8% 351%
 --- Syn fertiliser (application) 23.6% 5% 4% --- -6% 0% 8% -3% -8%
4.  CH4 Agriculture 100.0% -10% -12% -36% 6% 4% -9% -2% -10%
A.  Enteric Fermentation (Tier 2) 73.3% -7% -4% -16% 8% 0% -9% 0% -8%
B.  Manure Management (Tier 2) 25.2% -18% -39% -68% 2% 34% -7% -9% -2%
C.  Rice Cultivation 1.3% -28% --- --- --- --- -55% --- -34%  
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4.  N2O Agriculture (corrected) 2% -7% -1% 20% -34% 3% -4% 3%
4.  N2O Agriculture 100.0% -26% -20% -33% 0% -58% -16% -47% -25%
B.  Manure Management 9.9% -38% -39% -65% 394% -81% -24% -57% -5%
D.  Agricultural Soils(2) 90.0% -25% -19% -26% -11% -51% -14% -46% -26%
 --- Atmospheric Deposition (ammonia vol.) 5.3% 35% 2% 70% --- 60% -5% 26% -2%
 --- Animal Production (N excretion on pasture) 12.7% -31% -63% -9% 13% -82% -58% -29% -47%
 --- Crop Residues 5.1% -15% -38% -17% --- -67% 5% -40% -54%
 --- N fixation 2.0% -47% 2508% -78% 87% 22% -14% 69% 18%
 --- Org fertiliser (Animal Waste) 13.2% 64% 391% 94% -13% 65% 168% -13% 166%
 --- Syn fertiliser (application) 23.6% 5% -11% 7% -1% -5% 5% 58% 3%
4.  CH4 Agriculture 100.0% -10% -18% -19% -5% -38% -22% -17% 14%
A.  Enteric Fermentation (Tier 2) 73.3% -7% -17% -7% 1% -9% -8% -19% -8%
B.  Manure Management (Tier 2) 25.2% -18% -25% -53% -25% -62% -47% -3% 190%
C.  Rice Cultivation 1.3% -28% --- -41% --- -43% 65% --- ---  
Source: own calculations; 2001 three year average calibration year for CAPRI and NGHGIs for year 2001; 
comparison of CAPRI estimations with NGHGIs. 
. 
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Appendix 8 Estimated shadow values for the construction of regional marginal abatement cost curves 
App. 8.1. For the EU-15 and Member States 
 
Code 1% 2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 7% 8% 9% 10% 11% 12% 13% 14% 15% 
European Union EU000 12.0 24.0 36.1 48.2 60.3 72.5 84.6 96.5 108.3 119.5 130.0 140.5 150.9 161.1 171.3 
Austria AT000 13.6 27.9 42.2 56.7 71.1 85.5 100.1 114.7 129.4 144.0 158.6 173.0 187.1 201.2 215.4 
Belgium BL000 13.9 27.9 42.0 56.2 70.4 84.6 99.0 113.4 128.0 142.5 156.6 170.1 183.5 196.7 209.9 
Germany DE000 14.8 29.7 44.7 60.0 75.2 90.2 104.6 118.1 130.6 141.6 152.2 162.7 173.4 184.2 195.0 
Denmark DK000 15.9 32.0 48.1 64.6 81.2 98.0 114.8 132.3 156.2 173.6 191.2 208.6 225.9 243.2 260.5 
Greece EL000 8.9 18.0 27.1 36.3 45.4 54.5 63.7 73.1 82.7 92.5 102.8 113.2 124.5 136.6 149.0 
Spain ES000 8.2 16.0 24.2 32.2 40.2 48.2 56.3 64.6 72.9 81.4 89.3 97.3 105.1 112.9 120.8 
Finland FI000 20.2 38.7 53.2 67.1 82.6 98.4 114.5 130.7 147.0 163.3 179.6 195.9 212.4 228.9 245.6 
France FR000 12.2 24.5 36.8 49.3 61.9 74.6 87.4 100.2 113.2 125.1 135.8 146.3 156.4 166.3 175.7 
Ireland IR000 7.1 14.1 21.1 28.2 35.3 42.6 49.9 57.2 64.5 71.9 78.9 85.6 92.4 99.1 105.9 
Italy IT000 15.0 30.6 46.1 61.8 77.6 93.5 109.2 123.4 136.7 150.0 163.2 176.3 189.4 202.4 215.2 
Netherlands NL000 17.3 35.1 52.7 70.4 88.1 105.9 123.7 141.7 159.6 177.6 194.2 210.3 226.5 242.8 259.0 
Portugal PT000 8.7 17.2 26.0 34.8 43.9 53.0 62.4 71.9 81.3 89.5 97.6 105.5 113.6 121.9 130.5 
Sweden SE000 13.7 27.2 40.1 50.1 59.9 69.5 79.2 88.9 98.7 108.6 118.6 128.7 138.9 149.2 159.9 
United Kingdom UK000 7.4 14.6 22.0 29.4 36.8 44.2 51.6 59.0 66.5 73.8 80.8 87.8 94.7 101.4 108.0 
Source: own calculations; year 2001; Luxembourg is modelled together with Belgium; emission reduction standards for CO2eq emissions from 1 % to 15 %. 
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App. 8.2. For Nuts 2 regional units (Nuts 1 if not further disaggregated) 
 Code 1% 2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 7% 8% 9% 10% 11% 12% 13% 14% 15% 
BURGENLAND AT110 20.1 40.4 60.6 80.8 101.0 121.2 141.4 161.6 181.8 201.9 222.0 237.9 246.3 254.8 263.2 
NIEDEROESTERREICH AT120 14.7 30.3 46.2 61.7 76.5 91.4 106.3 121.2 136.1 150.8 165.6 180.4 195.2 210.0 224.8 
KAERNTEN AT210 11.5 23.4 35.4 47.6 60.0 72.3 84.8 97.6 110.7 123.7 136.7 149.7 162.8 175.9 188.9 
STEIERMARK AT220 12.8 26.3 39.9 53.7 67.7 81.8 96.3 110.8 125.4 139.9 154.5 169.0 183.5 198.0 212.5 
OBEROESTERREICH AT310 12.2 24.9 37.8 51.3 64.8 78.4 92.0 105.6 119.3 132.8 146.3 159.8 173.4 186.9 200.5 
SALZBURG AT320 13.6 28.1 42.6 57.5 72.4 87.4 102.4 117.5 132.5 147.5 162.5 177.4 192.4 207.4 222.4 
TIROL AT330 14.1 28.3 42.7 57.0 71.5 86.2 100.9 116.2 131.4 146.7 162.0 177.7 193.5 209.2 225.0 
VORARLBERG AT340 15.2 30.8 46.3 61.7 77.3 93.1 109.0 125.3 141.9 158.5 175.2 192.2 209.3 226.4 243.6 
ANTWERPEN BL210 14.2 28.8 43.3 57.9 72.4 86.9 101.4 116.0 130.5 144.9 159.8 175.3 190.9 206.6 222.2 
LIMBURG (B) BL220 16.0 32.3 48.6 64.9 81.2 97.7 114.5 131.6 149.3 166.8 184.3 201.8 219.5 237.2 255.5 
OOST-VLAANDEREN BL230 14.1 28.5 43.1 58.2 73.5 89.3 105.2 121.2 137.3 153.4 169.4 185.4 201.5 217.5 233.6 
VLAAMS BRABANT BL240 14.9 29.9 44.9 60.1 75.1 90.2 105.4 120.6 136.0 151.3 166.6 182.1 197.6 213.2 228.9 
WEST-VLAANDEREN BL250 15.0 30.4 45.7 61.0 76.2 91.4 106.7 122.2 137.8 153.4 169.3 185.4 201.5 217.7 234.4 
BRABANT WALLON BL310 14.9 29.7 44.6 59.5 74.4 89.3 104.3 119.4 134.5 149.6 160.0 169.7 179.8 190.2 200.6 
HAINAUT BL320 13.2 26.3 39.5 52.8 65.9 79.1 92.4 105.7 119.0 132.4 145.7 156.3 165.8 175.4 184.9 
LIEGE BL330 13.9 27.7 41.6 55.6 69.5 83.4 97.4 111.5 125.7 139.8 153.8 163.4 173.0 182.6 192.2 
LUXEMBOURG (B) BL340 10.5 20.5 30.8 41.2 51.6 62.0 72.5 83.1 93.8 104.5 115.2 125.9 136.6 147.3 156.2 
NAMUR BL350 11.9 23.5 35.4 47.3 59.2 71.1 83.0 95.1 107.2 119.3 131.3 143.3 154.5 163.2 171.8 
LUXEMBOURG (GRAND-DUCHE) BL400 15.1 30.3 45.6 60.9 76.3 91.8 107.4 123.1 138.7 153.9 163.5 173.6 183.9 194.3 204.7 
STUTTGART DE110 16.2 33.4 50.6 67.1 83.3 99.2 115.0 130.7 142.6 154.0 165.3 176.7 188.0 199.4 210.8 
KARLSRUHE DE120 16.2 32.5 49.2 65.9 82.5 98.9 114.7 130.4 141.4 152.0 162.6 173.2 183.8 194.5 205.1 
FREIBURG DE130 13.6 27.0 40.7 54.6 68.7 82.8 96.7 110.8 124.9 136.8 146.8 156.8 166.8 176.8 186.8 
TUEBINGEN DE140 14.1 28.3 42.6 57.4 72.4 87.3 102.1 116.9 131.7 142.6 153.4 164.2 175.0 185.9 196.8 
OBERBAYERN DE210 14.5 28.9 43.7 58.5 73.3 88.1 102.8 117.5 130.9 141.5 152.3 163.0 173.8 184.6 195.3 
NIEDERBAYERN DE220 15.3 30.6 46.0 61.4 76.9 92.0 106.9 121.9 136.8 148.2 159.5 170.9 182.3 193.6 205.0 
OBERPFALZ DE230 15.5 31.1 46.8 62.6 78.4 94.1 109.7 125.4 139.9 151.1 162.3 173.5 184.7 195.9 207.2 
OBERFRANKEN DE240 15.2 30.6 46.3 62.1 77.9 93.6 108.9 124.4 138.3 149.1 159.9 170.6 181.4 192.2 202.9 
MITTELFRANKEN DE250 15.4 30.8 46.3 61.9 77.5 92.8 108.1 123.4 138.6 150.1 161.5 172.9 184.4 195.9 207.4 
UNTERFRANKEN DE260 16.2 32.6 49.3 66.0 82.6 99.0 114.7 130.3 142.0 153.0 164.0 175.0 186.0 197.0 208.1 
SCHWABEN DE270 12.9 26.0 39.2 52.7 66.1 79.4 92.5 107.4 123.5 138.7 149.9 161.2 172.5 183.7 195.1 
 xviii  
 Code 1% 2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 7% 8% 9% 10% 11% 12% 13% 14% 15% 
BRANDENBURG DE400 15.2 30.1 45.2 60.4 75.6 90.5 105.2 116.1 123.7 131.4 139.1 147.7 157.2 166.7 176.3 
DARMSTADT DE710 15.2 30.4 45.8 62.0 79.1 96.0 111.4 126.8 139.2 149.9 160.6 171.3 182.1 192.8 203.5 
GIESSEN DE720 13.7 27.3 41.2 55.7 70.3 84.9 99.1 113.4 127.6 139.5 149.8 160.0 170.3 180.6 190.9 
KASSEL DE730 14.6 29.1 43.8 59.0 74.4 89.7 104.6 119.5 133.4 143.9 154.5 165.1 175.6 186.2 196.7 
MECKLENBURG-VORPOMMERN DE800 16.2 32.3 48.5 64.9 81.2 97.4 112.4 122.2 132.0 141.8 151.3 161.0 170.8 180.6 190.5 
BRAUNSCHWEIG DE910 17.7 35.7 54.1 72.8 91.4 109.2 126.2 137.4 148.6 159.8 171.2 182.2 193.3 204.3 215.3 
HANNOVER DE920 16.1 32.1 48.3 64.5 80.7 96.7 112.3 128.0 140.2 151.3 162.5 173.6 184.8 195.9 207.1 
LUENEBURG DE930 12.2 24.3 37.4 51.5 65.6 79.6 93.7 107.8 121.9 134.3 144.9 155.6 166.3 177.0 187.7 
WESER-EMS DE940 14.9 30.2 45.2 60.6 75.9 91.1 106.1 121.1 134.8 146.8 158.9 170.8 182.7 194.7 206.8 
DUESSELDORF DEA10 15.1 30.5 46.0 61.6 77.2 92.6 108.0 123.4 138.8 151.3 163.3 175.2 187.2 199.2 211.2 
KOELN DEA20 14.4 28.9 43.8 58.9 74.0 89.0 103.8 118.6 133.4 146.7 157.6 168.5 179.4 190.3 201.2 
MUENSTER DEA30 15.5 31.6 47.6 63.7 79.7 95.3 110.8 126.4 140.4 153.1 165.8 178.5 191.1 203.8 216.5 
DETMOLD DEA40 15.2 30.5 45.9 61.4 76.8 91.9 106.8 121.7 136.5 148.2 159.8 171.3 182.9 194.4 206.0 
ARNSBERG DEA50 12.7 25.6 38.7 52.4 66.5 80.5 94.2 107.8 121.4 135.0 146.9 157.6 168.3 179.0 189.7 
KOBLENZ DEB10 13.8 27.6 41.7 55.9 70.3 84.8 99.2 113.5 127.8 139.3 149.5 159.9 170.4 180.8 191.3 
TRIER DEB20 11.3 22.7 34.1 45.7 58.1 71.2 84.4 97.6 111.1 124.4 134.4 144.6 155.1 165.6 176.2 
RHEINHESSEN-PFALZ DEB30 19.1 37.9 57.0 76.1 95.2 114.0 129.3 140.4 151.5 162.5 173.6 184.6 195.7 206.8 217.8 
SAARLAND DEC00 11.6 23.1 34.8 47.4 60.2 72.9 85.5 98.1 110.6 123.1 132.3 141.7 151.1 160.6 170.4 
SACHSEN DED00 14.6 28.7 43.2 57.9 72.7 87.2 101.1 113.7 122.6 130.9 139.2 148.4 158.2 167.9 177.8 
DESSAU DEE10 20.4 40.2 60.4 80.7 101.0 119.7 130.2 140.7 151.2 162.0 172.8 183.8 195.1 206.5 217.9 
HALLE DEE20 21.7 43.5 65.7 88.4 111.7 125.6 137.4 149.0 160.4 171.9 183.4 194.9 206.4 217.9 229.3 
MAGDEBURG DEE30 18.6 36.8 55.2 73.8 92.3 110.6 124.7 135.1 145.5 155.9 166.4 176.9 187.5 198.2 208.9 
SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN DEF00 10.9 21.7 32.6 43.5 54.4 65.1 75.5 86.5 97.7 108.8 118.1 126.7 135.5 145.1 155.1 
THUERINGEN DEG00 14.5 28.8 43.4 58.0 72.5 86.8 100.7 113.0 122.0 131.2 140.8 150.3 160.0 169.7 179.4 
ANATOLIKI MAKEDONIA, THRAKI EL110 8.2 16.7 25.2 33.8 42.9 52.7 63.4 75.9 88.6 101.2 114.0 126.9 139.8 152.6 165.5 
KENTRIKI MAKEDONIA EL120 12.1 24.5 36.9 49.4 60.1 71.2 82.4 93.6 104.9 116.2 127.6 139.1 150.7 164.1 177.6 
DYTIKI MAKEDONIA EL130 9.5 19.1 28.6 38.2 48.2 57.1 65.5 74.2 85.0 96.7 108.7 120.6 132.6 144.8 156.9 
THESSALIA EL140 9.2 18.6 27.9 37.5 47.3 56.7 66.1 75.7 85.2 95.0 105.0 115.1 128.2 143.4 158.6 
IPEIROS EL210 7.0 14.1 21.2 28.5 35.9 43.4 51.1 58.8 66.5 74.2 82.0 89.8 97.6 105.6 113.5 
IONIA NISIA EL220 8.9 18.0 27.0 36.1 45.2 54.4 63.0 71.8 80.5 89.3 98.2 107.2 119.2 132.5 145.7 
DYTIKI ELLADA EL230 7.4 14.8 22.3 29.9 37.8 45.8 53.9 61.9 69.9 77.9 86.0 94.1 102.3 110.5 118.9 
STEREA ELLADA EL240 8.9 18.0 27.1 36.3 45.6 55.0 64.3 73.7 83.1 92.6 107.2 122.2 137.2 152.2 167.3 
PELOPONNISOS EL250 8.7 17.4 26.1 35.0 43.9 52.9 61.8 70.7 79.7 88.7 97.8 106.9 116.0 125.2 136.5 
  xix 
 Code 1% 2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 7% 8% 9% 10% 11% 12% 13% 14% 15% 
ATTIKI EL300 10.9 21.9 32.9 43.9 54.0 63.3 72.8 82.4 92.0 101.7 111.4 121.2 132.1 145.5 159.1 
VOREIO AIGAIO EL410 6.4 12.8 19.3 25.7 32.2 38.8 45.4 52.1 58.7 65.2 71.8 78.4 85.1 93.7 104.6 
NOTIO AIGAIO EL420 7.2 14.5 21.9 29.3 36.8 44.9 53.2 60.5 69.1 79.4 89.8 100.1 110.5 120.8 131.2 
KRITI EL430 6.7 13.4 20.1 26.9 33.8 40.7 47.6 54.5 61.5 68.4 75.4 82.5 94.0 106.4 118.8 
GALICIA ES110 9.6 19.0 28.6 38.2 47.8 57.6 67.4 77.9 88.5 99.5 106.6 113.8 121.0 128.1 135.2 
ASTURIAS ES120 7.0 13.7 20.6 27.4 34.3 41.2 48.2 55.3 62.3 69.5 76.5 83.6 90.7 96.9 102.0 
CANTABRIA ES130 8.4 16.6 25.0 33.2 41.5 49.9 58.2 66.7 75.1 83.6 92.1 98.1 103.4 108.7 113.9 
PAIS VASCO ES210 7.9 15.4 23.2 30.6 38.0 45.4 52.9 60.6 69.7 80.4 91.1 101.9 110.7 118.8 127.0 
NAVARRA ES220 7.3 14.3 21.5 28.2 34.8 41.5 48.2 55.1 62.1 69.2 76.3 83.5 90.8 99.3 108.5 
RIOJA ES230 7.7 14.9 22.5 29.5 36.3 43.3 50.2 57.3 66.3 77.4 88.6 100.0 111.7 122.9 133.9 
ARAGON ES240 8.4 16.1 24.3 31.4 38.2 45.3 52.7 61.2 69.9 78.6 87.4 96.1 104.9 113.7 122.2 
MADRID ES300 8.0 15.8 25.7 36.2 46.9 57.5 67.7 78.7 89.2 100.2 111.2 122.2 132.4 142.7 152.9 
CASTILLA-LEON ES410 7.0 13.7 20.6 27.1 33.5 40.0 46.5 53.0 59.6 66.2 72.9 79.6 86.4 93.3 100.3 
CASTILLA-LA MANCHA ES420 7.9 15.4 23.1 30.2 37.1 43.9 50.8 57.6 64.5 71.4 78.3 85.3 92.3 99.4 107.8 
EXTREMADURA ES430 5.6 10.7 16.2 21.1 25.9 30.8 35.7 40.6 45.6 50.6 55.6 60.5 65.5 70.5 75.3 
CATALUNA ES510 10.0 20.2 30.9 43.2 55.8 68.4 81.0 93.7 106.4 118.5 129.5 140.5 151.6 162.7 173.8 
COMUNIDAD VALENCIANA ES520 10.8 21.3 32.4 45.9 59.7 73.5 87.4 101.3 115.1 128.4 141.5 155.2 169.5 183.8 198.0 
BALEARES ES530 9.1 17.8 26.7 34.9 42.9 50.7 58.6 66.4 74.5 82.5 90.7 99.0 105.6 111.9 118.3 
ANDALUCIA ES610 9.0 17.6 26.5 34.6 42.6 50.6 58.6 66.7 74.7 82.8 90.9 99.2 107.3 115.1 122.9 
MURCIA ES620 9.3 18.3 27.6 36.3 45.1 55.4 67.1 79.3 91.5 103.7 115.9 127.9 139.9 151.9 163.9 
CANARIAS ES700 9.2 18.1 27.3 35.7 44.0 52.2 60.5 68.8 77.1 85.4 93.7 101.0 107.7 114.3 120.9 
ITAE-SUOMI FI130 15.6 31.2 46.9 60.1 73.3 86.7 101.1 115.4 129.6 144.1 158.5 172.9 187.4 201.8 216.4 
VAELI-SUOMI FI140 18.6 37.1 51.9 65.9 80.0 94.2 108.5 123.1 137.7 152.4 167.0 181.6 196.3 211.0 225.9 
POHJOIS-SUOMI FI150 16.3 32.7 47.6 60.9 74.2 87.7 101.6 115.6 129.6 143.8 158.0 172.3 186.5 200.8 215.2 
UUSIMAA FI160 23.1 42.7 56.7 71.0 88.2 105.7 123.6 141.6 159.6 177.6 195.7 213.7 232.1 250.5 268.9 
AHVENANMAA/AALAND FI200 20.6 41.0 55.7 71.2 87.0 103.4 120.1 136.7 153.4 170.2 186.9 203.7 220.6 237.7 254.7 
ILE DE FRANCE FR100 18.9 37.4 56.0 74.7 93.4 112.2 130.9 149.7 168.5 187.1 205.6 224.1 242.2 259.8 276.7 
CHAMPAGNE-ARDENNE FR210 16.2 32.4 48.7 65.0 81.4 97.8 114.2 130.6 147.1 162.1 174.7 186.3 197.9 209.5 220.9 
PICARDIE FR220 17.4 34.9 52.7 70.5 88.3 106.2 124.2 142.1 159.8 173.3 185.5 197.6 209.5 221.1 232.5 
HAUTE-NORMANDIE FR230 14.8 29.7 44.6 59.7 74.9 90.2 105.5 120.8 136.3 151.8 166.9 179.0 189.4 199.8 210.1 
CENTRE FR240 11.1 22.0 33.1 44.3 55.5 66.8 78.0 89.3 100.7 111.7 122.4 133.0 143.7 154.3 164.6 
BASSE-NORMANDIE FR250 14.4 29.3 44.4 59.5 74.7 89.8 105.0 120.2 135.4 150.4 165.1 179.3 188.7 198.1 207.4 
BOURGOGNE FR260 9.8 19.9 30.1 40.5 51.0 61.5 72.1 82.6 93.2 103.5 113.3 123.1 132.9 142.9 152.9 
 xx  
 Code 1% 2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 7% 8% 9% 10% 11% 12% 13% 14% 15% 
NORD-PAS-DE-CALAIS FR300 14.2 28.5 42.8 57.0 71.4 86.1 100.7 115.4 130.2 145.1 155.8 164.9 174.0 183.4 192.7 
LORRAINE FR410 12.9 25.9 39.0 52.3 65.6 78.9 92.3 105.7 119.2 132.4 145.2 158.0 170.8 181.9 190.8 
ALSACE FR420 16.3 32.6 49.0 65.3 81.7 98.2 115.0 132.0 149.2 166.1 178.0 188.6 199.1 209.8 220.6 
FRANCHE-COMTE FR430 15.3 31.0 46.8 62.5 78.3 94.1 109.9 125.8 141.6 157.3 170.2 179.2 188.2 197.3 206.3 
PAYS DE LA LOIRE FR510 10.8 21.6 32.5 44.0 55.4 66.9 78.8 90.2 102.3 113.4 124.1 134.8 146.1 157.5 166.6 
BRETAGNE FR520 15.8 32.2 48.4 64.6 80.8 97.0 113.3 129.5 145.8 157.1 165.7 174.3 182.8 191.5 200.0 
POITOU-CHARENTES FR530 9.9 19.5 29.1 38.7 48.3 57.9 67.8 77.6 87.5 97.1 106.3 115.5 124.6 133.8 142.9 
AQUITAINE FR610 9.9 19.7 29.5 39.3 49.2 59.2 69.2 79.4 90.0 100.3 110.3 120.4 131.3 142.2 152.9 
MIDI-PYRENEES FR620 7.8 15.3 22.7 30.0 37.3 44.7 52.8 61.1 69.5 77.6 85.2 92.8 100.7 108.5 116.3 
LIMOUSIN FR630 6.4 12.5 19.2 26.1 33.1 40.2 47.4 54.6 62.1 69.1 75.5 82.0 88.7 95.3 102.0 
RHONE-ALPES FR710 12.5 25.5 38.7 51.8 64.9 78.1 91.3 104.8 119.0 133.0 146.6 160.2 173.8 183.1 191.7 
AUVERGNE FR720 8.2 16.3 24.3 33.1 42.7 52.8 63.2 73.7 84.4 94.6 104.7 115.1 125.4 135.8 146.2 
LANGUEDOC-ROUSSILLON FR810 8.2 16.1 24.0 31.6 39.4 47.9 56.6 65.4 74.2 82.7 91.0 99.2 107.5 115.7 123.9 
PROVENCE-ALPES-COTE D'AZUR FR820 8.4 16.7 25.6 34.7 43.7 52.8 61.9 71.0 80.2 89.2 98.1 107.0 115.9 124.9 133.9 
CORSE FR830 6.8 13.3 19.8 26.2 32.8 39.4 46.2 53.1 60.2 68.1 75.2 82.3 89.5 96.6 103.9 
Border, Midlands and Western IR010 6.8 13.3 19.9 26.6 33.4 40.4 47.3 54.3 61.3 68.4 75.1 81.4 87.8 94.2 100.6 
Southern and Eastern IR020 7.4 14.6 22.0 29.4 36.8 44.3 51.8 59.3 66.9 74.5 81.8 88.8 95.8 102.9 109.9 
PIEMONTE IT110 12.8 26.0 39.2 52.5 65.9 79.2 92.6 105.9 119.0 132.1 145.1 158.1 171.1 182.6 194.0 
VALLE D'AOSTA IT120 17.5 35.3 52.9 70.5 88.2 105.9 123.6 135.4 146.0 156.7 167.3 178.0 188.7 199.4 210.2 
LIGURIA IT130 11.6 23.5 35.5 47.7 59.9 72.1 84.4 96.7 108.8 120.8 132.8 144.8 156.9 168.9 179.8 
LOMBARDIA IT200 18.2 36.9 55.6 74.3 93.0 111.7 130.4 146.9 159.7 172.5 185.3 198.2 211.1 224.1 237.0 
TRENTINO-ALTO ADIGE IT310 14.5 29.2 44.4 59.8 76.7 99.8 122.9 137.0 148.1 159.2 170.4 181.6 192.9 204.3 215.8 
VENETO IT320 21.3 43.4 65.3 87.2 109.8 132.0 154.2 172.0 188.8 205.5 222.2 238.9 255.6 272.3 289.1 
FRIULI-VENEZIA GIULIA IT330 26.5 53.7 80.6 107.5 134.5 152.1 169.0 186.0 203.0 220.0 237.0 253.9 270.9 287.9 304.9 
EMILIA-ROMAGNA IT400 17.3 35.1 52.6 70.2 87.7 105.3 120.2 132.1 144.0 156.0 168.0 179.9 191.9 203.9 216.0 
TOSCANA IT510 10.8 22.6 35.1 47.6 60.1 72.7 85.2 97.8 110.2 122.6 135.0 147.4 160.0 173.2 185.2 
UMBRIA IT520 13.9 28.2 42.6 57.0 71.4 85.8 100.2 114.6 128.9 143.0 157.2 171.4 185.8 200.4 214.8 
MARCHE IT530 18.7 38.1 57.8 77.7 97.6 117.6 137.6 157.6 177.3 196.8 216.0 233.9 251.8 269.7 287.6 
LAZIO IT600 12.6 25.4 38.2 51.0 64.0 77.0 90.1 103.1 116.0 129.0 142.9 156.6 170.2 183.7 196.4 
ABRUZZO IT710 10.0 20.8 31.7 42.8 53.8 65.0 76.1 87.3 99.0 110.3 121.7 133.1 144.9 157.3 169.6 
MOLISE IT720 14.2 28.5 42.9 57.2 71.6 86.1 100.8 115.4 130.4 145.8 162.0 178.0 193.4 208.7 224.0 
CAMPANIA IT800 13.5 27.6 41.7 55.8 70.0 84.2 98.4 112.6 126.7 140.7 154.7 167.6 179.1 190.6 202.0 
PUGLIA IT910 12.9 25.9 38.9 52.4 66.8 83.3 100.4 117.8 135.4 153.0 167.7 182.5 197.3 212.0 226.8 
  xxi 
 Code 1% 2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 7% 8% 9% 10% 11% 12% 13% 14% 15% 
BASILICATA IT920 9.1 19.3 28.0 38.3 48.7 59.3 70.3 81.6 92.8 104.0 115.2 126.5 137.8 149.1 160.3 
CALABRIA IT930 10.2 21.1 32.0 42.9 53.9 65.2 76.6 88.0 99.4 110.7 122.0 133.3 144.8 156.2 167.5 
SICILIA ITA00 9.1 18.1 27.2 36.3 45.6 55.8 67.3 79.1 91.0 102.7 114.5 126.4 138.3 150.2 162.3 
SARDEGNA ITB00 7.1 14.8 23.6 32.4 41.6 51.2 60.9 70.5 80.0 89.6 99.1 108.7 118.3 128.1 137.8 
GRONINGEN NL110 22.8 45.8 68.7 91.7 114.7 137.7 160.7 184.4 208.7 233.0 257.2 281.6 306.0 330.5 354.7 
FRIESLAND NL120 14.1 28.3 42.6 56.9 71.2 85.5 99.9 114.2 128.5 142.8 157.1 171.5 185.9 200.3 214.8 
DRENTHE NL130 21.1 42.7 64.0 85.4 106.7 128.1 149.5 170.9 192.4 213.8 235.3 256.8 278.3 299.9 321.5 
OVERIJSSEL NL210 13.9 28.1 42.1 56.2 70.2 84.3 98.4 112.5 126.6 140.8 155.0 169.1 183.4 197.6 211.9 
GELDERLAND NL220 13.2 26.7 40.1 53.5 66.9 80.4 93.9 107.6 121.2 134.9 148.6 162.3 176.0 189.8 203.6 
FLEVOLAND NL230 34.4 69.0 103.6 138.6 173.8 209.3 245.2 281.3 317.3 353.4 371.4 381.9 392.3 402.9 413.4 
UTRECHT NL310 13.9 28.0 42.1 56.1 70.2 84.3 98.4 112.5 126.6 140.8 155.0 169.2 183.4 197.6 211.9 
NOORD-HOLLAND NL320 18.2 36.6 55.1 73.6 92.0 110.5 129.1 147.6 166.2 184.6 203.1 221.7 240.2 258.8 277.5 
ZUID-HOLLAND NL330 18.3 36.9 55.6 74.3 93.0 111.9 131.3 151.0 170.6 190.3 210.0 229.7 249.4 269.3 289.2 
ZEELAND NL340 33.8 68.2 102.9 138.0 173.6 209.6 245.6 281.7 317.9 354.2 371.5 381.8 395.5 409.1 419.4 
NOORD-BRABANT NL410 15.1 31.0 46.6 62.1 77.6 93.2 108.8 124.4 140.0 155.5 170.9 186.4 201.9 217.5 233.1 
LIMBURG (NL) NL420 18.5 37.9 57.2 76.5 95.7 115.0 134.4 153.7 173.1 192.4 211.7 231.0 250.4 269.8 289.3 
LISBOA E VALE DO TEJO PT130 9.0 18.2 28.3 39.1 50.8 62.6 74.4 86.3 98.1 109.9 121.3 131.3 141.2 151.1 161.1 
ALENTEJO PT140 6.1 11.9 17.9 23.7 29.5 35.4 41.4 47.5 55.5 64.0 71.9 79.8 87.7 95.7 103.6 
ALGARVE PT150 7.5 14.9 22.5 29.7 36.9 44.4 52.9 62.5 72.3 81.8 90.9 100.0 109.3 118.4 127.0 
ENTRE DOURO E MINHO PT160 10.2 20.0 30.1 40.0 50.0 60.2 70.6 81.3 91.4 97.1 103.0 109.9 117.8 125.8 133.8 
TRAS-OS-MONTES PT170 7.2 14.1 21.4 28.3 35.2 42.4 50.3 58.7 67.3 76.4 85.0 93.7 102.5 111.3 120.9 
BEIRA LITORAL PT180 10.2 20.3 30.8 41.0 51.3 61.7 72.1 82.6 92.7 99.0 106.2 112.8 118.4 124.1 132.4 
BEIRA INTERIEUR PT190 7.9 15.6 23.5 31.0 38.6 46.9 56.4 67.0 78.5 89.8 100.7 111.6 120.0 128.4 136.8 
ACORES PT200 11.7 23.5 35.4 47.2 59.2 71.2 83.2 93.6 99.3 104.9 110.3 116.1 123.8 133.3 142.9 
MADEIRA PT300 10.9 21.5 32.4 42.7 53.1 63.5 73.9 84.3 93.1 98.8 104.5 110.1 115.8 121.6 127.3 
STOCKHOLM SE010 14.0 27.5 41.5 54.4 65.9 77.5 89.2 100.8 112.5 124.3 136.0 147.8 159.5 171.0 182.5 
OESTRA MELLANSVERIGE SE020 12.8 25.3 38.1 48.1 58.0 67.9 77.9 88.0 98.2 108.5 118.9 129.3 139.6 149.8 160.0 
SYDSVERIGE SE040 13.0 25.7 38.0 47.3 56.6 65.9 75.3 84.7 94.2 103.7 113.4 123.6 134.6 145.5 156.9 
NORRA MELLANSVERIGE SE060 15.5 30.7 44.8 55.4 66.0 76.6 87.2 97.9 108.6 119.3 130.1 141.0 151.8 162.6 173.3 
MELLERSTA NORRLAND SE070 15.5 31.0 47.1 63.0 78.9 88.8 98.7 108.7 118.7 128.8 138.9 149.1 159.2 169.5 179.7 
OEVRE NORRLAND SE080 17.9 35.7 53.9 72.0 84.1 94.2 104.4 114.6 124.9 135.4 146.0 156.6 167.2 177.8 188.5 
SMAALAND MED OEARNA SE090 14.0 27.5 39.4 47.5 55.7 63.9 72.1 80.4 88.7 97.1 105.6 114.3 123.0 132.8 143.7 
VAESTSVERIGE SE0A0 13.6 26.9 39.5 49.0 58.9 69.0 79.3 89.6 100.0 110.4 120.9 131.3 141.7 151.9 162.3 
 xxii  
 Code 1% 2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 7% 8% 9% 10% 11% 12% 13% 14% 15% 
North East UKC00 6.1 12.1 18.1 24.2 30.3 36.4 42.5 48.6 54.7 60.8 66.5 72.2 77.9 83.6 89.3 
North West (including Merseyside) UKD00 6.0 11.9 17.9 23.9 29.9 35.9 41.9 47.9 53.9 59.9 65.6 71.4 77.1 82.8 88.6 
Yorkshire and The Humber UKE00 7.6 15.1 22.8 30.4 38.0 45.7 53.4 61.1 68.7 76.4 83.7 91.0 98.3 105.6 112.9 
East Midlands UKF00 8.6 17.1 25.7 34.3 42.9 51.5 60.1 68.7 77.4 85.9 94.2 102.4 110.6 118.9 127.1 
West Midlands UKG00 6.8 13.6 20.3 27.2 34.0 40.8 47.6 54.5 61.3 68.1 74.6 81.1 87.6 94.0 100.5 
Eastern UKH00 13.4 26.5 39.8 53.1 66.5 79.8 93.1 106.5 119.9 133.2 146.1 158.8 169.8 176.1 182.5 
South East UKJ00 8.1 16.0 24.1 32.2 40.3 48.5 56.6 64.8 73.0 81.1 88.9 96.7 104.5 112.3 120.0 
South West UKK00 6.9 13.8 20.7 27.6 34.5 41.5 48.4 55.4 62.4 69.3 75.9 82.4 89.0 95.5 102.1 
Wales UKL00 5.3 10.6 15.9 21.3 26.6 31.9 37.3 42.7 48.0 53.3 58.4 63.5 68.6 73.7 78.8 
Scotland UKM00 7.8 15.7 23.6 31.5 39.5 47.4 55.4 63.4 71.5 79.4 86.9 94.4 101.9 109.4 116.8 
Northern Ireland UKN00 6.3 12.5 18.7 25.0 31.3 37.6 43.9 50.3 56.6 62.9 68.7 74.4 80.2 86.0 91.8 
Source: own calculations; year 2001; emission reduction standards for CO2eq emissions from 1 % to 15 %. 
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Appendix 9 Permit transactions from emission trading at regional level (without price effects) 
App. 9.1. For the EU-15 and Member States 
  Code 
 Initial 
Permit 
Price* 
Final 
Permit 
Price 
Total 
amount of 
permits 
Purchases 
inland** 
Purchases 
abroad 
Sales 
abroad 
Total 
purchases Total Sales 
    Euro Euro 1000 Units 1000 Units 1000 Units 1000 Units 1000 Units 1000 Units 
European Union EU000 171.3 157.6 271393.1 952.1 5984.0 5984.0 6936.1 6936.1 
Austria AT000 215.3 161.2 5714.3 0.0 239.7 0.0 239.7 0.0 
Belgium BL000 210.0 160.8 7118.7 3.7 275.6 0.0 279.3 3.7 
Germany DE000 195.0 160.8 48495.7 4.8 1704.2 0.0 1709.0 4.8 
Denmark DK000 260.4 161.2 7448.1 0.0 469.3 0.0 469.3 0.0 
Greece EL000 149.0 154.2 5998.7 32.9 0.0 52.2 32.9 85.1 
Spain ES000 120.8 151.8 28357.9 89.8 0.0 1681.5 89.8 1771.3 
Finland FI000 245.6 161.2 3546.5 0.0 198.0 0.0 198.0 0.0 
France FR000 175.7 159.5 68820.9 690.4 1101.7 0.0 1792.1 690.4 
Ireland IR000 105.9 150.9 11819.0 0.0 0.0 1106.1 0.0 1106.1 
Italy IT000 215.2 160.9 27573.3 37.2 1204.8 0.0 1242.1 37.2 
Netherlands NL000 259.0 161.2 13553.6 0.0 785.7 0.0 785.7 0.0 
Portugal PT000 130.5 151.9 5091.3 5.4 0.0 162.7 5.4 168.1 
Sweden SE000 159.9 159.1 4714.0 11.9 4.9 0.0 16.8 11.9 
United Kingdom UK000 108.0 151.2 33141.1 76.0 0.0 2981.6 76.0 3057.5 
Source: own calculations; simulation scenario 85 % emission standard and emission trade; year 2001; Luxembourg is modelled together with Belgium. 
* Initial permit prices are in line with the MAC15% results in App. 8.1. 
** Purchases inland are equal to sales inland for a Member State. 
 xxiv  
App. 9.2. For Nuts 2 regional units (Nuts 1 if not further disaggregated) 
 Initial 
Permit 
Price* 
Final 
Permit 
Price 
Total 
amount of 
permits 
Purchases 
inland** 
Purchases 
abroad 
Sales 
abroad 
Total 
purchases Total Sales   Code 
Euro Euro 1000 Units 1000 Units 1000 Units 1000 Units 1000 Units 1000 Units 
BURGENLAND AT110 263.2 161.2 270.4 0.0 20.6 0.0 20.6 0.0 
NIEDEROESTERREICH AT120 224.7 161.2 1661.1 0.0 80.0 0.0 80.0 0.0 
KAERNTEN AT210 188.9 161.2 540.6 0.0 13.1 0.0 13.1 0.0 
STEIERMARK AT220 212.5 161.2 979.2 0.0 39.1 0.0 39.1 0.0 
OBEROESTERREICH AT310 200.4 161.2 1373.2 0.0 45.2 0.0 45.2 0.0 
SALZBURG AT320 222.4 161.2 332.2 0.0 15.2 0.0 15.2 0.0 
TIROL AT330 225.0 161.2 434.9 0.0 19.8 0.0 19.8 0.0 
VORARLBERG AT340 243.5 161.2 122.8 0.0 6.6 0.0 6.6 0.0 
ANTWERPEN BL210 222.2 161.2 609.9 0.0 27.0 0.0 27.0 0.0 
LIMBURG (B) BL220 255.5 161.2 403.8 0.1 24.1 0.0 24.2 0.0 
OOST-VLAANDEREN BL230 233.6 161.2 919.2 0.1 47.1 0.0 47.1 0.0 
VLAAMS BRABANT BL240 228.9 161.2 339.4 0.1 16.8 0.0 16.9 0.0 
WEST-VLAANDEREN BL250 234.4 161.2 1605.2 0.1 82.2 0.0 82.3 0.0 
BRABANT WALLON BL310 200.6 161.2 214.9 0.4 9.1 0.0 9.6 0.0 
HAINAUT BL320 184.9 161.2 932.9 0.1 26.1 0.0 26.2 0.0 
LIEGE BL330 192.3 161.2 549.9 0.2 20.2 0.0 20.3 0.0 
LUXEMBOURG (B) BL340 156.3 155.9 573.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.7 
NAMUR BL350 171.8 161.2 566.9 2.5 4.2 0.0 6.6 0.0 
LUXEMBOURG (GRAND-DUCHE) BL400 204.7 161.2 403.0 0.2 19.0 0.0 19.1 0.0 
STUTTGART DE110 210.8 161.2 1511.7 0.0 74.0 0.0 74.0 0.0 
KARLSRUHE DE120 205.1 161.2 510.0 0.0 23.7 0.0 23.7 0.0 
FREIBURG DE130 186.8 161.2 887.0 0.0 25.8 0.0 25.8 0.0 
TUEBINGEN DE140 196.8 161.2 1276.1 0.0 47.4 0.0 47.4 0.0 
OBERBAYERN DE210 195.3 161.2 2381.2 0.0 85.7 0.0 85.7 0.0 
NIEDERBAYERN DE220 205.0 161.2 1770.7 0.0 77.0 0.0 77.0 0.0 
OBERPFALZ DE230 207.2 161.2 1186.9 0.0 54.7 0.0 54.7 0.0 
OBERFRANKEN DE240 202.9 161.2 865.7 0.0 37.8 0.0 37.8 0.0 
MITTELFRANKEN DE250 207.4 161.2 1074.7 0.0 48.7 0.0 48.7 0.0 
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UNTERFRANKEN DE260 208.1 161.2 983.1 0.0 47.0 0.0 47.0 0.0 
SCHWABEN DE270 195.1 161.2 1607.1 0.0 54.7 0.0 54.7 0.0 
BRANDENBURG DE400 176.3 161.2 2910.1 0.0 51.9 0.0 51.9 0.0 
DARMSTADT DE710 203.5 161.2 612.7 0.0 27.3 0.0 27.3 0.0 
GIESSEN DE720 190.9 161.2 543.7 0.0 17.8 0.0 17.8 0.0 
KASSEL DE730 196.8 161.2 946.5 0.0 36.1 0.0 36.1 0.0 
MECKLENBURG-VORPOMMERN DE800 190.5 161.2 2970.8 0.0 100.6 0.0 100.6 0.0 
BRAUNSCHWEIG DE910 215.3 161.2 986.1 0.0 53.6 0.0 53.6 0.0 
HANNOVER DE920 207.1 161.2 1519.2 0.0 70.3 0.0 70.3 0.0 
LUENEBURG DE930 187.7 161.2 2583.1 0.0 72.9 0.0 72.9 0.0 
WESER-EMS DE940 206.8 161.2 3941.7 0.0 169.1 0.0 169.1 0.0 
DUESSELDORF DEA10 211.2 161.2 809.7 0.0 38.0 0.0 38.0 0.0 
KOELN DEA20 201.2 161.2 833.1 0.0 34.6 0.0 34.6 0.0 
MUENSTER DEA30 216.4 161.2 1951.7 0.0 95.4 0.0 95.4 0.0 
DETMOLD DEA40 206.0 161.2 1245.5 0.0 54.4 0.0 54.4 0.0 
ARNSBERG DEA50 189.7 161.2 836.0 4.7 20.6 0.0 25.4 0.0 
KOBLENZ DEB10 191.3 161.2 679.6 0.0 22.2 0.0 22.2 0.0 
TRIER DEB20 176.2 161.2 488.0 0.0 7.7 0.0 7.7 0.0 
RHEINHESSEN-PFALZ DEB30 217.8 161.2 607.2 0.0 34.7 0.0 34.7 0.0 
SAARLAND DEC00 170.4 161.2 187.6 0.1 1.8 0.0 1.9 0.0 
SACHSEN DED00 177.8 161.2 2094.7 0.0 40.4 0.0 40.4 0.0 
DESSAU DEE10 217.9 161.2 471.7 0.0 26.7 0.0 26.7 0.0 
HALLE DEE20 229.2 161.2 602.4 0.0 39.4 0.0 39.4 0.0 
MAGDEBURG DEE30 208.9 161.2 1422.9 0.0 71.7 0.0 71.7 0.0 
SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN DEF00 155.1 155.9 3322.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.8 
THUERINGEN DEG00 179.4 161.2 1875.6 0.0 40.1 0.0 40.1 0.0 
DANMARK DK000 260.4 161.2 7448.1 0.0 469.3 0.0 469.3 0.0 
ANATOLIKI MAKEDONIA EL110 165.5 156.2 663.7 5.6 0.0 0.0 5.6 0.0 
KENTRIKI MAKEDONIA EL120 177.6 156.2 1106.3 20.3 0.0 0.0 20.3 0.0 
DYTIKI MAKEDONIA EL130 156.9 156.2 355.6 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 
THESSALIA EL140 158.6 156.2 898.6 1.7 0.0 0.0 1.7 0.0 
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IPEIROS EL210 113.5 150.9 452.4 0.0 0.0 21.8 0.0 25.9 
IONIA NISIA EL220 145.7 150.9 81.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 
DYTIKI ELLADA EL230 118.9 150.9 624.7 0.0 0.0 18.3 0.0 29.2 
STEREA ELLADA EL240 167.2 156.2 552.3 4.7 0.0 0.0 4.7 0.0 
PELOPONNISOS EL250 136.5 150.9 422.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.4 
ATTIKI EL300 159.1 156.2 125.2 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 
VOREIO AIGAIO EL410 104.6 150.9 156.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.2 
NOTIO AIGAIO EL420 131.2 150.9 175.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.0 
KRITI EL430 118.8 150.9 383.8 0.0 0.0 12.0 0.0 12.0 
GALICIA ES110 135.2 150.9 2768.1 0.0 0.0 53.3 0.0 80.2 
ASTURIAS ES120 101.9 150.9 1103.0 0.0 0.0 175.3 0.0 175.3 
CANTABRIA ES130 113.9 150.9 859.7 0.0 0.0 90.9 0.0 90.9 
PAIS VASCO ES210 126.9 150.9 607.6 0.0 0.0 23.4 0.0 23.4 
NAVARRA ES220 108.5 150.9 588.1 0.0 0.0 34.8 0.0 34.8 
RIOJA ES230 133.9 150.9 281.1 0.0 0.0 1.9 0.0 5.4 
ARAGON ES240 122.2 150.9 1604.0 0.0 0.0 44.0 0.0 63.9 
MADRID ES300 152.9 153.3 500.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
CASTILLA-LEON ES410 100.3 150.9 6116.7 0.0 0.0 527.5 0.0 527.5 
CASTILLA-LA MANCHA ES420 107.8 150.9 2666.7 0.0 0.0 164.9 0.0 164.9 
EXTREMADURA ES430 75.3 150.9 2026.3 0.0 0.0 402.9 0.0 402.9 
CATALUNA ES510 173.8 156.2 3060.5 58.1 0.0 0.0 58.1 0.0 
COMUNIDAD VALENCIANA ES520 198.0 156.2 773.7 26.3 0.0 0.0 26.3 0.0 
BALEARES ES530 118.3 150.9 240.9 0.0 0.0 15.4 0.0 15.4 
ANDALUCIA ES610 122.9 150.9 4293.6 0.0 0.0 138.6 0.0 176.6 
MURCIA ES620 163.9 156.2 694.5 5.4 0.0 0.0 5.4 0.0 
CANARIAS ES700 120.9 150.9 172.6 0.0 0.0 8.5 0.0 9.9 
ITAE-SUOMI FI130 216.4 161.2 527.7 0.0 22.5 0.0 22.5 0.0 
VAELI-SUOMI FI140 225.9 161.2 805.4 0.0 39.5 0.0 39.5 0.0 
POHJOIS-SUOMI FI150 215.2 161.2 358.1 0.0 15.1 0.0 15.1 0.0 
UUSIMAA FI160 268.9 161.2 1835.3 0.0 119.6 0.0 119.6 0.0 
AHVENANMAA/AALAND FI200 254.7 161.2 19.9 0.0 1.2 0.0 1.2 0.0 
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ILE DE FRANCE FR100 276.7 161.2 714.8 51.6 0.0 0.0 51.6 0.0 
CHAMPAGNE-ARDENNE FR210 220.9 161.2 2848.0 0.0 162.1 0.0 162.1 0.0 
PICARDIE FR220 232.5 161.2 2726.1 50.1 130.0 0.0 180.1 0.0 
HAUTE-NORMANDIE FR230 210.1 161.2 2397.4 118.5 0.0 0.0 118.5 0.0 
CENTRE FR240 164.6 161.2 3262.9 0.0 11.8 0.0 11.8 0.0 
BASSE-NORMANDIE FR250 207.4 161.2 5277.4 253.1 0.0 0.0 253.1 0.0 
BOURGOGNE FR260 152.9 155.9 3796.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 13.9 
NORD-PAS-DE-CALAIS FR300 192.7 161.2 2728.8 0.0 105.6 0.0 105.6 0.0 
LORRAINE FR410 190.8 161.2 3089.2 0.0 97.1 0.0 97.1 0.0 
ALSACE FR420 220.5 161.2 805.2 47.9 0.0 0.0 47.9 0.0 
FRANCHE-COMTE FR430 206.3 161.2 2078.8 110.3 0.0 0.0 110.3 0.0 
PAYS DE LA LOIRE FR510 166.6 161.2 7586.6 58.9 0.0 0.0 58.9 0.0 
BRETAGNE FR520 200.0 161.2 9272.6 0.0 470.5 0.0 470.5 0.0 
POITOU-CHARENTES FR530 142.9 155.9 3081.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 53.3 
AQUITAINE FR610 152.9 155.9 3156.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 11.0 
MIDI-PYRENEES FR620 116.3 155.9 4334.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 263.0 
LIMOUSIN FR630 102.0 155.9 2325.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 238.7 
RHONE-ALPES FR710 191.7 161.2 3718.8 0.0 124.5 0.0 124.5 0.0 
AUVERGNE FR720 146.2 155.9 4240.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 47.1 
LANGUEDOC-ROUSSILLON FR810 123.9 155.9 727.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 35.1 
PROVENCE-ALPES-COTE D'AZUR FR820 133.9 155.9 491.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 14.2 
CORSE FR830 103.9 155.9 160.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 14.1 
Border IR010 100.6 150.9 5021.3 0.0 0.0 545.1 0.0 545.1 
Southern and Eastern IR020 109.9 150.9 6797.7 0.0 0.0 560.9 0.0 560.9 
PIEMONTE IT110 193.9 161.2 3399.7 12.6 94.0 0.0 106.6 0.0 
VALLE D'AOSTA IT120 210.1 161.2 84.2 3.2 1.1 0.0 4.3 0.0 
LIGURIA IT130 179.8 161.2 143.9 0.0 2.6 0.0 2.6 0.0 
LOMBARDIA IT200 237.0 161.2 5772.0 0.0 373.5 0.0 373.5 0.0 
TRENTINO-ALTO ADIGE IT310 215.7 161.2 551.9 0.0 29.6 0.0 29.6 0.0 
VENETO IT320 289.0 161.2 3071.3 0.0 255.8 0.0 255.8 0.0 
FRIULI-VENEZIA GIULIA IT330 304.9 161.2 610.5 0.0 55.6 0.0 55.6 0.0 
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EMILIA-ROMAGNA IT400 215.9 161.2 3315.1 0.0 168.8 0.0 168.8 0.0 
TOSCANA IT510 185.2 161.2 951.6 20.7 0.0 0.0 20.7 0.0 
UMBRIA IT520 214.8 161.2 474.9 0.0 19.9 0.0 19.9 0.0 
MARCHE IT530 287.6 161.2 633.0 0.0 47.1 0.0 47.1 0.0 
LAZIO IT600 196.3 161.2 1307.7 0.0 39.7 0.0 39.7 0.0 
ABRUZZO IT710 169.6 161.2 550.8 0.0 4.3 0.0 4.3 0.0 
MOLISE IT720 224.0 161.2 259.8 0.0 11.8 0.0 11.8 0.0 
CAMPANIA IT800 202.0 161.2 1148.2 0.0 45.8 0.0 45.8 0.0 
PUGLIA IT910 226.8 161.2 1017.3 0.0 50.5 0.0 50.5 0.0 
BASILICATA IT920 160.3 160.2 465.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
CALABRIA IT930 167.5 161.2 655.3 0.0 4.1 0.0 4.1 0.0 
SICILIA ITA00 162.3 161.2 1513.8 0.7 0.7 0.0 1.4 0.0 
SARDEGNA ITB00 137.8 155.9 1647.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 37.2 
GRONINGEN NL110 354.7 161.2 861.6 0.0 74.1 0.0 74.1 0.0 
FRIESLAND NL120 214.8 161.2 1314.5 0.0 54.6 0.0 54.6 0.0 
DRENTHE NL130 321.5 161.2 894.2 0.0 72.3 0.0 72.3 0.0 
OVERIJSSEL NL210 211.9 161.2 1541.8 0.0 61.4 0.0 61.4 0.0 
GELDERLAND NL220 203.6 161.2 2344.2 0.0 81.1 0.0 81.1 0.0 
FLEVOLAND NL230 413.4 161.2 455.8 0.0 49.7 0.0 49.7 0.0 
UTRECHT NL310 211.9 161.2 469.7 0.0 18.7 0.0 18.7 0.0 
NOORD-HOLLAND NL320 277.5 161.2 737.9 0.0 50.7 0.0 50.7 0.0 
ZUID-HOLLAND NL330 289.2 161.2 809.2 0.0 57.4 0.0 57.4 0.0 
ZEELAND NL340 419.4 161.2 604.8 0.0 66.0 0.0 66.0 0.0 
NOORD-BRABANT NL410 233.0 161.2 2623.9 0.0 135.0 0.0 135.0 0.0 
LIMBURG (NL) NL420 289.3 161.2 895.9 0.0 64.7 0.0 64.7 0.0 
LISBOA E VALE DO TEJO PT130 161.0 156.2 925.0 5.4 0.0 0.0 5.4 0.0 
ALENTEJO PT140 103.6 150.9 1305.0 0.0 0.0 100.2 0.0 100.2 
ALGARVE PT150 127.0 150.9 89.8 0.0 0.0 2.8 0.0 3.1 
ENTRE DOURO E MINHO PT160 133.8 150.9 984.5 0.0 0.0 20.4 0.0 25.5 
TRAS-OS-MONTES PT170 120.9 150.9 297.8 0.0 0.0 11.8 0.0 11.8 
BEIRA LITORAL PT180 132.4 150.9 617.8 0.0 0.0 14.5 0.0 14.5 
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BEIRA INTERIEUR PT190 136.8 150.9 343.4 0.0 0.0 6.9 0.0 6.9 
ACORES PT200 142.9 150.9 498.0 0.0 0.0 4.9 0.0 4.9 
MADEIRA PT300 127.3 150.9 29.9 0.0 0.0 1.2 0.0 1.2 
STOCKHOLM SE010 182.5 161.2 92.4 2.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 0.0 
OESTRA MELLANSVERIGE SE020 160.0 159.9 1002.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
SYDSVERIGE SE040 156.9 156.8 898.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
NORRA MELLANSVERIGE SE060 173.3 161.2 334.1 4.4 0.0 0.0 4.4 0.0 
MELLERSTA NORRLAND SE070 179.7 161.2 169.1 0.0 3.6 0.0 3.6 0.0 
OEVRE NORRLAND SE080 188.5 161.2 182.4 5.4 0.0 0.0 5.5 0.0 
SMAALAND MED OEARNA SE090 143.7 155.9 905.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 11.9 
VAESTSVERIGE SE0A0 162.3 161.2 1130.1 0.1 1.3 0.0 1.3 0.0 
North East UKC00 89.3 150.9 1218.2 0.0 0.0 177.5 0.0 177.5 
North West (incl. Merseyside) UKD00 88.5 150.9 2139.0 0.0 0.0 309.5 0.0 313.6 
Yorkshire and The Humber UKE00 112.9 150.9 2380.5 0.0 0.0 155.5 0.0 155.5 
East Midlands UKF00 127.1 150.9 2088.2 0.0 0.0 73.0 0.0 73.0 
West Midlands UKG00 100.5 150.9 2051.5 0.0 0.0 206.9 0.0 206.9 
Eastern UKH00 182.4 156.2 2086.5 76.0 0.0 0.0 76.0 0.0 
South East UKJ00 120.0 150.9 1917.7 0.0 0.0 93.9 0.0 93.9 
South West UKK00 102.1 150.9 3920.6 0.0 0.0 376.0 0.0 376.0 
Wales UKL00 78.8 150.9 3862.6 0.0 0.0 703.5 0.0 770.4 
Scotland UKM00 116.8 150.9 8473.2 0.0 0.0 480.4 0.0 480.4 
Northern Ireland UKN00 91.8 150.9 3003.2 0.0 0.0 405.5 0.0 410.3 
Source: own calculations; simulation scenario 85 % emission standard and emission trade; year 2001. 
* Initial permit prices are in line with the MAC15% results in App. 8.2. 
** Purchases inland are equal to sales inland for a Member State. 
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Appendix 10 Impact of transaction costs on emission trading (sensitivity 
analysis) 
TCin/TCout 0 € 5 € 10 € 50 € TCin/TCout 0 € 5 € 10 € 50 €
0 € 0.743 1.077 2.872 2.203 0 € 6.899 6.288 5.440 4.004
5 € 0.000 0.693 0.952 1.859 5 € 7.664 6.555 5.984 3.318
10 € 0.000 0.000 0.688 1.332 10 € 7.645 7.248 6.169 4.876
50 € 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.274 50 € 7.645 7.248 6.857 3.658
%transaction costs / transaction value Total transaction Costs (Mio €)
TCin/TCout 0 € 5 € 10 € 50 € TCin/TCout 0 € 5 € 10 € 50 €
0 € 0.0% 3.1% 6.4% 29.4% 0 € 0.000 31.449 54.406 200.202
5 € 0.0% 3.1% 6.4% 28.4% 5 € 0.008 36.241 66.600 175.245
10 € 0.0% 3.1% 6.2% 29.7% 10 € 0.008 36.241 68.569 257.169
50 € 0.0% 3.1% 6.2% 27.4% 50 € 0.008 36.241 68.569 196.600  
Source: own calculations (repeated simulations for year 2001 with a 15% emission standard and trading of emission 
permits). 
TCin = Unitary transaction costs for trade within national borders (rows). 
TCout = Unitary transaction costs for trade with foreign regions (columns). 
